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THE NATURE AND EFFECT OF CORPORATE VOTING 
IN CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZA TXON CASES 
David A rthur S k eel, Jr. * 
INTRODUCTION 
BANI(R UPTCY theo~y became somet~ing of a cottage industry in the 1930s. Even berore the econo.m1c slump that marked our 
transition to the current decade quickly converted hordes of real 
estate and merger and acquisition attorneys into bankruptcy attor-
neys, it seemed that every legal scholar with interests remotely related 
to bankruptcy had something to say about the relatively recently 
enacted Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. 1 Almost without exception, 
that commentary focuses upon the role of bargaining in a chapter 11 
reorganization. Although bankruptcy scholars disagree as to the 
appropriate role of bankruptcy bargaining, 2 they take as a given that 
* Assistant Professor of Law, Temple University. I am grateful to Alice Abreu, George 
Cohen, Saul Levmore, Laura Little, Lynn LoPucki, Ed Rock, Bob Scott, and Bill Woodward 
for helpful comments on earlier drafts. Financial support for this research was provided by the 
Temple University School of Law. 
I Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at II U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1988)). 
My principal concern throughout the Article is with the reorganization provisions set forth in 
chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code, II U.S. C. §§ 1101-1174 ( 1988), and in particular with 
corporate reorganizations invol ving large, publicly held firms. Hereinafter, Bankruptcy Code 
provisions will be cited as: "Bankruptcy Code § -." 
2 Thomas Jackson proposed a "creditors' bargain" model of bankruptcy in the early 1980s, 
and he and Douglas Baird elaborated upon the model thereafter. Baird and Jackson argue that 
the purpose of bankruptcy is to provide a collective proceeding for resolving without alteration 
the parties' diverse entitlements. See, e.g., Douglas G. Baird, The Uneasy Case for Corporate 
Reorganizations, 15 J. Legal Stud. 127 (1986); Thomas H. Jackson, The Logic and Limits of 
Bankruptcy Law (1986); Thomas H. Jackson, Avoiding Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 Stan. L. 
Rev. 725 (1984); Thomas H. Jackson, Bankruptcy, Non-Bankruptcy Entitlements, and the 
Creditors' Bargain, 91 Yale. L.J. 857 ( 1982) [hereinafter Jackson, Creditors' Bargain] . Other 
law-and-economics scholars have suggested refinements to various aspects of Baird anc! 
Jackson's analysis. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Commentary on "On the Nature of Bankruptcy": 
Bankruptcy, Priority, and Economics, 75 Va. L. Rev. 219 (1989); Robert E . Scott, Through 
Bankruptcy with the Creditors' Bargain Heuristic, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 690 (1986) (proposing a 
"common disas ter" model as a means of explaining the persistent impulse toward 
redistribution in the Bankruptcy Code). 
Another group of commentators rejects the assumptions underlying the creditors' bargain 
model and argues instead that the model is overly simplistic and gives short shrift to values 
crucial to the bankruptcy process . See, e.g., James W. Bowers, Groping and Coping in the 
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negotiatiOilS arr1Cn1g the delJtOr 1 its creclit()fS; 2u1~i its s!)are}lcilders are 
the crux of chapter 11. 3 
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vide that only common shareholders vote, on a one-vote-per-share 
basis, 5 but corporations are free to alter this off-the-rack rule should 
they so choose. 6 Although shareholders' principal voting responsibil-
ity is to elect the directors who will oversee the activities of the firm, 
shareholders also vote on the ultimate issues facing a firm. For exam-
ple, shareholder approval is required for charter amendments and for 
fundamental corporate changes such as mergers, sales of most or all 
of a ilrm's assets, or dissolution. 7 
After a chapter 11 petition has been fi led, corporate voting is gov-
erned by a federally imposed bankruptcy system. Unlike state corpo-
ration law, chapter 11 provides only for a single, all-encompassing 
Shadow of rv1urphy"s Law: Bankruptcy Theory and the Elementary Economics of Failure, 88 
Mich. L Rev. 2097 (1990); Donald R. Korobkin, Rehabilitating Values: A Jurisprudence of 
Bankruptcy, 91 Colum. L Rev. 717 (1991); Elizabeth Warren, Bankruptcy Policy, 54 U. Chi. 
L Rev. 775 (1987). 
J See, e.g., Baird, supra note 2, at 145; Raymond T. Nim;ner & Richard B. Feinberg, 
Chapter 11 Business Governance: Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment, Trustees and 
Exclusivity, 6 Bankr. Dev. J. 1, 51 (1989). 
4 Bankruptcy Code §§ 1121-1129; see infra Part H .A. for a detailed description of these 
rules. 
s See, e.g., Dd. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 212(a) (1983). 
6 A corporation can provide in its charter for cumulative voting, vveighted voting, a 
staggered board, or almost any other designer voting term. See, e.g., id. § 102(b) (giving firms 
significant leeway in tailoring voting provisions to their needs); id. § 214 (certificate of 
incorporation may provide for cumulative voting); id. § 221 (voting rights may be given to 
bondholders and debenture holders); see also Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, 
Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L & Econ. 395, 399 (1983) (overview of corporate voting rules 
and practices). 
7 DeL Code Ann. tit 8, § 242 (1983) (charter amendments); id. § 251 (mergers); id. § 27 1 
(sales of most or all of the firm's assets); id. § 275 (dissolution). 
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vote on whether to approve or reject a reorganization plan. Also 
· · 1 1 · h r · · ..- , · , 0 , unhke state corporation .aw, w 11c ,1rints the rrancmse to tne urm s 
shareholders, chapter 11 permits every holder of a claim or intert;;st to 
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to chapter 11 's voting provisions. Tht analysis demonstrates that 
chapter i 1 's voting rules are responsive to precisely the same norma-
tive concerns that explain shareholder suffrage outside of bankruptcy. 
I conclude Part H by exploring se,_;eral positive dimensions of the 
analogy. 
In Part HI, I apply my analysis to several particularly troublesome 
chapter 11 voting issues-including sales of most or all of a firm's 
assets, directorial elections, and the supermajority requirement for 
plan approval. The analysis suggests that once in bankruptcy, sales of 
most or all of a firm's assets should be approved by a majority of the 
firm' s unsecured creditors, rather than by a court. The analysis also 
suggests that unsecured creditors, rather than shareholders, should be 
the voters in any directorial election. Finally, Part HI argues for 
replacing chapter 11 's current supermajority voting standard with 
simple majority voting to reduce the threat of a creditor's acquiring a 
blocking position and using this veto power improperly. 
In Pan IV, I address a potential objection to vesting additional vot-
ing power in unsecured creditors. The thrust of this argument is that, 
because the unsecured creditors of publicly held debtors often are 
widely dispersed, collective action problems might prevent them from 
exercising the franchise effectively and thus make it pointless to alter 
the current voting rules. Drawing on the ·work of several social scien-
tists, 8 I conduct an in-depth analysis of the parties' collective action 
dilemma in chapter 11 , and of the Bankruptcy Code's (imperfect) 
solution-chapter 11 committees. The mqmry suggests th at 
s See Russell Hardin, Collective Action (19 82); Mancur Olson , T he Logic of Collective 
Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups (2d ed. 197 1); Willi am J. Baumo!, Welfare 
Economics and the Theory of the State (2d ed. 1965). 
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unsecured credi tors would still be, as originally argued, better voters 
than judges or shareholders. 
y 
.i. IN T HE BEGINNING: SHAREHOLDER VOTiNG 
OUTSIDE OF BANKRUPTCY 
Nearly a decade ago, Kenneth Scott noted that m the "err:erging 
perspective, the 'entity' of the public corporation is rnerely a legal 
device fo r tying together an interconnecting web of contracts among 
all the suppliers of factors of production in ways th.at lo'.ver the trans-
action costs of organizing production."9 In subsequent years , this 
nexus-of-contracts perspective has provided important new insights 
into the nature of publicly held firms. 10 In this Part, I draw from this 
and related literature in developing a two-pronged contractual justifi-
cation for the observation that, outside of bankruptcy, in the vast 
majority of publicly held corporations the franchise is exercised by a 
single class of common shareholders under a one-share, one-vote allo-
cation. 11 My two-pronged analysis brings together the somewhat 
divergent insights of, among others, Frank Easterbrook, Daniel F is-
9 Kenneth E. Scott , Corporation Law and the American Law Institu te Corporate 
Governance Project, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 927, 930 (1983). The origins of this perspective date to 
R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 (1937). 
10 E.g ., Symposium, Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 Colum. L. Rev . 1395 
( 1989) (debating whether corporate law is enabling, as the nexus-of-contracts advocates argue, 
or mandatory). 
I I As noted, corporations enjoy significant freedom to alter this off-the-rack rule. Close 
corporations in particular often adopt one or more special voting provisions. In the vast 
majority of publicly held corporations, however, the franchise is exe rcised by a single class of 
common stockholders. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 399-400. 
The recent spate of dual class recapitalizations casts an interesting li ght on this observation. 
In the face of th e takeover wave of the 1980s, the managers of numerous publicly held 
corporations sought to insulate themselves by effecting, through exchange offers, a division of 
their firm 's stock into two classes: one class typically would have greater vot ing rights and be 
controlled by management; the other class typica lly would have lesser voting rights but offer 
larger dividends. Several commentators decried this development and called on the Securities 
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") to restrict such dual class recapitalizations. See, e.g. , 
Jeffrey N . Gordon, Ties that Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of 
Shareholder Choice, 76 Cal. L. Rev . I (1988) (arguing that firms de listed from the New York 
Stock Exchange for deviating from the one-share, one-vote norm should be prohibi ted from 
listing on another exchange). The SEC's response, Rule 19c-4, 17 C.F. R. § 240. 19c-4 (1990), 
effectively banned dual class recapitalizations bu t subsequently was in validated . Business 
Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1990) . Dual class recapita lizations are 
exceptional and thus do not undermine the suggestion that most firm s limit vot ing to a single 
class of shares in that they occur predominantly in firms with an unusually high percentage of 
fam ily ownership. See Gordon, supra, at 44-46; Peter N. Flocos, Comment , Toward a 
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chel , ! 2 and Oliver '\Villiamson. 13 In this Part, I also address share-
holders' collective action problems and the issue of whether 
shareholders care about their voting rights. The analysis of this Part 
wi11 then be used, in Part H, to examine the voting rules imposed by 
chapter 11 . 
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The first ,Drong of the contractual analvsis of comorate voting is th e: 
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link between agency costs and the choice of shareholders as keepers of 
the franchise. 14 In corporations, agency costs stem from the diver-
gence of interests between shareholders, who theoretically mvn the 
corporation, and the managers, who run the corporation.15 More 
generally, agency costs exist whenever a decisionmaker will not reap 
the full benefit or bear the full cost of her decisions, and thus 1acks the 
appropriate incentives. Because shareholders have no stake in a cor~ 
poration's assets until all other claimants have been paid in full, share-
holders are the firm's residual owners so iong as the firm remains 
solvent. The significance of this residual ownership status from an 
agency cost perspective is that it invests shareholders with decision-
Liability Rule Approach to the "One Share, One Vote" Controversy: An Epitaph for the 
SEC's R ule 19c-4?, 138 U. Pa L Rev. 1761 (1 990). 
12 Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6; Frank H . Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischei , The 
Corporate Contract, 89 Colum. L Rev. 1416 (1989). 
IJ See Oliver E. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 Yale LJ. 1197 (1984) (hereinafter 
Williamson, Corporate Governance]; Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using 
Hostages to Support Exchange, 73 Am. Econ . Rev. 519 (1983); Oliver E. Williamson, 
Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & Econ. 233 
(1979) [hereinafter Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics]. 
14 Identifying agency costs is the central insight of the nexus-of-contracts theorists. Seminal 
contributions to this literature include Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the T heory of 
the Firm, 88 J. PoL Econ. 288 (1980); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of 
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. F in. Econ. 305 
(1976); Oliver E. Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business Behavior, 53 Am. Econ. 
Rev. 1032 (1963). Easterbrook and Fischel first applied the insights of agency cost anal ysis to 
corporate voting. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6. In the discussion that follows I d raw 
liberally from their analysis, which has become the standard neoclassical account of corporate 
voting. 
15 Shareholders ' delegation of authority to the firm' s day-to-day managers is indi rect. 
Shareholders elect directors, see, e.g., DeL Code Ann. tit. 8, § 211 (1983), who then hire the 
officers who oversee the ordinary operations of the firm , see, e.g ., id. § 142. 
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1 . . . . 1 ~ 1... • 1:" ma.:.::mg mcentJ.ves supenor to tnose or any otHer consntaency 01 the 
finil.16 
Consider the following ill ustration comparing shareholders' and 
d .t ' . ~ · th t f. ' ~ . .. . ere• 1 ors mcenuves : assume i,a._ a corporac1on s assc LS curren dy are 
,,vorth $200, that the cmporation owes a bank $125, that a bond-
holder, ·whose claim is subordinated to that of the bank, is o-wed $50, 
and that the so!e shareholder has a claim to the $25 residuai; assume 
funher that the corporation is presen ted wi th an investment opportu-
. '. ' ·c • . -o·-rr h ' . "11, ruty, wmcn, u pursued, carnes a ) ~~o c 1ance tne corporatmn WL oe 
">VOrth $300 in one year but also a 50% chance the corporation will be 
worth only $150. Clearly, the wealth-maximizing response would be 
to pursue the opportunity because the present value of the opportu-
nity is $225 ($25 more than the current value of the firm). 17 It is far 
from obvious, however, that either the bank or the bondholder would 
encourage the corporation to undertake the venture. T he bank is 
likely to be indifferent to the opportunity because its claim will be 
paid regardless and it gets no benefit from any upside potential. The 
bondholder, on the other hand, will actively oppose the venture 
because the opportunity creates a 50% chance that she will lose one-
half of her claim whereas she currently expects payment in full. Only 
the shareholder, whose expected residual interest will increase from 
$25 to $50, can be expected to view the venture with enthusiasmY 
Shareholders' decisionmaking incentives also are better than those 
of the managers of the firm, who typically own only a small percent-
age of the firm's stock and thus do not feel the full impact of their 
'6 See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, Corporate Law§ 9.5, at 389-90 (1986); Easterbrook & Fischel, 
supra note 6, at 403-06. 
17 The value of the opportunity equals the sum of e11ch possible value discounted by the 
probability of its occurrence. Thus, in the example, the value equals ($300 X .50)+ ($150 X 
.50) = $150 + $75 = $225. For the sake of simplicity, I have assumed risk neutrality and 
have ignored the time value of money. 
18 To be sure, shareholders' incentives are not perfect. Shareholders may, especiall y if the 
firm is in a precarious financial condition, encourage the firm to pursue undu ly risky ventures 
because much of the risk of such ventures would be bome by higher prim;ty creditors, such as 
the bondholders. Risk-taking of this sort effects a redistribution from creditors to 
shareholders, for shareholders enjoy much of the upside potential but little of the downside 
risk. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 404; Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A 
New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 549-53 (1983); infra Part 
III.A. (detailed discussion of this observation and its implications for corporate voting in the 
bankruptcy context) . Moreover, even appropriate risk-taking by the shareholders may have 
third-party effects, as is illustrated by the bondholder's potential exposure in the hypothetical. 
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decis1o:tllnalzirlg. In recent years, sor[lt iirrns :have a~tem pt:~ c~ to 
- . i . ' • t. i i • l"" .. • reallgn tne1r managers mcen 1ves tnrougl1 a vanety or stoc l< opt10n 
1 ' d" . . ' . . . t. Dlans anc ov coor •matmg even managers' oa:se compensatiOn vvrth t11e , -
--> -..-~ -~~ ~-- ~c. o+ d~o firm'n -oto~k 19 The [P~" ?'"' co····-ov"' '"S'' --..,n~ ~,-ni·-a pel .!. VlL J. "..,...<..ll\.....,... 1 l l ). '-' _. lJ.. 1 ~ 0 L- • . . ..,:..,.., c ... t l ..- . l 1 t.t J v.i ... 1 ~v~ .... ; .. ~L- t.:A .._ _ _ , _t.ti: ' 
· , r · · · ·1 · ti1e f' ercerveQ excesses Ol management corn1)ensatlon prov1dcs tei11ng 
evidence t hat fhese rneastlres h_ave not 1::et~n fu ll::/ ttTective.20 
J\gency costs also explain in part the te11dency to limit >;oting to 
' T ·"' ' .h ld . . . 1 . r ., -one vote per snare. -~.r snare. OH ers have a ::,Ing ,e vme wr e2cn share 
of stock, their voting power mirrors their econo:-;1. ic incen tives. By 
' . ,.. d" . . . . contras t, tne creat1on or · ·lsproporttonate 1/0t1 r1g po\ver 1ntrod t1ces 
additional agency costs. Shareholders with more than one vote per 
share of s tock will not receive gains or losses commensurate with the 
influence they wield and therefore cannot be expected to make: opti--
mal d ecisions on behalf of the corporation. :; ; In sum, because share-
holders have decisionmaking incentives superior to managers and all 
other constituencies, they appropriately hold a monopoly of the 
franchise outside of the bankruptcy context. 
19 See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers' Discretion and Investors' ·w-elf:Om:: 
Theories a fl d Evidence, 9 Del. J. Corp. L. 540, 559-62 (1984) (arguing that compensation 
packages such as stock option plans improve managers' dec isionm aking incentives); Daniel R . 
Fischel, T he " Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent D evelopments in 
Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. Rev. 913, 9 18-1 9 (!982) (same). 
20 See, e.g., Karen W. Arenson, The Boss: Underworked and Overpaid?, N.Y. Ti mes, Nov. 
1 7, 199 1, § 7 (Book Reviews), at 11 (reviewing Graef S. Crysta l, In Search of Excess: The 
Overcompensation of American Executives ( 1991 )). 
21 T he problem of disproportionate incentives may also help explain courts' longstanding 
aniipathy toward attempts to buy votes without also buying the shares to which the votes 
attach. See Macht v. lvferchants Mortgage & Cred it Co , 194 A. 19 (Del. Ch. 1937); 
Easterbrook & F ischel, supra note 6, a t 410-11. But see Schreiber v. Carney, 447 A .2d 17 
(Del. Ch. 1982) (purchase of voting rights without transfer of stock is not necessarily illegal); 
Wincorp Realty Invs. v. Goodtab, Inc., No. 7314 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1983) (reported at 8 Del. 
J. Corp. L. 63 6 (1983)) (agreement between shareholders involving sale of voting righ ts is not 
ill egal per se); Thomas J. Andre, Jr., A Preliminary Inqu iry into the Utility of Vote Buying in 
the Iviarket fo r Corpc,rate Control, 63 S. Cal. L. Rev. 53_?, ( 1990) (arguing th at vote buying 
provides both bidders and stockholders with an additio nal financial incen ti ve); Robert C. 
Clark , Vote Buying and Corporate Law, 29 Case W. Res. L. Re v. 776 (1979) (arguing in favo r 
of permitting "equity-centered" vote buying); Henry G. f.1ia nne, Some Theoreti cal Aspects of 
Share Voting: A n Essay in Honor of Adolf A . Berle, 64 Coium. L. Rev. 1427 (1964) 
(conclud ing tha t vote selling is invaluable to the functioning of the United States corporate 
system). See in fra note 223 for a more de tailed discussion of vot e buying. 
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The S<::'.::ond prong of the contractual analysis focuses on the nature 
' ' 1 ., . • . , 1 ' 1 • • " .\ r m tne CCH1tracttl8. l re1at10nshlp oetween snareno_ders arto nrms. il:,any 
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'. 1 ' 1 1 ;r 4' ' . Sll ~ppllers ~ :eiJCiers, ar1o ernp oyees. iL1 these <Jf1 _go111g corrtracts 
requir~ i:nvestrnent in contract-specific assets or skills, they rnay give 
:cise to bilatersJ morwpolies- that is, each of the varties -will have a . ' 
strong incentive to preserve the relationship, rather than to reenter 
the rnarketplace at the cost of losing any transaction··specific asset and 
being forced to redevelop it in a subsequent contract . 22 T he danger in 
any bils.tersJ monopoly situation is that one party will later behave 
opportunistically23 in an effort to appropriate the monopoly gain .24 
A similar long-term contractual relationship exists between share-
holders and fi rms, even though shares of stock in publicly held corpo-
rations frequently change hands. 2 5 Unlike other constituencies, 
however, shareholders cannot with relative ease safeg uard against 
opportunism by the firm's managers. Employees who have developed 
(or vvill develop) firm-specific skills, for example, can contract for sev-
erance pay or unionize;26 this minimizes the danger that the fi rm will 
terminate them prematurelyY Similarly, suppliers who make firm-
specific investments can require progress payments or a price pre-
22 Williamson, Corporate Governance, supra note 13, at 1202; Williamson, Transaction-
Cost Economics, supra note 13; see also Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured 
Financing, 86 Colum. L Rev. 90 1 ( 1986) (analyzing the specialized rela tionsh ip that develops, 
and is encouraged by article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC"), between a debtor 
and its principal lender). 
23 The terms "opportunism " and " strategic behavior" as used in the tex t denote 
inappropriate behavior, that is, behavior that exceeds the bounds of ordinary arms-length 
bargai ning. Williamson defines opportunism as "self-interest seeking with guile. " O liver E. 
Wiiliamson, The Economic Inst itutions of Capitalism 47 (1985). 
24 Williamson, Corporate Governance, supra note 13, at 1202-05. This prob lem arises only 
if transaction-specific assets (such as customized equipment or job-spec ific employ ment skills) 
are at stake. O therwise, both pa rties can transfer their assets to another contrac t at low cost in 
the event the relationship breaks clown. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott , Principles of 
Relational Contracts , 67 Va. L R ev. 1089, 1100-01 (1981). 
25 Williamson, Corporate Governance, supra note I 3, at 1210. 
26 See Michael L. Wachter & George M . Cohen, The Law and Economics of Collecti ve 
Bargaining: A n Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Parti al 
Closu re, and Relocation, 136 U. Pa. L Rev. 1349 (1 98 8). 
27 The firm itself is similarly protected because employees who quit p rem aturely may forfeit 
unvested pension benefits and accrued vacation days. Williamson , Corporate G overnance, 
supra note 13, at 1208. 
.. 
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mium, and bondholders are protected both by a plethora of bond CO'i" 
enants .and by the right to renegotiate their relationship with the firm 
(or to walk away) at the end of the bond term. Lenders protect them·· 
selv,::s not only with provisions defining breach of a covenant or war-
ranty as a default, but also with broadly worded insecurity clauses 
that authorize: tbe lender to accelerate the debtor's loan if the lender 
loses faith in the debtor's ability to service the debt. 2 8 
B-:;cartse the relationship between shareholders and the firm is not 
subject to periodic renewal, shareholders do not have the same ability 
to renegotiate. 29 In addition, because their investment in a firm. c~1.n ·· 
not be traced to any particular assets, shareholders also are unable to 
create asset-based safeguards. 30 The shareholders' vulnerability is noi: 
absolute. They do have access to a small repertoire of specific safe-
guards, such as charter provisions and information requirements, but 
these safeguards provide only limited protection. Unfortunately, it is 
all too easy for management to amend the corporate charter31 or to 
limit the usefulness of the information that shareholders receive. 
The threat of opportunism in this context provides further support 
for the choice of shareholders as voters. 32 Because the nature of their 
relationship with the firm precludes the adoption of a specific, local-
ized governance structure to prevent strategic behavior, shareholders 
rely on their voting rights and, in particular, on their right to choose 
2s The UCC imposes significant restraints on the breadth of creditors' insecurity clauses, 
however. Most importantly, U.C.C. § 1-208 permits a creditor to exercise such a clause only if 
she " in good fa ith believes that the prospect of payment or performance is impaired ." Courts 
have occasionally applied this "good faith belief in impairment" requirement in other contexts 
as well. See, e.g., Brown v. Avemco lnv. Corp., 603 F .2d 1367, 1375-80 (9th Cir. 1979) 
(applying the requirement to a due-on-lease default clause). These limitations support the view 
that credi tors are not fully protected by contract. 
29 Will iamson, Corporate Governance, supra note 13, at 1210. An individual shareholder 
can of course sell her shares, but the terms of the rights associated with the shares will not 
change in the hands of the buyer, who will likewise be unable to negotiate. 
30 !d. 
31 T he firm's managers cannot amend its charter without shareholder approval, but in most 
contexts collective ac tion problems will preclude effective opposition by shareholders . See 
infra Part I. C. for a furth er discussion of shareholders' collective action problems. 
J2 Although the contractual safeguard analysis developed in this Section com plements the 
agency cost/residua! ownership perspective discussed in the previous Section, the two start 
from somewhat different premises . The contractual safeguard analysis questions an important 
assumption of the residual ownership version of the agency cost perspective-that the markets 
in which a corporation contracts are fully competitive-and focu ses on pa rti es' efforts to 
minimize the transaction costs that result from such incomplete competition (as when bi lateral 
monopolies develop) . 
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\YiU monitor the behavior of management on their 
idea also explains t he one-share, one-vote rule. If a 
shareholder had less than one vote per sh are of stock, the value of the 
contractual :_safeguard v;cmld be diminished. It is precisely thi s con-
cern that lies at the heart of the recent controversy m~er dual class 
recapitaliza tions. 
John Coffee has recently underscored the intuition that creditors 
and employees, not'vVithstanding the apparent effectiveness of their 
safeguards, also may be exposed to the threat of manage:ment oppor-
tunism. 34. Coffee frames his analysis as a reconsideration of the puzzle 
of firms' use of free cash flow. Commentators have long viewed with 
suspicion managers' tendency to retain or reinvest free cash flow even 
when it seems inefficient to do so. Managerialists and transaction cost 
economists both have attempted to explain such behavior as "empire 
building" by managers. 35 Coffee suggests that an altemative explana-
tion is equally plausible. Coffee argues that, over and above the firm's 
explicit contracts with creditors and employees, managers implicitly 
may have promised to protect these stakeholders' interests by retain-
ing cash flow rather than distributing it to shareholders as dividends. 
The advent of "bust up" takeovers destabilized the implicit bargains, 
however. Faced with the threat of a takeover, managers often 
arranged their mvn leveraged buyouts, thus diverting the firm's cash 
flow to its former shareholders and perhaps breaching the managers' 
unwritten contract with the firm's creditors and employees. 36 
33 Wiliiamson, Corporate Governance, supra note 13, at 1210-11. Therefore, eliminating 
shareholders· voting rights iikely increases the firm ·s cost of capital. The firm might minimize 
this effect by giving its shareholders the option of converting their stock into debt. 
34 See John C. Coffee. Jr., Unstable Coalitions: Corporate Governance as a Multi-Player 
Game, 78 Geo. L.J. 1495 (1990). Coffee's focus is on the existence and limitations of implicit 
contracting in the corporate context. The expl icit bargains struck by creditors and employees 
also may afford inadequate protection against strategic behavior, as when the firm uses 
bankruptcy as a means of evading its contractual obiigations. See, e.g., Joel Kurtzman. 
Business Diary: Those Irksome Gas Contracts, N.Y. Times, Aug. 4, 199!, § 3, at 2 (Columbia 
Gas System files for chapter II relief to force renegotiation of long-term natural gas contracts, 
which, because of a drop in natural gas prices, required it to pay up to five times the then-
current market price). 
35 Coffee, supra note 34. at 1500. For examples of the managerialist approach, see Vvilliam 
J. Baurnol, Business Behavior, Value and Growth (!959); Merritt B. Fox, Finance and 
Industrial Performance in a Dynamic Economy (1 987); Willi amson, supra note 14. 
36 The principal problem with implicit contracting in this context is that managers can 
defect without compensating the parties injured by their defection. CotTee, supra note 34, at 
1535. But see Edward B. Rock, Corporate Law Through an Antitrust Lens, 92 Colum. L. 
.. 
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sha:rel1old.(::rs sl~are the1r voti:ng rights? Jrhc_t is , st~otllrl cred.itc;rs a.nd 
• 1 b . - ., ' "! 1 1 ~ en1p1oyees a1so 't entxt1eo t.o VCY[ e ~;. ncl to oe rer)resentect 011 tt.i_<.; 
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represen tatives tlStJa:l.ly control1c:(l {>~)?~r -jc .~~n.d other vc:tirtg otttccJr;.'1eS; 
shareholders' crJntract11al saf~:suards ar1cl d.ecisio11rnakir1g atlfhority 
would be undermined by the pr:::s.:nce of constituencies with poten.·· 
tially confl icting interests. 
Second, multiple-constituency representation v;ould affect 
adversely the decisionmaking apparatus of the corporation as a ·whole. 
The inefficiencies created by the presence of multiple decisionmakers 
are well documented in the literature. I"Jot only would each constitu-
ency tend to divert the attention of the board to its own operating-
level comDlaints, but when the multiule decisionmakers d]d consider . . 
Rev. (forthcoming April 1992) (q uestioning Coffee's normat ive assumption that coalitions are 
desirable). 
37 See, e.g., L.C.B. Gower, J.B. Cronio. A.J . Easson & Lord Wedderburn of Charlton, 
Gower's Principles of Modern Company Law 9-1! (4th ed. 1979); Ciyde W. Summers, 
Ccdetermination in the United States: A Projection of Problems and Potentials, 4 J. Comp. 
Corp. L. & Sec. Reg. 155, 170 (1982). The argumen t in favor of extending the franchise 
arguabiy derives from the historical debate over whether d irectors owe duties to ali of the 
COflStituencies of a firm. See E. Merrick Dodd, Jr.. For Whom are Corporate Managers 
Trustees'', 45 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1932). The "other constituency" debate has gained new 
currency in recent years, largely :ts a r~sponse to the takeover 'Nave of the 1980s. See, e.g., 
ABA Committee on Corporate Laws, Other Constituencies Statutes: Potential for Confusion, 
45 Bus. Law. 2253 (1990) (cri ticizing states' adoption, as a means of preventing unwanted 
takeovers, of statutes that permit managers to take other constituencies in to account when 
making decisions on behalf of the firm). In terest in gly , employees have shown a much greater 
interest than either bondholders or other cred itors in protecting themselves through 
representation on the board of directors. Cofl'ee suggests that employees' greater concern with 
the identity of the firm 's managers results from their having a less viable exit option. Coffee, 
supra note 34, at !52!. Em ployees an: also particularly vulnerable to the effect of' 
informational asymmetries vi:>-a-vis the lirm and seek representation in part to ensure ongoing 
access to relevant information. Williamson, Corpo rate Governance, supm note 13, a t 1208-09. 
Employees' inability to diversify mr, y al so be a factor. 
472 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 78:461 
larger issues, they also would be unlikely to produce a consistent set 
of management and policy choices. 38 
F inally, the firm would incur significant informational costs in edu-
cating the additional constituencies as to the strategies and operations 
of the 11rm. In short, expansion of the franchise would generate costs 
that appear to outweigh its utility. 39 A contractu:J.l safeguard analysis 
therefore supports the view that shareholders should retain their 
monopoly on voting rights. 
C. The Collective Action Dilemma in Corporate Voting 
Having established a double-edged normative justification for 
shareholders' privileged status with respect to voting, it is time to con-
sider how useful shareholders' voting rights prove in practice. As has 
frequently been noted, significant obstacles hinder effective collective 
action by the shareholders of a publicly held firm. 
The first obstacle is rational apathy. Shareholders, or their agents, 
must incur significant costs if they wish to cast their vote on any given 
proposal in an intelligent fashion. These costs include, at the least, 
the costs of securing relevant information, of developing the capacity 
to evaluate such information, and of actually evaluating the proposal 
at hand (or of hiring an agent to perform these tasks) .40 If the 
expected payout to a shareholder from informed voting is less than 
the total of these costs, even a rational shareholder would forgo the 
benefits of informed voting, because the shareholder will be better off 
if she simply returns the proxy provided by management and lets 
management cast her vote. 
Free riding discourages collective action even in contexts where the 
benefits of informed voting outweigh the costs of becoming an 
informed voter. Widely dispersed shareholders rarely will incur the 
costs of informing themselves because each knows she will share 
equally in the benefits of informed voting by her fe llow shareholders 
38 Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Indi vidual Values (2d ed. 1963); Easterbrook & 
Fischel, supra note 6, at 405; Williamson, Corporate Governance, supra note 13, at 1206. 
39 My conclusion that creditors and employees should not enjoy voting rights does not 
mean to suggest that it would never be appropriate to address manage ria l opportunism in 
other ways . See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 34, at 1548 (suggest ing tha t corporate stakeholders 
should be compensated for the losses suffered as a result of management's breach of implicit 
cont racts in th e takeover context). 
40 See Manne, supra note 21, at 1440. 
• 
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even if she does not bother to vote in an informed fashion hersel f. ~ 1 
The likelihood of free riding thus creates a classic prisoner's dilemma: 
it is in shareholders' collective best interest for each shareholder to 
fully inform herself, but the individually rational strategy for most 
shareho1ders is not to do so.42 Faced with these barriers, shareholders 
are •:r,ore likely simply to sell their shares than to incur the costs of 
becor:c, ing an informed voter and of organizing opposition to manage·-
n 
.... o ·l t- .,..., . r ,"J. i\1\Cal r..:: 
t!_.t .• L 1-' .:1.'- ' ~Jv.:) .h..J • 
Given the dan1pening effect of collective action problems on mean-
in?fu] shareholder particioation in most contexts, one might question 
~ :J J,. • 
whether shareholders care about their voting rights. Focusing on the 
constituencies who hold competing (and superior) claims to the assets 
of the firm suggests a partial explanation for the suspicion that , even 
in the face of these collective action problems, shareholders would not 
gladly relinquish the franchise. Simply stated, someone must vote, 
and what shareholders want is for the votes to be held and cast by 
parties with interests similar to theirs. 43 Shareholders may be content 
to live with the chilling effect of collective action problems on their 
efforts to organize, no matter how severe, because their retention of 
the voting right ensures that adverse parties will not possess it. 
Another reason shareholders value the franchise is because of its 
particular importance to the market for corporate control. Takeover 
bidders typically offer current shareholders a significant premium 
41 Free riding comprises a pair of related problems. The first is the im possibility of 
exclusion: shareholders who inform themselves, and then organize other shareholders either 
for or against a given proposal, cannot prevent those who do not bother to inform th emselves 
from sharing in the benefits of their efforts. Second, there is no obvious means of compelling 
all shareholders to contribute to the costs of voting in an informed fashion. See Gordon, supra 
note 11, at 44 n.142. The proxy contest reimbursement rules are designed to help overcome 
these problems by taxing the costs of a proxy fight to the firm, but as a practical matter 
insurgents are not compensated unless their action both is successful and results in a change in 
control of the firm. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 29 1 
(N.Y. 1955); Clark, supra note 21, at 782. 
42 Clark, supra note 16, § 9.5, at 391-93. Hardin has demonstrated that the logic of the 
prisoner's dilemma, which game theorists originally developed in the context of two-person 
games, applies equally to multiplayer games. Hardin, supra note 8, at 27-28; Russell Hardin, 
Collective Action as an Agreeable n-Prisoners' Dilemma, 16 Behav. Sci. 4 72 (1971 ). 
43 I am grateful to Saul Levmore for this insight. The shareholders' concern is both that 
other consti tuencies' interests may diverge from their own and also that, if th ese constituencies 
do not face equally debilitating coll ect ive action problems, they may be ab le to ac t successfully 
upon those interests . 
474 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 78:46 1 
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buy the sharehoiders' voting rights, which are necessary for a success-
ful ass~rtion of control. The desire to be on the receiving end of such 
a takeover premillm ft1rther explains \Vlty sharel1olrl-~rs r11ay care 
,-l a c. ·;~] 'I " 1; -q< t dv~ f': .. r. r. C-~~ i<;'? 45 
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Fina!I~/ J rer:en.t tren.ds suggest a sorrte\vhat differe11t vie\v o:Z" t:he col-
lective action problern and whether it reduces the large majority of 
C'0.f·norr·1-w votes ·'" o r_. ITl~ -.~o -Formal~ty --ro at- ·D"'~'::"-c~Qil-p tL·o cw. dc:. ·vc-.1~ vV .t Ch •,~ . l<. I_ '-' .1 '-'- '-' ~ L ~h,, _.. ·.tJ : l C tCcL~ _1.\<..CJ<.,. • ,, ' ,; up-
ments, Uln~;i der first Russell Hardin's analysis of collectiv ::: ::-tction. 
Borrowii~g his terminology from T homas Schell ing, H ardin has 
described the smallest subgroup of a larger group for whom it would 
be rational to ensure that the larger group provides a collective good46 
h .,, ...... · 1-. · 1 \ "'1 H , · . as t e smzuest emcacwus suugroup, or (K; . ..aram demonstrates 
that as the ra tio of the collective-good benefits to costs increases, the 
size of this subgroup decreases. 48 For shareholders, the collective 
good is informed voting. 49 Because the benefits to a shareholder of 
informed voting increase with an increase in the extent of her share-
44 See Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 Stan. L Rev. 597, 601 
(1989); Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" 
Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 891, 892 (1988). Cornm.::ntators 
dispute the source of the premiums. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. F ischel, The 
Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 Harv. L Rev. 
1161 ( 1981) (premiums reflect gai ns from sy nergy and improved management) with Lynn A. 
Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really P remiums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate 
Law, 99 Ya;;:: LJ. 12 35 (1990) (premiums may reflect price pressure rather ihan efficiency 
gains). 
45 Bankruptcy is another specialized context where shareholders' voting rights may prove 
important. Shareholders may be able to compel a shareholders' meeting in chapter 1 1 and to 
employ this ability strategically. See infra Part IILB. for a more detailed discussion of 
shareholders' right to compel a shareholders' meetiP.g; see also Lynn M. LoPucki & William 
C. Whitford, Shareholders Unite! There's Leverage in Delaware, X ABI Newsletter 18, 19 
(July 1991) (suggesti ng that shareholders may wish to cause the firm's chapter 11 petiti on to be 
filed in Delaware. rather than New York, due to the greater probability in Delaware that they 
will be permitted to call a shareholders' meeting). 
-lo A coliective good is one characterized by impossibility of excl usion; that is, if a group 
supplies such a good, the members who contributed to its provision cannot prevent members 
who did not from sharing in the benefits of the good. Hardin, supra note 8, at 19. 
47 I d. at 41 (citing Thomas C. Schelling, IV1icromotives and Macrobehavior 213-43 ( !978); 
Thomas C. Schelling, Hockey Helmets, Concealed Weapons, and Dayl ight Saving: A Study of 
Binary Choices with Externaliti es, 17 J. Conflict R esol. 38 i ( 197 3)) . 
48 I d . at 40-4 i. See infra Part IV for further discussion of the dynamics of (k), the smallest 
efficacious subgroup, and its sign ificance for groups' efforts to act collectively. 
49 Edward Rock's more precise definition of informed voting is " disciplining." Edward B. 
Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo . 
1 ... 
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holdings, the smallest efficacious subgroup also decreases m size as 
the concentration of shareholdings increases. Thus, the likelihood 
that shareholders will overcome th e collective action problem 
depends, at least in part , on the exte nt to which shareho1dings are 
concentrated in the hands of rela tively few investors . 50 
. . . • • . 1 1 . c 1 h . The dramat1c mcrease m mst1tut1ona . ownersm p 01 stocK as given 
rise to just such an increase in conce:ntration and has led m any com-
mentator::. to predict substantial inroads on the collective action prob·-
lem. These com mentators are no t prophesying in a vacuum. 
Insti tutional shareholders already have begun to take a more active 
role in corporate governance, as evidenced by the substantial support 
that many shareholder proposals--e:,;pecially those relating to take-
overs·-have received in recent years . 51 T hough commentators disa-
gree as to whether institutional investors will be effective champions 
of shareholders' interests, 52 there seems to be substantial agreement 
that institutional sharehoider activism is the direction of the future, 
and thus that the traditional view of shareholders as powerless in the 
face of the collective action dilemma is no longer fully accurate. 
I!. AFTER DISASTER: CORPORATE VoTING IN CHAPTER 11 
REORGANIZATION CASES 
Sections 1121 to 1129 of the Bankruptcy Code provide an elaborate 
network of voting rules for the purpose of regulating the chapter 11 
franchise. Commentators have considered isolated aspects of the vot-
ing ru1es53 and have also addressed various chapter 11 voting issues 
L.J. 445, 454 (i 991); see a lso Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. 
L. Rev. 520, 522 ( 1990) (defining the collective good as "shareholder voice"). 
so Rock, supra note 49, at 459. 
51 I d. at 481-84. In fiscal year 1987, 45 shareholder resolutions were approved by more than 
20% of the firm 's shareholders. Sharon Marcil & Peg O 'Hara, Voting by Inst itutional 
Investors on Corporate Governance Issues in the 1987 Proxy Season app. 55-58 ( 1987). By 
1990, this number had mushroomed to !60. 7 IRRC Corp. Governance Bull. , July-Aug. 1990, 
at 1 i 5-23. In both years the vast majority of resolutions related to takeovers. 
5" Compare Rock, supra note 49 (ex pressing skepticism as to the efficacy of ins titutional 
shareholder activism due to agency cos ts associated with their money managers) with l3lack , 
supra note 49 (adopting a more optimist ic view). 
53 See, e.g., Ethan D. Fogel , Confir ma tion and the Unimpaired Class of Creditors: Is a 
"Deemed Acceptance" Deemed an Acceptance~, 58 Am. Bankr. L.J. 151 (1984) (arguing that 
a " deemed acceptance" should sat isfy the one class accepta nce requirement for confirmation of 
a plan und er the original version of Bankruptcy Code§ 1129(a)(l0)). 
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\vithout reference to these provisions. 54 What they have not done as 
yet is consider chapter 11 suffrage as a unified 'Whole. Xn this Part, I 
bring the insights developed in Part I to bear in an effort to provide 
such an analysis . M y inquiry shows that, despite their major superfi-
cial differences, state corporate law voting rules and the: chapter 11 
voting framework are largely consistent from a ncrrn2,tive perspective. 
The voting regime is not perfect, however. I ccnsider several 
problems with the voting rules and propose possible: solutions at the 
end of the Part. To facilitate both the analysi:o rJ f this Part and its 
application to specific voting issues in Part III , K defer unti1 Part IV 
detailed discussion of the parties' collective action problems. 
A. An Overview of Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 
Chapter 11 provides a voting framework remarkably different from 
corporate voting outside of bankruptcy. The crucial distinction lies in 
section 1126(a), which states that any "holder of a claim or interest 
allowed under [section] 502 of this title ... may accept or reject a 
plan." 55 Simply put, whereas shareholders enjoy a monopoly of the 
franchise before the corporation files its petition, section 1126(a) 
establishes universal suffrage as the norm in chapter 11 ,56 at least to 
the extent the parties are voting on a reorganization plan. 
Understanding the voting regime set forth in sections 1121 to 1129 
is central to appreciating the significance of this distinction. Section 
11 23(a) provides, as a starting point, that the proponent of a reorgani-
zation plan must organize the claims against and interests in the cor-
poration into classes. 57 Section 1126 establishes a system of classified 
voting on the plan. 58 Under section 11 26(c), acceptance by creditors 
requires the approval of two-thirds in amount and a majority in 
54 See, e,g., Raymond T. Nimmer & Richard B. Feinberg, Chapter 11 Business Governance: 
Fiduciary Duties, Business Judgment, Trustees and Exclusivity. 6 BankL Dev. J. 1, 15-20 
(1989) (suggesting that sales of substantial assets prior to confirmation may allow the debtor to 
subvert the participatory, negotiated process of bankruptcy). 
55 Bankruptcy Code § 1126(a). 
56 Bankruptcy Code § 1126(!)-(g) carve out limited exceptions to this norm, See infra note 
63 and accompanying text. 
57 ld, § 1123(a) (requiring a plan proponent to designate classes of claims and interests and 
to specify any that are not impaired). 
58 Id. § 1126. 
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number of the claims in each class of credi tors. 59 Acceptance by a 
class of interests requires that two-thirds in amount of the a llovved 
interests cast their votes in favor of the plan. T hus, the emphasis of 
section 1126 rests on whether the class as a whole votes for or against 
the plan. 
Obviously, in determining which claims or interests belong in o. p 8I · 
ticular dass, the plan proponent has a tremendous incentive to choose 
• • " • , 1 ·~ h -,:; ., her classes m such a way as to ng tne vote 11 S1 e can. 1 or examp.e, 
she might place dissiden t claimants in a class v•hose other claim.ants 
can be counted upon to support the plan and carry the class. Section 
1122(a) imposes significant limitations on this sort of maneuvering, 
however, by permitting the proponent to "place a claim or an interest 
in a particular class only if such claim or interest is substantially simi-
lar to the other claims or interests of such class."60 
After the court approves the contents of the plan, including its clas~ 
sification of claims and interests, and every interested party receives 
an appropriate disclosure statement,61 the plan proponent must secure 
59 Id. § 1126(c). The "amount" of each creditor's claim is determined in accordance with 
§ 502 of the Bankruptcy Code. Id. § 1126(a). Among other things, § 502(a) requires the 
bankruptcy court to estimate the amount of a contingent or unliquidated claim, and 
§ 502(b)(5) d isallows any claim to the extent it is based on interest that is unmatured as of the 
commencement of the chapter 11 case. Interestingly, bonds and other debt instruments are 
allowed in their face amount, even if the debt is trading well below face value at the time of 
bankruptcy. In re Lorraine Castle Apartments Bldg. Corp., 149 F.2d 55 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 326 U.S. 72 8 (1945); Chaim J . Fortgang & Lawrence P. King, The 1978 Bankruptcy 
Code: Some Wrong Policy Decisions, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1148, 1161 n.57 (1981) . On the other 
hand , the unaccrued portion of original issue discount instruments is disallowed as unmatured 
interest. In re Chateaugay Corp. , 109 B.R. 51, 54.57 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990), a ff'd, 130 B.R. 
403 (S.D. NY. 1991); In re Allegheny Int'l, Inc., 100 B.R. 247, 250·52 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 
1989). 
60 Bankruptcy Code § 1122(a). The precise parameters of this requirement are uncertain. 
For example, courts have refused to permit a plan proponent to classify trade and institutional 
creditors separately where the classification was designed to ensure satisfaction of 
§ 1129(a)(IO), which requires acceptance of the plan by at least one impaired cl ass. In re P ine 
Lake Village Apartment Co., 19 B.R. 819, 828·31 (Bankr. S.D.N. Y. 1982). Yet they may be 
separatel y classified if institutional creditors agree to accept their distribution in the form of 
debt but trade creditors wish to receive cash. 5 Collier, supra note 5 9 , ~ 1122.04, at 1122·21. 
See generally Daniel C. Cohn, Subordinated Claims: Their Classification and Voting Under 
Chapter I I of the Bankruptcy Code, 56 Am. Bankr. L.J. 293 (1982) (discussing the 
enfo rcement of subordination by classi.fica tion and assignment). 
61 See Bankru ptcy Code§ 1125. Section 1125 requires that the disclosure statement contain 
" adequate information ," defined as information sufficient to "enable a hypothetical reason able 
investor . . to make an informed judgment about the plan." Id. The intent is to provide 
investors with information analogous to that required under the securities laws, wh ile at the 
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the at11rmative votes of each class of claims or interests to t:;:onfirm a 
j • • 1 61 -1 • 1 '1 -" C. I!"'\ • -, .• 
consensua~ reorgamzatwn pan. - ~ectwn · LLv\IJ prov10es, however, 
that a class that is not "impaired" under the plan is conclusively pre> 
smned to have accepted the p1an, 63 and thus the plan proponen~ JJeed 
not solicit acceptances from such a class. Ti1e language of section 
. ''I,- . . 1" d . I . • . 1 . ' . . .t 1 L,b 1s 1naJ.rect an · 1ts .teg1s!at1ve 11story 1Jnc1ear) btrt rts apparen.t 
denial to members of unimpaired classes of the right to vot2'54 consti-
tutes a significant exception to the universality of the chapter 11 
franchise. 
For a class to be unimpaired, its treatment under the plan must 
meet one of three requirements. The plan must: (1) fully preserve the 
legal, equitable, and contractual rights of each claimant; (2) cure any 
default under and reinstate the terms of each claim; or (3) pay the 
allmvecl arrwunt of each claim in full, in cash, on the effective date of 
h ' 65 -, . l 1,.., ~/f) 1 ' ' ' d " . . t .e plan. Sect10n . .d) \. , tne ·aeeme acceptance proviSion, 
reflects the drafters' conclusion that a class that meets any of these 
requirements has no grounds for complaint and thus no nf:ed to 
vote. 66 
- ---·- -------- ---------- -------
same time ensuring that the requirement not be excessively onerous for the pla n proponent. 
Report of the Committee on the Judiciary, H.R. Rep . No. 595, 95th Cong., 1. s t Sess. 226-31 
( i 977) , retHinted in 1978 U .S.C. C.A.N. 5963 [hereinafter House Repor t]. 
62 If c,ne or mor:: of the classes of claimants or interest hoiders of the firm rejects the pian, 
;he plan may still be confirmed under the cramdown provisior.s of Bankruptr;y Code§ ll29(b) . 
The most important requirement of§ 1 i29(b) is the absoluk priori ty ruie, ,,,.hich prohibits a 
cla$S of claims or interests from participating in the plan unless a li hlghe! p6or1ty c!ai rnants 
have been paid !n full. See Bankruptcy Code § ll29(b)(2)~ David l ... Sk~e l, ·rhc TJncertain 
State of an 1Jnstated Ru.k: Bankruptcy's Cont1ibution Ruie Doctrine P .. fter Ahlers, 6 3 i\m. 
Bank r. L.J. 221 , 222 (1989). 
63 ~-=:onversely, under Ban~(ruptcy Code § 1126(g), ::1 c1 as~. t1:.at ·would rcceiv~ nothing under 
:.: p!an is presumed to have: rejected the plan . 
M Fogei, supra note 53, at 154-55. Section 7-309 of the bill p roposed by the Bankruptcy 
(:ornmission stated explicitly that creditors not ~~rnateriaily and adv~:rseiy B.ff~~cted n by a plan 
v;ould not be e<1tit! ed to vote. Repo rt of the Commission on t!v~ I-lankrupccy Laws of the 
United Scates, pt. II, H.R. Doc. NG. i37, 93d ·Cong., i st Sess. 250 (1973). 
65 Ban.ki-uptcy Code § 1124. 
66 1~hat satisfaction of any on.e of the requirtineDts \vlll leave D. ·:lass uni:;.npaired does not 
r;1e~n that the requirements are intercha~geable. R.einstatillg the te rnJs of 3. bor:.d that is 
c urre ntl~..r trading \ve il belo\v face v2lue, for in stance, woakl be significant ly less costiy to the 
debtor than repaying the bondholder in full as of the eli'ectiv:: date of the pL:n. :Rather than 
pay ing its full value, in cash, the debtor could repurchase the : ·::ins:a~cd bond at its discounted 
rnarket value irnrnediately after bankruptcy. See F~oes supr2. note 13, ::.t 5~- 5 - 4 7 . 
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B. A Normative Assessment of the (Nearly) Universal 
Su;]rage of Chapter 11 
479 
T his Section looks at the chapter 11 voting rules described above 
through the lens of the contractual analysis developed in Part I. This 
return to the earlier frame,.vork addresses the question whether the 
chapter 11 fran chise is responsive to the same nonnative concerns as 
shareholder voting outside of bankruptcy, or whether chapter ll vot-
ing is of an entirely ditTerent character. 
1. Applying the Residual Ownership Prong to Chapter 11 Suffrage 
At first blush, the chapter 11 voting regime seems wholly inconsis-
tent with the residual ownership perspective on corporate voting. 
Recall that this view of corporate voting justifies shareholders' exclu-
sive right to vote as necessary to vest decisionmaking power in the 
firm's optimal decisionmakers, its residual owners. In affording every 
constituency access to the voting process, chapter 11 abandons the 
goal of limiting suffrage to the single constituency with the best deci-
sionmaking incentives. T he true residual owners vote, but so do 
numerous classes whose decisionmaking incentives are less desirable. 
The analysis is not so simple as this characterization suggests. Con-
sider first the fact that because chapter 11 not only effects a sale of the 
firm's assets, either tu its current claimants and interest holders or to 
a third party,67 but a1so compromises the claims of most or all classes 
of claimants, multiple constituency voting is inevitable. Were the vote 
concerned solely with an issue of general applicability---such as 
whether to con&ummate a saie of the firm's assets-a single class of 
claimants could make the decision on behalf of all of the firm 's con-
stituencies. But realistically the drafters of the Code could not have 
meant to give a single class of ciaims the authority to determine 
whether and how to compromise the claims of another class. A ru le 
permitting one class of creditors to alter the claims of another class 
67 Robert Clark first pointed out that the reorgani zation (and scaling down) of the debts of a 
firm is, in effect , a ";;;:de" of the firm to it s current creditors. Robert C. C lark, The 
Interd isciplinary Study of Legal Evolution , 90 Yale L.J . 1238, 1250-54 ( 198 ! ). Althm;gh 
critics of the law-and-economics school believe this an alogy ignores the multiplicity of values 
at stake in chapter 11 , see, e. g., Korobkin, supra no te 2, at 749-55, 759-6!, the meta phor is a 
useful tool for developing a fuil understanding of the complexity of chapter l!. 
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would create a huge risk of opportunistic behavior by the decision-
m aking class. 6 8 
M ore important, despite the inevitability of multiple constituency 
voting, the Bankruptcy Code still seems to focus voting aut}Jority on 
the residual class. The resid ual class is the first class thz:t will 
impaired if the p1an proponent seeks to compensate as many cb.sses ·ltl 
full as the firm' s assets will c.llow. Because unimpaired classes of 
claims or interests are deemed to accept a reorganization plan, f'-<11 
compensation eliminates the ability of a class to vote against the pl&.rL 
Therefore, the residual class will vote in nearly every chapter 11 case 
(unless the reorganization plan proposes to pay the residual owners in 
full but impairs a higher class), and its vote frequentl y wi11 prove 
pivotal. 
Admittedly, the use of deemed acceptances substitutes imperfectly 
for a precise determination of the true residual owner. In practice, for 
instance, reorganization plans often reflect negotiated compromises 
that impair all but the most senior creditors, and thus numerous con-
stituencies vote. T hat various classes participate is not inconsistent 
with the suggestion that the vote of the residual class is crucial, how-
ever, for the residual class is the highest priority class whose vote the 
plan proponent must get, given that the residual class invariably will 
be impaired . 69 
The fo llowing illustration may help clarify the analysis. Suppose 
that a corporation , with assets of $1 million, has fi led a chapter 11 
petition . Claims against the corporation total $1.3 million: $500,000 
owed to the secured creditors, and $400,000 each owed to the general 
unsecured creditors and the subordinated unsecured creditors, v;ith 
the shareholders entitled to any residual. The corporation, as debtor 
in possession, proposes a reorganization plan consisting of a sale of 
68 Such opportunism probably could be controlled only by s trictly lim it ing cne 
decisionmaker's lat itude. Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code arguably reflects such a regime. 
69 An interesting analogy can be drawn between the analysis in the text and the median 
voter theorem developed by Harold H0telling and other public choice theorists. In its simplest 
form, the median voter theorem suggests that each of the parties in a two-part)' representativ:o 
democracy will be driven toward the viewpoint of the median voter, somewhat !23 I h<'.ve 
argued that the chapter 11 voting rul es tend to focus attention on the r'~Sidual ownership class. 
The dynamics of an actual election, like those of a bankruptcy case, are much more GOmp lex 
than the unimodal, symmetric preference assumptions of the origina l model •.vould sugges t. 
Consequently, subsequent theorists have refined the theo rem to begin to account fo r som o.: of 
these complexities. See Dennis C. Mueller, Public Choice II, at 179-95 (1989) . 
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the comoration to a third narty for $1 million and distribution of the 
L L 
proceeds as fo llows: $500,000 to the secured creditors, $250,000 to the 
general unsecured creditors, $150,000 to the subordinat.':d unsecured 
creditors , and $100,000 to the shareholders. 
-.-.. -I 1 , "l • • • ,..., ~"'It "' Decause the ·p1an proposes to pay tne securec~ -~~~-ectrtots 1n I"u L~:r tney 
· . - - ' T ' - ' 1' e.re un1mpa1red and may not vote. ~ ne general LlDSf~Ct1rea crec.J.tors 
1 1 • • 1 1 • "1 • <" ~ 
rr1ay V·Ote, out tne corporation can s1.te.nce tne'ir c t~J.ss 1T r~.ecessarJ' oy 
proposing to pa.y thern their full ~400,000. 70 l~he corporation enjoys 
no such luxury >Nith respect to the subordinated unsecured creditors 
because compensating the prior two classes in full would leave only 
$100,000 for the subordinated unsecured creditors. As a result, the 
corporation cannot pass a consensual plan without the support of 
subordinated unsecured creditors/' and therefore their vote should 
play an important role in the plan process. 
The shareholders are similarly situated in that the corporation can-
not pass a consensual plan without their support. 72 The possibility of 
a cramdown tempers the importance of their vote, however. If the 
shareholders refuse to vote for a plan supported by the corporation's 
other constituencies, the corporation can threaten to amend its plan 
to comply with the absolute priority rule73 under which, in the event 
the plan proponent fails to obtain the approval of every class, no class 
of claims or interests may participate in the reorganization unless aH 
superior classes have been compensated in full. Because the share-
holders 'Would receive nothing under such a plan, and because every 
constituency is likely to be aware of this fact, the shareholders should 
have less leverage than the subordinated unsecured creditors, the 
fi rm's true residual class.74 
70 This "sil encing" process is extrem ely ex pensive, and debtors cannot usually afford to pay 
many classes in fu ll. Nevertheless, something like this does go on- senior creditors usually get 
very near their full claim. Their willingness to accept slightly less than full payment i'eflects 
their recognition that fa ilure to compromise may result in costly delay. The effect of this is, at 
least in a general way, to focus a ttent ion on unsecured creditors. 
7t Bankruptcy Code§ 1129(a)(8) (requiring acceptance by every impaired class) . 
72 Id. 
73 See id. § 1129(b)(2); supra note 62. 
74 Th is effect is vitiated if the parties do not perceive cramdovm as a viable option. See 
supra note 62; infra Part II. C. 
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2. Applying the Contractual Safeguard Prong 
to Chapter 1 j Suffrage 
(Vol. 78:46 1 
T he expanded sufFrage of chapter 11 also makes sense frorn a con-
trHctual safeguard perspective. R ecall that this view of cor~porate vot-
il1g ju.st ifles sharc11oicl\~r.s' exciusive right tc; VtJte as cz)mpe:rt satiol1 for 
sl1areh.oLjers' pec1.1liar i.nabiiity contrz~c tually to safeguard their 
interests . 7 5 
The distinction between shareholders and other constituencies in 
this regard breaks down in ban kruptcy . Several Bankruptcy Corle 
provisions significantly undermine the efficacy of other constituencies' 
contractual protections. First, the filing of a chapter 11 petition trig-
gers an automatic stay of all efforts to collect a debt from or otherwise 
enforce rights against the debtor. 76 Thus, a secured }ender loses (at 
lec.st temporarily) the right to repossess her collateral in satisfaction 
of amounts owed. Second, the Bankruptcy Code neutralizes the effect 
of ienders' default and acceleration ciauses. T he Code permits the 
firm to reinstate the maturity of a loan, notwithstanding any preban-
kruptcy defaults; 77 after bankruptcy, the lender has no choice but to 
continue a contractual relationship it otherwise would have been enti-
t led to terminate.78 Finally, bankruptcy provides management with a 
:means of forcing employees to renegotiate and make midstream con-
cessions with respect to the terms of collective bargaining agreements 
and other contracts. Despite the enactment of sections 1113 and 1 i 14 
75 See s11pra Part LB . 
n Bankruptcy Code § 362. 
n Id . S i 124 . 
iS See, e. g., Jackson, Creditors' Bargain, supra note 2, a t 887-92 (suggesting that the 
fJ:mkn!ptcy Cocte• s nonrecogni t ion of ipso fac to c la uses unde rm ines cred itors· bargain ed -for 
entitlements) . Could a lende r whose loan was reinstated attempt to accele ra te immediately 
after bankruptcy. claiming that she is "i nsecure"-th at she had a good faith belief her 
collatera l value had been impaired , as requ ired by U .C C. § 1-208? Courts likely v:ouid not 
permit such an act ion. 
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To curb t 1 1~:: perce:tveo a use oi tn1s -~.:veapo11 , · tn.e stat Ll ~~ CJI S{lC .\1 
....... . --. +- ...... (:"\ • ., .... ) ; .. , "Dr ra: 1. "b J,f,1 .l-C 30 li <>.C cS L:.Al,O.inS UJ .• Cvl.l .n n - an~. u p L y. 
1··Ievert}leless, bankw ptcy does not com plettly negat-e the effc;~t i ve­
I"less o f r:outract1.la1 safegu ards. T h oug:h th·: ;3. tltOrnatic S"tEl:'y' a:nd tb.e 
,d_ebt(Jr:·s r ~. gb.t t rJ rei11state 'lleal-<e rl the IJOstu. r~~ of cred i tc)rS~ ~ he (~\;-de 
rec<Jgni?e:.~ t"h ·e irnpc;rtance of preser\'ing creclito rs! b8 rgainc·d-~ for en_ti~· 
tler:nents. Perhaps the most significant ma:u if=s tation of this policy is 
the absolute priority rule. 8 i In a sense, the absolute priority rule sub-
stitutes for the par t ies' -bargained-for contract~ja 1 rig11tS ~ S,ecure.d 
creditors, for instance, bargained most fu lly as a class w protect their 
in terests ou tside ofbankruptcy. 8 2 Bankruptcy neutral izes many of the 
contractual safeguards of secured creditors, b ut, in their stead , the 
absolu te priority rule ensures that even in chapter 11 secured credi-
tors can insist upon compensation prior to any other class. 83 T hus, 
secured creditors stand first in line in chapter 11 (a11d m ay veto any 
reorganization plan that attempts to deviate rrom this standard), just 
as they do outside of bankruptcy. Similarly, a senior class of bond-
holders takes priority over the holders of subordinated bonds, and 
stockholders still are entitled only to any residual interest. 
'" Bankruptcy Code § 1113 provides that collect ive bargai n ing agreem en ts may not be set 
asi d e in bankru ptcy u nl ess three conditi ons exis t: (I ) the tru stee has bargai ned with th:= u niGn 
:n an attempt to reac h <: mut ua l agreem ent; (2) the un io n h;:;s rejected the tr ustee' s pn>posa ls 
wit hout good ca use; a nd (3) the " ba lance of equities" clearl y favo rs rejection o f the agreem::nt. 
Section \ 114 :;•: ts up similar res trictions on m odifica tio ns o f employee retirement pbns . 
:m See, e.g., A nne ]_ McCla in, Note, Ban>:ruptcy Code Sectior; 111 3 and the Sim ple 
R ejection of Collec ti ve Ba rgaining Agreements : Labor Loses A.ga in, 80 Geo. LJ . 19 1 (179 1). 
T he uncert a in ty of ern ployees' pensio n be nefits u nde r § 4047 of lhe Ernp1oyce R etiren1ent 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 USC § 1347 (1988), is a m ply a t tested to by 
Pension Benefit G uaran ty Corp. v_ LTV C o rp. , 11 0 S. Ct. 2662 ( l990), in vvhich the U ni t c:d 
States Suprer;·J (~ Cou rt held that the Pension Benefit CJ uara n ~ y Corporation d id not hCt 
a. :-bitrarily: and capric iously in res torin g LTV 's pens ion pla ns. r·~e vertht:!ess , L T~/ con ·t inusd to 
:1 rgue that lt could noi be compelled to make payn1ents lO the r~stored p!ans be~.:1use o:ven \Vith 
s uch payment:; the plans wo uld p robably be unable to sa tisfy ou ts id e debts . Sc•:: P ension 
Bene!it G ua ra n ty Corp. v. LTV Corp. , 122 B.R . 863 (S.D.N.Y . 1990) (rejecting t h is a rgument, 
bu t agreeing t hat the Supreme Court had left it opc:n); sc:c: <tl so K urt zm2n, supra note 34. at 2 
(C:ul u:-n bia Gas System Inc. files chapter 11 petition to force: renegOtiatio n of long-tern; 
contrac t:; •.vit h its na turai g:1s supplie rs). 
:; I Bankruptcy Code § I i 29(b )(2); see supra note 62 _ 
t: 2 ~fak in g securi ty significan tly reduces a creditor' s exposure. Bcc2use of th e reduced risk , a 
secured c redito r can c ha rge a re la t ive ly !owe r interest rate. Ste s,~o tt, s upra note 2. 2-t 69!;_ 
SJ Secu red credit o rs a lso can seek relief fro m the a utom a ric :;tay to foreciose on thei r 
co ll ateral unde r Bank rup tcy Code § 362(d), which a uthorizes reli ef if the secured creditor' s 
co ll;;te ra i is no t "~dequa t e l y pro tected " or if th e deb tor has no equ ity in the colbte ral and th e 
collatera l is not nec tssary to an effec ti ve reorga niza tio n. 
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st-:.:crc:gate safeg1Jarc1s ·provided ·by c hta~pter 1 i, l1c,~,v-~ 
-~ver , the Drrr1 "s cred.itors are far more exposed t'i-1ar1 ~Jefore banl<-
:ruptcy. T he absolute priority rule provides broad protection in 
fl~·.,·c•·nr P·>: T-.F>r'i;o11ly1' '-'r·r "-f:CUr"'r1 r:redi tOTS bu·r lfS dir- ·u:·t.cs ~'[P "'aci 1v . ;i'i.....-J.:.. ) :' _...._> t-" ·'--' .,_. ___ ,_ .<. ·J '-' "" \,..U ""' 1 .\.- \. - ~"' '-' · ~ · '"" 1.4-- ~.- \....- 0- .:. J 
" .. --. 
.:::".:·~I e :n 
1J.:n-.J;.::: fTil i ~~ed :i.n. r}f8.ctice. F -or instance, (;(}liftS an.d. t:h-: fi r rn;s ()t:ner 
C()DSt1in-e;;_cL:;s vi ~':i~j tt1e crarr1do\vn provisio~ns of sect1iJ~! 112.9-(b) as a 
cosd y and thus undesirable alternative to consensual reorganization 
because cra.rndo;,vn requires a complete valuation of the :fi.rrn's 
9.S:3~t ::. . 84 1Vioreover, in those cases involving a cramdovr i1, the court 
must make not only em initial valuation of the secured creditor's col-
lateral, but perhaps a lso a determination of whether a proposed pian 
wili yield her the "indubitable equivalent" of her secured interest, as 
required by the absolute priority rule. 85 It is widely believed that 
secured creditors tend not to get the benefit of their bargain on either 
occasion. R6 Finally, unless a creditor is oversecured, its claim ceases 
accruing interest after the filing of the chapter 11 petition. 37 Under .. 
secured creditors therefore receive no compensation for the delay in 
enforcing their contractual rights. The Bankruptcy Code safeguards 
protecting employees are, as noted above, equally provisional and lim-
ited in scope. 
Thus, the overall effect of chapter 11 is to undermine cr,:;ditors' 
contractual safeguards considerably. The Bankruptcy Code ulti-
mately retn.m s, in the fo rm of surrogate protections, much less than it 
takes cnvay . As a result, the imbalance between shareholders' need fo r 
generalized contractual safeguards such as voting rights, and that of 
employees and other creditors, is significantly red uced in bankruptcy. 
Because shareholders no longer have a superior normative claim to 
the franchise, the contractual safeguard approach implies that each 
------·------------------------------------------------
3'' See Ly nn M . LoPucki & Wi liiam C. Whitford, Bargaining Over Equ it y's Share in the 
Banhuptcy Reorgan ization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 139 U . Pa. L. Rev. 12 5, 143-
58 (1990). LoPucki ;:; nd 'Nhitford conc lude that several other factors, including fear of delay 
and (most importantly) the "in termediated" nature of chapter 11, also contribute to the 
parties: negati·,.,. ~ vit\v of cramdo\.vn. ld. 
ss Bankruptcy Code § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) . 
sc. See, e.g., Jackson, Creditors ' Bargain, supra note 2, at 872-77. 
87 B:,_n kn: ptcy Code § 506(b). The Supreme Court has rebuffed credi tors' efforts to 
circu mven t this rule by see king payment of lost opportunity costs unde r Bankruptcy Code 
§ 362(d)(! ), which deals with "adequate protection" of a claim. Un ited Sav. Ass' n v. T imbers 
of inwood Forest Assoc., 484 U .S. 365 (1988). 
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c•Jns t:tuf:;r~cy sl1ordcl be, as i·(: is_, eJrtitle ~J to ·vote if its n~ttrr.dJers .. s:.ce 
impa;,r,:::cl by the reorganization plan in question . 
The preceding analysis suggests that chapter 11 decisiomrmking 
·p>1r2 l '1·e1,, ;n i,·n·-J•·· r ;· ~· nt .--pSD"'C"i "' ·:he ('Qn)o ·"~''t "' vnt;Dcr ru'l~"'S a·op '_(l.c::J r.Ji e. _ ......,,_ __ ..,..._ ,.) ~-··· - J..i--l "..JJ. wU.l .i ...., A. \_... . J ~ ~ ~ t- .. -_... ..,... v o.. l -o _. -.\ _ ~ '--~ __ 
outsicle of ~JB.rd\. TU lJtcy. 1 .... h e ,/otir1g process .focuses atrthority ort 
firm's .,-,.::5iei'J::d (jy:ner, yet tt1 e expanded fra nchise is consistent with 
the parties ; ne;;d for contractual safeguards. f·Jonetheless, negotia-
tions arnong the constituencies in chapter 11 often seem to produce 
voting results tha t no single class would hu.ve chosen. The follcwing 
Sections will examine one of the causes of this problem. 
C Shareholders' Role in the Chapter j 1 Voting Process 
Although hapter 11 's voting rules focus attention on the residual 
class, the rules cannot completely eliminate the multiple peak prob-
lem88 that arises whenever parties with divergent and often conflicting 
in terests IT.t<1ke decisions. 89 The presence of the shareholder constitu-
ency in particular most distorts decisionmaking in chapter 11. As the 
illustration above suggests, shareholders usually have lost their 
residual ovmer status by the time a corporation enters chapter 11 .90 
Because chapter 11 debtors typically are insolvent (though the Bank-
ruptcy Code requires no proof of this), the new residual owners of a 
publidy held fi rm are likely instead to be its unsecured creditors, or, 
as in the illustration, a subclass thereof.9 1 
In contrast to the shareholders of a flourishing business, whose 
incentives further the fi rm's wealth-maximization goal, shareholders 
of an insolvent corporation pursue a separate agenda because they 
88 See supra note 38 and accompanying text. 
89 See Thomas H . J2.ckson & Robert E. Scott, On the Nature of Bankruptcy: A n Essay on 
Bankruptcy Shari ng and the Cred itors· Bargai n, 75 Va. L. Rev. 155, 160 (1989) ("the !aw 
cannot ensure th e! t the interests of an y part icular group of claimants will coincide with this 
interest of the whole"); Roe, sup ra note 18, at 538- 40 (arguin g that the parties ' negotiatio ns 
a re subject to signii'icant hold-up risks, due to the num erou s parties involved, and th at, simply 
to reach agreement, the part ies oft en agree to more debt than is appropria te for the firm' s 
capital ~ t ructure) . 
90 See, e.g., LoP ucki & \V hi tfo rd, supra note 84, at 14 1- 43. LoPucki and W hi tford 
conducted an extensive empi rica l study with respec t to 43 firms that filed chapter 11 petition:, 
afte r Ocwber 1, 1979-ea·~h declaring assets in excess of S 100 million. Of the 43 firms , 
Lo Pucki <:!nd \Vhitfo:·c! concluded that 30 were insolvent (at least as of the confirma tion date). 
91 For closely hdd fi rms, this often may not be th e case . The principal credi to r of a small 
corporation frequ.en d y is a secured l ~ nder who holds a sec ur ity interest in all of th e fir m's 
assets. If such a. lender is undersec ur<:d, it can be seen as the true residual owner. 
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;~:ts rnay v;ish to prolong the chap ter 11 case as long as possible in the 
. . - ~ , f ., . 9 ' "" d .- .,, nope tnat the nrm s ortunes ww 1m prove. - :_:,econ . , they Wll1 
n~~--:;J~.i n.g to lose, 2.11d everythin:~; tc: 
: _~~t~~-~ir.'te:~: s risks .93 
r• · ' 1 ~ ... ' . • -. • · t-' '~ -: u1ven snareno!C1ers quesnonat..l le mcendves, one coulJ argue tnat 
shareholders' role in the deci.sionmaking process should be con-
s t;:·ained or even elirllinated once a filn1 enters chapter 11. Yet the 
chapter 11 voting framework has precisely the opposite effect in prac-
tice, given the rarity with which cramdown provisions are invoked. 
Because the emphasis in most chapter 11 cases is on consensual reor-
ganization, the plan proponent must secure shareholders' support, 
notwithstanding shareholders' lack of entitlement to any distribution 
in a cramdown situation. Shareholders obviously will , and do, exact a 
price for their voting support. 
The question that emerges is whether chapter 11 should eliminate 
shareholders' voting rights if the firm is insolventY4 Withholding the 
franchise from shareholders would further focus decisionmaking 
authority on the true resid ual class. Moreover, limiting shareholders' 
c·ight to vote in this fashion is not unfair to shareholders because 
arguably they have no financial int erc:~st in an insolvent firm . 
At least two arguments can be m :1de in support of the current vot-
ing regime, ho\vever. First, \vere an insolvent firm liquidated today, 
" 2 Jackson & Sco tt, supra note 89, at 15S-59 (n ot ing that lower classes want the debtor to 
::cn ti nue in business because they expect tc fare poo rly in a liquid ation) . 
93 Id . The bankruptcy of Arlan's D epartment Stores ("Arian 's") o frers a vivid exa mple of 
:f;is phenomer.on. After Arlan 's filed for bankruptcy relief in 1970, its managers engaged in a 
last-ditch eftort to reverse the store 's fortunes. They spent a significan t portion of its funds 
hi iing (w ithout court approval) a speciai consuitant, who dire:::ted an elaborate campaign that 
i:: ·;olved altering the layout of the stores. stocking new and different merchandise, and 
cc;nducting a costly promotional campaign . T hi:. step was designed to maximize Arl:m's 
pmfits during the 197 3 Christmas shopping season. Sadl y, th~ cam pa ign failed , and A rian ·s 
suosequen tiy was liquidated. See In re Arlan ·s Depa rtm ent Stores, 462 F. Supp. 1255, 1259 
\.::: D N.Y. 1978), atf'd, 615 F.2d 925 (2d Cir. 19791 
94 Both ?viark Roe and Lucian Bebchuk, each of when: has offered a dran1~Hic(llly nev; 
model for chapter 11 reorganization , have designed nev; systems tha t tend toward strict 
ad. b~rence to the absol ute priority rule and thus would have a simi!ar effect. See Lucian A. 
Bebchuk, A New Approach to Corpora te Reorg;:; nizat ion, 10 ! Harv. L R ev. 775 ( 1988) 
(proposing that c~ain1ants and interest hoiders be given tradable options in the reorga nized 
enti ty) ; Roe, supra nme 18 (propc,sing an all-equity cap italization. the value of the equ ity w be 
determined by offering 10% for sale on the market). 
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each argument suggests that shareholders should retain their voting 
rights despite tl1is fac t. 
Lynn LoPucki a:nd ·vviHiam -Whitford have suggtsl::d a possible 
. . - ~·1- . h l ] ~ ' . cornprormse posrt10n . i 11ey argue t. at courts cou.~c nne!. m an appro-
• 1 • h ' l" rl 1 ' . , 1 - 1 onate case tnat -uw: s .areno ~~ers .11ave no p1aus10 e entn,ement to par-
ti cipr.~te in any distribution and therefore are not a party in interest. 96 
Th.eir ru.le would eliminate shareholder suffrage with respect only to a 
.-'h''~y>o -t· 1' aL"·"'+r ·r ·w >- os~· ri "'b +-: f<1 r r~~'~ceea: 1.'"" '"" ''"" ~-,. 9 7 ·,..,..;,,, ,_,.
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pc}s1t1ons o;1 tJ1 1S tr.tcrny ISStle. 1 r1e impor tant pcn11 t tor ·prGsent l1 Ur-
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conte~ ts \V11ere their 1rtc:e.ntives are ske,~ved , ar1d becai.-t se the parties 
seJdcrn resort tC) cr~~rn c1()1f?lrt, sb.arel1old.er SlJffragc or-ter1 ~J. rHJerrnirt es 
8:37 (2d ed. ! 99 1 ). 
G6 Lo P ucki .j~ 'V/hit fo:d, supra i\Ote 84, at 186. 
'·'i7 ld. ·One quc:stion that rt:. ighr P.!"ise with respect to the LoPuck i ailcJ \~l hi t fo rd proposal is 
·.vhe: thcr CO ilt"t s ever •sLr:...dd fnvok,: it. f.);!e suspects tha t cou rts \vculd t~ c x.c·2~d i n~ly '.v i !ling to 
find scrr-1 e hope of a n equity recovery , especia ll y if the clcterminnt\c:1 \\·:: r~ !~1.:.1 dc ~:a rl; .. :n the 
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Tlt£ J.~--fujoti.ty in J\ru rnber~!Two- 1-lzil'ils iP1 .~:1??l OUti t 
Requirement 
l-\s d.iscussec1 earlier) the one-share, or1e-vote requ i ren1er~t l~Jr sh2 . .re-
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tions~h ip -be t\veen the nu·mt,;r tJf sf1ares OW i1ed and th:: fir1a :ncicd s~: 8.ke 
in the firr-n. Accoun ting for creditors' interests proves m ore difEiu 1lt, 
for their claims differ vastly in origin and amount. As a result, chap--
ter 11 r:~quires not only that a majority in number of the clD.lrns in a 
class approve a reorganization plan, but also that two- thirds of the 
total amount vote in favor. The voting standard thus includes aspects 
both of a majority and of a supermajority standard. 98 
In practice, the two-thirds in amount prong is the more significant 
h urdle because a plan proponent who secures the affirmative votes of 
two-thirds in amount of the claims in a class usually also will have 
secured well over a majority in number. 99 Section 1126(c) has, there-
fore, the effect of a simple supermajority requirement. Section 
1126(d) makes this explicit with respect to shareholders by requiring 
as a prerequisite to acceptance that two-thirds in amount of a dass of 
interests cast their votes in favor of a plan. 
Why then was a supermajority standard adopted for the purposes 
of .::hapter 11 voting? The legislative history sheds little light on this 
question, even though the two-thirds acceptance requirement deviates 
both from the old chapter XI voting standard and from the recom-
98 The voting requirem ent of Bankruptcy Code§ 1126(c) derives in part from old C hapter 
X and in part from old Chapter XI. Section 179 of Chapter X based acceptance on the 
affi rmat ive vote of two-t hirds in amou nt of the claims in a class. II U.S. C. § 579 (repealed) . 
Section 362( I) of Chap ter XI , on th e ot her hand , required acceptance by a majorit y in <Jmoun t 
and a majority in number. 11 U.S.C. § 762(1) (repealed). Bankruptcy Code § 117.6 deviates 
from its antecedents iil that , whereas old §§ 179 and 362 required the appropriate m<1jorities of 
all claims in a cl ass , regardless of whether the claimants voted ,§ 1126 req uires on ly a majority 
in number and two-th irds in a mount of th e claims actually voted. Thus, failure to vote is no 
longer equi valent to rejection. See 5 Collier, supra note 59, ~ 1126.03, at 1126-ll to -12. 
99 T his generalization may not hold true if the class contains claims of disproportionate si ze. 
Another possible deviation results from the trading of bankruptcy claims. l f ~l n investor 
purchases large numbers of claims in a particular class, a court might give her on ly a single 
vote, rather than one vote for each claim. See C haim J. Fortgang & Thomas tvL i'>'laye r, 
Trad ing Claims and Taking Control of Corporations in Chapter 11 , 12 Cardozo L Rev. I, 86-
9 1 (1 990). T he effec t would be to dilute the claimant 's voting powe r and, in a n ntreme case. 
to enhan ce the impo rtance of th e majorit y-i n-number req uiremen t. 
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r.nen.~latic,n.s o:f tf1 ~-~ 197.3 1t eport (Jf r'he CommissitJn on tk1e 13.a:nkruptcy 
.,... il ,.. 1 • 1 "d - {" 0 ~ • • • 100 Laws, eacn or v~:mcn prov1 •.ed :tor s1mp1e maJonty votmg. 
Two concerns undoubtedly played a role in the drafters' choice. 
f...~~- -·=-' -r r.cn ..:-o~n ,~.-_7 .::;.·:-·i .·-., -r. ·--.1 f""':n s offiec·~· 3."' a'1t"'ra4-~"D r-..f + ~.c... --. ro,o· ~ ....... 1K fU 'D·'· r ··l' 
. 1 .d:3 c, · 'VJi :.;):l. . ,_,_,_,_, ._, ~·- ' _!,'-•'-'··" -d , • 11 -·'- l'v 1 \.h ~;.c V'·'--' -~!!' . ~ t ''.J 
co:ntiactv.al rigl(~.s clisse~n. t i 11g voters .against tl1elr v-;ishes. J\Jtho!.Igl~ 
t l1e .c::)nstl tu ti c, r~9. lit y of' (be Bar11::11ptcy Code prc,visions that bind d.is-
sen ters to the majorit y will has long been settled , :ol t~e drafters may 
have concluded as 2. mc>"tter of policy that a supermajority vote was 
n~eded to justify ~uc~ an effect. 
Second, like shareholders, the creditors of a publicly held corpora-
tion may be small and dispersed enough so that they have insufficient 
incentives to cast their votes in an informed fashion for or against a 
reorganization proposal. 102 Because this would give a plan proponent 
the upper hand, 103 the drafters may have concluded that the propo-
nent should be required to secure the support of two-thirds of the 
voters, in effect using the supermajority requirement as a partial 
response to voters' collective action problems. 
V/hatever the rationale, the d rafters ' adoption of a supermajority 
standard is m isguided . Consider how supermajority voting is used in 
close corporations, the most prevalent context of such arrangements. 
In contrast to the shareholders of publicly held corporations, share-
holders of close corporations are both investors and managers. 104 
Supermajority voting standards protect the minority shareholders of a 
closely held firm by giving them veto power over business decisions. 
f:."!.. minority shareholder 's major fear is that the majority shareholders 
rnay one day limit or cut off her access to the income generated by the 
firm . 105 T o protect herself, the minori ty shareholder of a four-share-
!OO On the other hand, the two-thirds votin g requirement is consistent with former C hapter 
X . Sc:e supra note 98. 
IOi See infra notes 120-2! and accompanying text. 
102 See infra Part IV for a discussion of creditors' collective ac tion problems in chapter 11. 
103 M oreover, many of the voters in question are likely to be trade creditors, whose rational 
apathy is intensified by t l1eir wil!ingn ess to accept any payment-however sma ll- rather than 
face further delay . 
104 See, e. g., Del. Code Ann . tit. 8, § 351 ( 198 3) (charter of close corpo ration m ay con tain 
provision providing that the sha reholders rather than directors manage the corporation) . 
105 As John Hetherington, M ich ael Dooley, a nd othe rs have pointed ou t, because there is 
u11likely to be a market fo r minority inte rests in a closely held firm, minority shareho lder:; 
could be trapped in the event the maj ority turns again st th em. E.g., J.A .C. Hetherin gton & 
['.1 ichael P . Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploit a tion: A Proposed Statutory Solu ti on to th e 
Rernain ing Close Corpora ti on Problem, 63 Va. L. Rev. I, 5-6 ( 1977) . 
'li]" 
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i·ng l1er a con1parable rai s~:: . 
fllinori t~/ prcrtect1o:n C\Jrz-:; ~ s J:.t a J)ric~:) l!.o ~ . vt:;,;{;r. _/:.~..._ rr.t i:n.:Jri-~:y s·hi;~re ·­
holc1er rnay also 1JSe f1e r ·vetc) _rJC\ver strategjca.11y, a.s ~3. ;.ve~1:por1 
designed to extract cor1cessiol1S from the rem.aining sl1areholder~ .. 
T h is cost is justified, and supermajority voting is thus desirable, if the 
actions taken by majority s}t~~:reho'lders coulrJ have a dispro·portlfJrJ.at.e 
efE'::ct on the minority, as in a close corporation. 106 T he franchise 
operates very differently in chapter 11, however. The chapter 11 vo te 
determines whether a class accepts or rejects the terms of a particular 
reorganization plan. If the class votes in favor of a plan, 2nd the plan 
is confirmed, every member of the class receives exactly the same dis-
tribution. 107 Similarly, rejection of the plan precludes any member of 
the class from receiving a d istribution unti1 such time as another plan 
is proposed and confirmed. Because each member of the class is 
affected in the same way by the outcome of the vote, there is no need 
to impose supermajority voting as a protective device. 108 For similar 
reasons, whereas states traditionally have required the approval of 
tvvo-thirds of a firm's shareholders to effect funds.mental corporat~ 
changes such as mergers, the current trend c1ear1y is wward simple 
rn;> ;o-·l"ty vo~;r· (7 l·n th"'"·"' c~- qtoy , ., 109 _,_ .... ~J 1 '!.... Ll 1 0 C. .a.\v._,....,. Vs-·~l...{~•-'--"• 
E. Positive _4s1vects of the /lnology Between Ch~prer 1 i ~>"~oting and 
Voting Under State Corporate Lm-v 
This Part began 'Nith the observation thac sections 1121 to 1129 of 
,!. ,,. Pu"'nr1rl~up ·t~'v r'ode a·l·"nl.~c ,~ ~J-:"~lp. r·r,r·porat·P. 'Vr•ti1·1'~' ,..,,.,,;ic:;,.,-~-1'~ •.·.ri+l-> ••. !. !.\...- ~ (A. \.._ •• ., J "-" ~ ...., .\ l(~. _,..._, ,._, i.......,;. v .....,.,.J .... -- " ;... ..... '-..J .... .. · ;;_, iJ..>- ............ ,_.j "-'"· ._. " ' ... t..,j,J:. 
-------------
!Ot See id .; ~ee also F rank FL Easterbrook & Daniel .F~. Fischel, C lose C.~orporation s and 
Agency Cos!s, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 271 , 296-97 (!986) (<irgu ing that, ir. deciding ·Nhether a 
minority shareholder in the close corporarion context has violat:od a fiduciary dL!ty by blocking 
a decision, courts should consider vvhether the decision in quesiion v.;a~ likely to have had a 
di::.r,roportionate impact). 
107 See Bankruptcy Code§ i i23(a)('t). 
IUS See ·victor Brudney & Iviarvin .A ... c:hireist::in, P. .. Restaten1ent of CorpOri)te Frer~zeouts, 
87 Yale LJ. 1354, 1357 (1978). This is not to say that class members '.vill n::ver have divergent 
interests or uitcrior n1otives: a trade creditor rnay ha·.,.'e a vested interest in the continued 
ex istence of the company, for in st~HiCC, or other investors ultirnately m~:..y ··Nish ro take the 
company over. Rather, the point is that ciass members ca nnot use din··::rentiai treatment 
-;,v ithin the class as a means o(acting on such n:orives. 
;o-; See, e.g., DeL Code Ann. tit. 8, § 251 (Supp. l 990). 
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ccx1trac tua.l 5;g_feguard perspectives that ju.st1. ·.fy the sharphol(Jer~/ 
r;i Dll.{)f'Dly Df t t~:~ Franchise outside of b2:nk r~l r;tcy. ~:t the cirarnat ic 
Stlp -~-~ - f~ ·,:-:~;;d c!~ sti.r:~ctions re rr1ain. It is l-1e1rjful a t pc i:n t tc; e:n ric}:: 
ft~ rth.t::r tll{~ ccl1liJa ris\jn bet\veell the t \vo scheT~n. e3 . ~rhe rernainder of 
tl1 is ~F~;.-:. l't dern<JilSt.rates that, in addition to \VC; rk~irig on a.. norrr1atlvc 
If state corporate governance rules rather than the Bankruptcy 
Code governed chapter 11 reorganization, the reorganization would 
. . ' h 'rl , . . h j.' 1 ~- ~ · g1ve nse to snare" oLers votmg ng_.ts 10r eac 1 01 tv/0 reasons. r 1rst, 
chap ter 11 effects a sale of all or substantially all of the firm's assets, 
ei ther to a third party (if there is an explicit sale) or to the firm'"s 
current creditors through the reorganization process. 110 Second, 
chapter 11 leads to a substantia lly al tered corporate charter: for 
instance, it requires the inclusion in a reorganized firm's charter of a 
provision prohibiting the issuance of nonvo ting stock 1 1 1 and also per-
mits the firm ('Nith the appropriate vote) to alter the rights of its cur-
rent interest holders and to issue new stock. 112 
Althoue:h this recharacterization of char;ter 11 hel ps exolain the 
0 .. " J,;. 
existence of voting rights, we still need to explain from a positive per-
spective why only one class of shareholders votes outside of bank-
ruptcy, whereas the franchise is nearly universal in chapter 11. The 
missing link between these apparently divergent voting regimes can be 
found in th e special class voting rules applicable outside o f bank-
~" rp<t e" ""l•,J[ c: <:J <:t:c>'""' f'0fp0l"atl.Of1 St~tu tp.;;: reqn1"r ., t}>, ~t f},., hold-PfC.: Of t~.l ~ ...... J. 'f ......... .... ... .._, . ...... t. ...... ,_.. .. "" J. "'-'" '-'-'"-J ... ~~- ~ ...... ,..~.JI. .. .:.. l-.... ... ...... v • ..!. 
ou tst:o:.nding shares of a class be permitted to vote en any amendment 
that alters the nature of their stock, even if the affected shareholders 
wou1d not othenvise be entitled to vote . 113 To pass, :such an amend-
n1ent :must be favored by a majority of a1l stockholde!"s entitled to vote 
11 n s~~e C l2.rk, sup ra no te 67. 
ttl Ba nkruptcy Code § 1!23(a)(6). 
112 See id. § 11 23(a){5)(H) (authorizing the " extension of<> maturity dnte or a cnange in an 
i nt~ res t rate cr other tcnn of outstandi ng securities"); id. § 1113(a)(5)(I) (contempla ting 
2.mendrnent of t ~1e fi rrn 's charter). 
113 See Del. Cock Ann. tit. 3, § 242(b)(2) (1 983) . 
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and also by a majority of those in the affected clzcSs. 11 ' ' "~ hus, even 
without the Bankruptcy Code, common shareholders' usual monop-
oly on suffrage would give way to a mor~ broadly regnne 
'""~''~ ,~-1·,.,.-,Dtc-r 11 P"ert ~L S occurred 115 v ... . ,._., ,_.. ..... , .:.Cl.l ~.._,.._ .i ...,'I .L .._ • 
r1ir1eteent}x cer1tufy, fundamental c1-1a11ges suc}.t as rc·c:rg:;::·s 
arnendments required unanimous shareholdei a. p 
standard protected the interests of minority shareho1ders, as intended, 
but also impaired firms' ability to adjust to their markets and to take 
desirable entrepreneurial risks, because any proposal coul.d be vetoed 
by a single shareholder. 117 
Subsequent state corporation statutes tried to accm::1rnodate both 
goals. To enhance the firms' flexibility, states replaced the 1.manirnity 
requirement with majority voting. M inority shareholders were com-
pensated for their loss of protection wi th appraisal rights. 118 This 
remedy allows a shareholder who is dissatisfied with a merger, or 
other fundamental change in the firm approved by a rnajority, to 
demand that the corporation repurchase her shares a t a price deter-
114 Id. § 242(b)(l). 
115 Although special class voting rules apply specifically to changes involving shares of 
stock, the analogy easily extends to alterations of creditors' ciaims. For c:xample, the iirm 
cannot alter the terms of a bond absent approval of the holders •.vho would be affected . 
Outside of bankruptcy, even supermajority approval often will not suffice to effect such a 
ch;mge. See Mark J. Roe, The Voting Prohibition in Bond Workouts, 97 Y zJe L.J . 232 ( 1987) 
(criticizing § 316 of the Trust Indenture Act, which prohibits modification of the core terms of 
a bond without the bondholders' unanimous consent). As a result, firms ~;ometimes resort to 
bankruptcy when they wish to alter (that is, scale down) bond terms. See In re The Southland 
Corp., 124 B.R . 211 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1991); George Anders, Memorex P iz,ns 'Prepackaged ' 
Bankruptcy, Wall St. J., July 17, 1991, at A3 (discussing Memorex's plan to file a chapter 11 
petition, together with a prenegotiated reorganization plan, to restructur,~ S 1.3 billion in debt); 
Barbara Demick, The Rise of Instant Bankruptcy, Phila. Inquirer, Au~:. 4, 1991, at D l 
(describing the use of "prepackaged" bankruptcies to scale down debts :.md quickly er,1erge 
from chapter 11). 
116 Armstrong v. Marathon Oil Co., 513 N.E.2d 776, 782 (Ohio !987); Ell iott J. \Neiss, T he 
Law of Take Out .Mergers: A Historical Perspective, 56 N.Y. U. L. Rev. 62'~ , 627 (1981 ). 
117 American Law Institute, Principles of Corporate Govermmce: Analysis and 
Recommendations 607-09 (Tent. Draft No. 11, 1991). 
II R 'Neiss, supra note 116, at 624-28. But see Hideki Kanda & S:lul Lo: ·rmore, The Appraisc•l 
Remedy and the Goals of Corporate Law, 32 UCLA L. Rev. 429, 430 (1935) (ques tioning the 
view that the elimination of shareholder unanimity requirements prompted the advent of the 
appraisal remedy). 
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mined in courL i 19 Not surprisingly, minority shareholders rebelled at 
the subst itution of appraisal rights for their former veto power. D is-
gruntled minority shareholders challenged the state la<;v provisions 
. . . . h f . 1 1 I"" 
·perrn. rttl r:~g 8. corporation to aJter t...!Le te rrr1 s 01 Its stoc;;.\. ana tf) eriect 
othet ~;.r_n e.n cl rrl :~ 1Yts to its cf1arter agai~st t:he dissenters' \visl1 :: ~. as vio -
lati 'i e the .c::~) ntracts Claus'= in J\.rticle I of the ~const i t r~ t icrlL ~fi1es{-: 
- rr..:. - ... ... . -. .-, -C" ; _ .-... +'--::. r V Of ·,·~ "!-.a o.a rlu """S .., " 120 1"1''f (' ~~'!.- •. - ~ ;-~-1,c ·nl- ~. r ·, r-:-·· 
L'l \J r.;:::·~·-L ::-; '~' lt. li.t a i l..V .,...L!C .,_ t) ~._...:j_, C..) ~ u ...... ,., ,_, u u~cq:~,:.. :::t.J t ~ .. .,~_, .. lj_ i= 
·olai :nt~- ha·v~ i.Jroverl frt1itless. 121 , " 
Dev:::lo:pments in bankruptcy law have foll owed a very similar pat-
tern. As with corporations outside of bankruptcy, reorganizati on 
efforts in the nineteenth century were hampered by an inability to 
bind minori ties. An amendment to the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, sec-
tion 77B, remedied this problem by establishing a system of m.ajority 
rule and thus eliminating the need to resort to cumbersome equity 
receiverships as a :means of effecting a corporate reorganization. 122 
The current Bs.nkruptcy Code can be seen as compensating minority 
claimants for their loss of clout by provid ing what arguably is a coun-
terpart to corporate law appraisal rights. 12 3 Section 1129(a)(7) of the 
11 9 See, e.g. , D el. Code A nn. tit. 8, § 262 ( 1983). 
120 See, e.g. , Keller v. Wilson & Co., 190 A. 115, 125 (Del. 1936) (Contracts C lause 
prohibited charter amendment that eliminated accrued and unpaid dividends, despite majority 
approval, because accrued dividends constituted a vested property right.) . Xeller was 
subsequ"n tly undercut by Fede ral United Corp. v. Havender, 11 A.2d 331 (Del. 1940), which 
held that a corporation could achieve the same effect through a merger. See Hottenstein '1 . 
York Ice l'i(ach . Corp., 136 F.2d 944, 950 (3d Cir. 1943). 
I l l See, e.g. , Goldman v. Postal Tel., 52 F. Supp. 763, 769 (D. Del. 1943): 
~ i nce the corporation is the creature of the state, and since the corporation law is a part 
of che corporate charter, it is self-evident the state has the right to reserve to itself, or a 
majority or more of the stockholders , the power to change the contract between the 
corpora tion and its stockholders or between its different classes of stockholders by an 
amendment to the charter after such cont racts are made, even if a particular class of 
st:xkhoiders must suffer slightly. 
122 .~ct of June 7, 1 934~ ch. 424, '!·8 Stat. 911, 913-1 4 (1934); see John Gerdes, 'Corporate 
Reorg<Yiliza tions Under Section 77B of the Bankruptcy Act § 20, at 64 (1936). P rior to section 
77B, finns reorgc;nized through a fictional sale in equity receivership. A major probl em •.vith 
this p;:oc.~s:. was the necessi ty of cashing out every minority claimant or sha reholder who 
d i ~.sented from the plan. !d. § 17, at 55-56. 
12J Section T!B(b)(5)(c) had provided for appraisal and payment of a class of claims that 
voteclngainst a proposed reorgani zat ion plan but did not make specific provision for dissen ting 
claimants in a class that, as a whole, approved the plan. VIII Securiti es and Exchange 
Comm'n, Repo>t on the Study and i nves tiga tion of the Work , Activities, Personnel and 
F unc tions of P rotective and Reorganization Com mittees i 38, 141 n.215 ( 1940). In theory at 
least, these cbimants were protected by the requirement that every reo rganizatio;, plan satisfy 
th•:: d!ctatcs c f the absolute priority rule. Id. at 151-52. 
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Bar1kt1.1 ·ptcy fCocle: pfO'iiclc;s tl1at the (i:dt11-crtlptc:/ Gortrt can.r1ot C()~1fir:tn 
a ""'~ (\"'''(j<""< ' ~.;7 'lt;,) ...... , ..... ¥1· ... ,n ~,..,...-:[·a ~·r t "ln "' r-11· ~ ..... ·---r-·-+l"n.....,... - ..-..--..pm~,..... p. -r-:: ,-.,;<:' n r·1a~·s ,J... 1_...,.._ 10v1 6a.l<•~ << u ; _._ l-' ·"·'- -'' •~i L'- ·J"' .1 . \.. u.co,;-.::uc '-iS 1..:1 ~1 J.IJ ~ - ,, vl o. ,_, _t..-:::, '-' -''-"-L 
!Tlerrt of tl1ei r cun tl ·L~c t;~~a! :c:i.g;l1ts . -C~o :_rfts i'Iave rcj.:~ct -ecl t i1es,~ 
argurnent3 anc~ ·nave u·pl-"u~1J tt"!e t:~ir l lzruptcy r~r~Jv}is io rls that bir.:ci 
1ninorities Ju~st a~ th.ey 2.ffi.rrne.d t:~Ilc.logotlS sections in state c(;rpora tic:rl 
law statutes. 125 
As r1oted ii1 t}le I ntrodllctic~n, cOLlrts ari-d coiilirH:;iJ.tators :have 
always characterized chapter 11 solely in terms of t he negotiations 
that take place among the parties. T he :firs t two Parts of this Article 
' t t 1 1 i. ' -; ... .. ·~ "'- 0 1 ' • t ' urew ou · ne ana1c)gy o-etv;een cnap(er I J. vo tmg nt es ana Sla· e la'N 
· ~ r 1-.. t1 · 1 · . · corporate votm g rules rrom uo n a normative ana a posltrve perspec·· 
t ive. "VVe now are ready to ;:1-pply the analysis of Parts I and II to three 
controversial chapter ll issues: sales o:f most or all of a firm's assets 
• ~ • 1 i-, ' 1" ' .,. 1 'L h ' ' pnor to connrmatJOn, tne Sliaieno Liers ngnt w compe a s.nareL oHi~ 
' • • 1--, • • • rl . ~ bl 1,; . • . . e:rs rneet111g, a:nrl t ~ue acqtllSltJon anu exercise or a OCr;.ln g pos1t1on 111 
a class (or classes) of c1airns. lJ1.1derstanding these issues as voting 
i24 Bankruptcy Cod·~ § ll29(a)(7). Interest irtgly, both § 11 29(s.)(7) and ·:orporate la..-:; 
appra isal r·ights have b~en cr i t ici~ed for fa iiing to give dissenters the fu ll going conccra vaiue of 
their cl a i1ns. See J~lc kson , 'Cred itors' Bargai n, supra note 2, at 393 n.168 (suggesting that the 
liquidation value prDvi.d·=d in § 1 i29(~)(7) should reflect the possibihty that liquidation rn:ty 
consist of the saie of t he fi rm !n tact to a third party); Eln-ter Schaefer, The Fallacy of 
'\f/e!g1n;ng A ..sset Vcdue ~nd Eatil ir: gs Value in the .i!,.ppraisa i of Cor?erate Stock, 55 S. CaL L . 
Rev . 1 OJ I ( 1932); Vv' ei:;s, supr~ note 1 } 6 ~ at 680. 
Co1ntnentators J.l so ha 't criticized th e requiremt:nts shareholders rn us.t satisfy to invo ke 
their appraisal ri ghts. E.g., Jc~l Se1ign1an ~ Reappr2.is ing the ,q_ppra isal H.ern.edy, 52 Cit(J. 
'\VB.sh . L. i1ev . 829: BJ!t-36 (1984) . 1n Dela\vare, fo r instance, a sharel":o!der rnus t d1:liver u. 
\vritten dematld fer a.p pra!sui r~gi1ts to the sor-poratior: p~· i cr to the vote in question ~ n1ust 
dernand a va1uat ion \t.:it hin } 20 days of the corporste change: ~nd cannot vcte her stock er 
rece i·r"e dividends V.'hiie the pet ition is pe ~1ding. Del. ~:ode r\ nn. ti.t. 8, :~ 2.62. (c}· (~), (k) (1 98 3). 
The !)e]a\V~1 re 5up1ctn.c ~:o urt :recogn i:!:ed and addressed n-;any of these prob1eins \Vith the 
aprraisal rerneCy in \.~/e i nh~ rgcr v. llCiP, Inc. 1 !.~57 J\ .?.d 701 , 714 (DeL 1983) _. but \"./~\~)not 
persuJ.ded tha t the ~ioss i bil ity of synergy gai ns shou!d be taken into ~.::ousid:~ lat ien . ~ ~:::: 
P:xnerican La\V Ii!stit:J :_ e~ :;upra note 1\7, at 6 16. 
12s Can1pbell v. i-\l1 -:ghr!n y (.:o:-p. ~ 75 F.2d 94·7, 954 (£.\th c:ir.), cert. den ied, 296 IJ.S. 58! 
(19 3:3); see Gerdes, supra note 122, § 22~ at 85-3 7. 
...,. 
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issues he1ps clarify some of Ihe confusion tb 2.t has plagued judicial 
and academic ans.lysis of banknmtcy. 
A. tc~ C~c;tzjirrJ?.r.Jtio?1. 
J () J (b)( l ) ()f the ~8 2~n kruptcy - i oan.K ·~ 
0 111- .-· ~r1a. ('\::" 4-~n· P -., ;rJ·;.,.,~ fV (--. :""\~'r""P r.f ~~ll S ·i nP"" 12 S .. 7;!-l .:, 0.::::...-... t~'"n ""'loafl'l CQn ... ~,...Ji ... .iC: ._f .:._ !. ~.L"" !,_., ~ ........ !Al.f_.... _, .. AJv._.~ ....... ...__., ,... L· - ···- l . -...-.::.:~- t.. .t.P_. .:.:· ·-..t~...- 1 \...t J ........ ..1z...c, ., ..- ._ ~ 
tem plates t hat the trustee may sel l minor portions of the debtor's 
'1 • , • 1 • ,... • .. i (" 1 4 
ous1.ness, sucn as a part.tcu1ar ~nece ()! e(J Uipt}J~: .n~ ·tnat tr1e n.r111 \VOu ... r~ 
not routinely sell (and might not have sold bu t for the need to seal~ 
dovm in bankruptcy). ¥/hat is less clear is whether section 363(b)(l) 
also gives the trustee the power to sell all or substantially all of the 
assets of the firm. 
1. Judicial Analysis: A Description and a Critique 
Two United States Circuit Court of Appeals decisions, In re Bran{;) 
Ainvays 127 and In re Lionel Corp., 123 h<:1ve addressed this issue. In 
Branzlf, Braniff Airways, Inc. ("Braniff") sought approval of an 
agreement that not onl.y would have resulted in the sale of Brani11's 
landing slots to a third party, Pacific Southwest Airlines ("PSA"), but 
also '.vould have assured shareholders and unsecured creditors a dis-
tribution in connection ;,vith any subsequent reorganization plan, and 
that Braniff's secured creditors would cast their votes in favor of the 
' 1"' 9 Th T- . • " " +' I ., ,.. ' ~· <' ' r. · . plan. - , e Umted ~tates 1~ot.1rt o: hppeals ror tne ,, nt.n LLrcmt, 
although recognizing that under certain circmnsto.nces a fi.rm may sell 
1' • . . ., -.., (1 \ 1 1 1... . most or a i ot 1ts assets pttrsuarn: to section Jl:J.) \ 0}, strtlCK uo·vvi1 tuis 
. ' "' ' ~fd' ' ' c i .!' agreement because lt purpon:ed to , l' rct acej :;orne 01 tne terms 0.1 any 
cutt'-" r,~orcrani7l'ltl·c.n ·nlan " 130 1 ~1 "--' ...... b' .l .t ....... ~<.... . !- ... . 
126 Bankruptcy Code§ 363(b)(J). 
127 700 F.2d 935 (5th Ci r. 1983). 
12s 722 F. 2d l 063 (2d Cir. 1983). 
129 In particular, under the agrecmen·t vv ith PS.t-\. , Braniff vvould have paid £2 .5 rni11ion for 
$7.5 rnillion vf PS.t\ travel scrip~ ··,;;h ich it could have issued only to Braniff shareholders ~1..nd 
unsecured creditors. The agreen1ent ~~dsc required Braniff's secu red creditors to vote a stated 
amount of their unsecured deficiency ciai1n i11 f:..t~~· o r 0f an:; reo rganizat ion pla.n supported by 
the ur:secured creditors' comn1ittee, 3nd provided fo r th{: relt::ase of any potentia] claitns 
against, arnong others, Braniff and its officers 2.nd directors. liranljf, 700 F .2ci ~lt 939-40. 
130 Id. at 940. According to the court . approving 'his agreement 'NOuld hav:o improperly 
eire urn ven ted the chapter 11 pr~rcqu i sitcs for confrmation·~·--safeguards such as the disclOSl..Ire 
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I:n contrast, in Lionel the court addressed d.ir~ctly the sale of most 
or all assets issue 13 1 and concluded that such s2: les should not be 
' 1 . 1 • " t. I ' d I • • t . h ~ . · 'h approved un ess tnere lS some ar zcu .a,e , ouszness p.Js.t;,~caLton, OL.er 
• '·1r . .....-, ·- p~·---""a""l'"'nP 'Y!+ or. rnaJ"or Cf"'dl'tr-r·" fo ·r ll Al· 'l"'""\ .-f · ~ ~ l! ~-J'"'(J OT 1;:- -.::l s:. ... \ r U C•., d }"1:: 0v. ll~llL 1 . •- , oU- => , .• . ~::. , , :::_, , 0 -"l liJlb - ' ~ '"' 11.1!{ 
pr~)f:·erty Ollt of the ordinary course of busi r~ ess . ~ ' 13 2 ~; court l1eld 
·'"·~,r"'\ 7 ---·o C>'l··c 'h 1. 'l "t ~ -~ ~ a· I· on haQ ... ~'""'r:-c.n -. t )o "'l .,,n .... r .....·r --··· ~ - -_,.. .. - ,..~- -~-_,. .. q ; - -, ~~-"~v ~.r 11"' !.li'"'· '- _; _;, ::>:..' H J '-' :C, d l '~( '' •" U--~-1 ~"' >~ .• o. •. C '. c ~·. : : 'c , c;.._\ .t L u .l,_:, d · •-· 
st8.nch rd as an attempt to baiance th >:: n~ed for ft e c~ci -b iJ>: y i;, f tu- thering 
the goals of chapter 11 with the loss of chapter -~ 1 's disd osur::: and 
voting protections when a court approves a sale of most or all of the 
firm's assets prior to confirmation under section J6J (b) .133 
Following Braniff and Lionel, courts have recognized that author-
izing sales of substantial assets pursuant to section 363 undermines 
the statutory scheme of chapter 11 and have responded by attempting 
to devise as a prerequisite to approval their own substitute for chapter 
l l 's protections. Courts typically subject proposals to sell substantial 
assets to enhanced scrutiny, requiring (as in Lionel) the debtor or 
other applicant to demonstrate a "good business reason" or an 
"articulated business justification" for the sale. 134 Another approach 
1s to require a showing that interested parties have received notice 
comparable to the disclosure mandated by section 11 25 in the context 
req uirements of§ 1 !25, the voting requirements of§ 1126, the best -i nterests-of-c reditors tes t 
of § I i29(a)(7), and the absolute priority rule of § 1129(b). ld. 
D l In Lionel the debtor sought approval of the sale of its most valuable ass.::t, an 82% 
interest in Daie Electron ics, Inc., to a thi rd-party buyer for $50 million. The sale was 
supported by the Creditors ' Committee, which apparently had been a <.l riving forc e behind .i t, 
a nd opposed by the Equi ty Holders' Committee. Lionel, 722 F.2d a t i 065-66. 
1.12 Id . at 1070 (emphasis added). 
1.1.1 Id. a t 1066. U nder the previous bankruptcy laws, co urts had been ·~xtr-: ;nely re luctant to 
approve preconfirmation sales of substantial assets and required as a p rerequisite a showing of 
perishability or other emergency. See, e.g., In re Pcdlow, /.09 F. 84 1, 342 (2d Cir. 1913) 
(s tandard sati sfied by sale of hand kerchiefs that wo uld lose considerable value unless sold 
d ming Christmas season). 
134 For cases approving sales, see, e.g. , Stephens Indus. v. McCl ui1g, 789 F .2d 386, 390 (6th 
Ci r. 1986); In re Delaware & Hudson Ry. Co. , 124. B.R. !69 , 179 (D . Del. 1991 ); In re 
E ngineering Prods. Co., 121 B.R. 246, 249 (Bankr. E .D . Wis. 1990) ; ln re T homson 
McKinnon Sees. , 120 B.R. 30 1, 309 (Bank r. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Channel One 
Communications, 117 B. R . 493, 496 (Bankr. E. D. i',;lo. 1990); ln re C;mvthers IvfcCall Pattern, 
114 B.R. 877, 890 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990); In re Oneida La ke Dev .. 114 B.R . 352, 356 (Bankr. 
N.D.N .Y. 1990); In re Naron & Wagner, 88 B.R. 85, 90 (Bankr. D . M d. 1988) . But see In re 
George Walsh Chevrolet, 118 B.R. 99 , 102 (Bank:. E.D . 1v!o. 1990) (deny i;1g ~;aie) . 
Unlike Braniff and Lionel, none of these cases involved a publicly held firm . Courts ma y bt 
more wi lling to approve pre-:onfirmation sales for privately held firms becau,;e of a greater 
li kei ihood that the firm 's assets are co mpl etel y encum bered. 
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of a reor<o.niza.tion plan. 135 l\!1ost commentators seem to 2tDDlaud this 
{ _,- .. ..;. J • 
.c i . , -1 ·~ 1 ., . . ~ "i ..., 'J t rcatlnent 01 tne 1ssue as ootn sens1b1e anct consistent wri:h c;1apter 11 
., . ~ ' .... d - J. • u . ., 1 ~ . ' as a -~;v.r:o l e. J ... or exarnp1e, r~ayrnor1 r~ Immer ana ~Z1cr1::\r.c~ J.·ie1r~oe:rg 
cite ~L::;:··o~"':.[/~/~ .Lionel, ar1cl their progeny as S11 }:~l=)()rt for tl1eir oveTa.11 CfJ .n -~ 
c-~:r:~~:<.'n -. __ busir1ess _go "'/er:na.nce in cha:pt~· ~ · 11.136 _,:-\ .. ccori"l i r.1~; '(:) I ~-T.i:~},·:~--
n1e r :J:··: r; ·;~.:,' e j. ~1b-~ rg~ tl-ie c~eotor Art ~ ) 033 C53JOT~ 
(lec:l.s ~J-·;(~ ;:~~!. ~Tig d.iscr::tion in cl1apter 1 ~t ():::=:.t;_Lts ~:: cf its ~-) qsi~-:~ -~;S.3 
-::r:.ce c-.!10. ::x~p~rt is e. Tiney 1Jelieve, hovve·ver~ fb?:."t C01Jrts s.b.~J '1J 1 c1 play 2,: 
- . / 1 l d f . l' 1 . ,, • • . . mucr: :rr:ore act1ve ~,_anc. ess ·e erentw_J ro"e n the debtor m posses--
si.o:;'s decision is likely to impose a large adverse impact on one CDD · 
stitutncy or threatens to dominate the outcom-e of the t nti re 
'f;"'nr;:r<>ni7q rjo·n c o;-aie 0'!-'Sllb"tan+ial " S<::·"' tS ·~n· OY" to rrY''hTm?.tinn iJllF' .. .. , u ;eo '"· · --~ --•- ''" r 1. a • 1 . u . ~ • a ~ '-' - y _" •A--1 .' "'··-"-•-- - .. ~~- -'" -- ·-·"' 
trates the latter concern and thus is a context in vvhich courts should 
conduct a more searching review than with respect to m ost other 
business decisions. 137 
Although t he cases and this Nimmer-Feinberg analysis h 0.ve man-
, 1 . . h 1 . ~ - • 1 ageo C.l.ccurate y to pmpomt t e symptoms, tney nuss L1e rnark wrtn 
t heir cure for the section 363 threat. Consider that outside of bank-
ruptcy, sales of most or all of a firm's assets constitute a fundamental 
change. Recognizing that managers should not have ultimate author-
:ity over fundamental decisions because their decisionmaking incen-
t ives are inferior to those of the residual owners of the firm, sta te 
corporation statutes require that such sales be submitted to a share· 
holder vote. 138 Nimmer, Feinberg, and the cases correctly rcco.grt i.:~e g 
similar problem in chapter 11. But the solution cannot be for courts 
. • ..J .. ' l • • 1 ,-.. , 1 
co step m anu more closely scrutiniZe tne reasons ror proposmg tn t 
sale. U nfortunately, judges have even vvorse decisiorm:Ia}~ing incen·· 
tives i:han rnanagers : because judges have no :financial inte:rest in f ne 
enterp rise and are immune from the market forces that constrain the 
"d . . k' . 1 • 1 agency costs or ec1s10nma~ m g by managers, tney are nnJch 1ess 
. • - • 1 " ,.. 1 . . . i • 1 ·• . smte:1 to p1ay the ro1e or nna arb1ter wltn respect to a c:n..:c1a 1)Usm;:;ss 
decision than to perform traditionally j udicial func't ior:os, such ~~.s 
poEcing misbehavior. 13 9 
J35 :);~ e . e.g ., Naron & Wagn er, 88 B.R . at 88. 
136 T'·Ti m;-r:cr & F einberg, supra note 3, at 15-20. 
i 31 id . at 19-20. 
u . De:!. Code Ann. ti t. 3, § 27! ( 1983). 
139 Bai rd ~ supra note 2, a t 13 6-37. Kenneth Scott a rgues tha t courts are poorly sui t;::d to 
n::v ~ e ·.,v bu s i:1c~~s judgments n1ade by the firm's managers bu t ~ven suited t (J : onsider a l!egeC 
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~rfris -r \-:;~;,.:i.o :nrng suggests that sales of stlb:; ta:ntinl assets 2~ h()~~lc1 
clecided b.Y ~3. ~v'rJte) rat:her tl1an by a jtldge. Because cl1apt~r 11 locates 
tl1e f..:Gn::_~~is .~: ·ln the plan process, one c011ld a rgue t}"-tat st1cl1 sales 
lcl .n.ot 
~tf~~~c teo r)z.._~_- · ·>c ::: .. i.n·.: lurJi r1 g the firirt's residua.I O\-v:n.ec) h:;~ -·I::: tl~tt: i1na.1 
32:·./. ~ 4 () 
JPr()pO! l·~;rn.s cf· t he CiJr re11t reg ime point 0 1J t ti1at requiring Ct11 asse t 
. ' ' . . . h 1 1 • 1 r· sales to tr.~. l(C :p !ace 1n cor111ect1o11 vvrt t -~.e p1an process 1g1lO:tes t oe 1act 
that an earlier sale sometirnes is in the best interests of everyone, as 
Y'Jhen the finn' s assets could decline in value. Recognizing that in 
some cases all interested parties will prefer a preconfirmation sale 
does not mean that enhanced judicial scrutiny under section 363 is the 
best ·way to etrect such sales, however. Notice that selling the firm.'s 
assets prior to confirmation in effect creates a liquidation: it reduces 
the parties' interests in the firm to interests in a pot of cash. 14 i Argua-
bly, prohi'oiting preconfirmation sales in chapter 11 \vould merely 
force the parti.,:s explicitly to convert the case to chapter 7 and con-
duct the s::::.le in that context. As long as the decisionmaking appara-
conflic ts uf int,:rests; accordingly, he concludes that the duty of loyalty should be strengthen;:;d 
and ~he dt!ty of ca n:~ eliminated outside of bankruptcy. See Ken neth E. Scott, Cor~;ora~ion 
L::;w and The A merican Lav; Institute Corporate Governance P roj ect, 35 Stan. L. Rev . 927, 
5'46 (1933): s::e also Sh lensky v. W rigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779 (Ill. A pp. 1968) ("it is not [the 
cou rt~;'] function to resolve fo r corporations questions of policy and business managem ent ' ") 
(citir;g Dav!s v. Louisv;He Gas & Elec. Co., !42 A. 654, 659 (Del. Ch. 1928)); George M. 
Cohen , Th'~ Negl.i.;;ence-Opportunisrn T radeoff in Contract Law 65-68 (unpublish .~d 
n1anuscript, on fi le \vith the -:.;irginict Lav·/ Revie\V Associa tion) (discussing co urts ' a bility to 
deter opportun ism) . The tex t makes the same point that within bankruptcy , court involvement 
siiould be :-nin imi zed-- not expanded-where a business decision is at issue. 
140 NGti c.~ that the pa rti es ' ri gh t to object to a proposed sale (a:; p rovided by !he current 
reqniteC:1 ·:::n t of nc• ti,2e a·:1c.l a hearing) is not an adequate surrogate fo r the franchise. ~Even if ;,ve 
pm 10 o n'" side th e lim itations of bankruptcy judges as the final arbii er, the right to object is 
sornething · .. 'try c.iix~ren t from having the final say. The parties m ight: for e;-.:a.mpl::;, vote 
again st a p.1opo:;n l -chai is su jficiently reasonable to \vithstan d legal ol.~jecti ons. 
1 ~-: P.A p~·rx.- on. .O:rrna tion scde inevitably leads to strict adh erence to the absolute ~Dr!or1ty ru le 
bec::.!use r~d ucing the assets of the fi:rn to cash el iminates any leverage j unior creditors and 
s}··ID. :ehold ·~ rs n~ight o·lher~~vise hav:-=. Consider the posture of L ionel a nd Brc."'t ifi~ See suprn 
n c:tt 129 . {) i'le S1.1 Spects th a t in Lionei the eq uity holders ' opposition t ~; th e sale v.r;l s b(.lsed on 
the r1.::a1ir~~- ti oi· 1 t hat th(: sale t,vou ld eliminate their prospects for r ecove ry . In Bran ijj~ th ~ ~arne 
reali B :.i or; probabl y caused junior creditors and shareholders (or Brani ff ' s managers, B.ding on 
thei r beha lf) to !ns ist that the Inemorandum of sale include p rovisions ensuring tha t their 
:;Gtere~:ts .,_v culd S l..ll· ·.;i;ie ccnfirmation. See id. 
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t"l.lS c.f ci1apter 7142 is s1xp~;ri·ut to ju.dicial rev1ev/ of a:ssel 
B.ctic)f'~ ;;~·ou}d irr1prove tf1e cuTre·nt reg1ine. 
frorn c:h a:p~er 11 ln tl-1 is con text . F'i rst; ccrnversior1 t;:1ay ~Je costly 
cc;·i t.~~.::rt t ~ous. -rhe f1(Jclcd ex r) e~r tse (r;_~g ·t-~t c-hill resort to t>~len c L::~=i_ ;_-; ·.: 
des ·i_rt=;.l;]e ear1y sa ies. Secortd, there rna.y be ca~. es in. \.V }lic fi tl1e paci: :~ ~:_.::) 
\.:;isb. to sell raost of the firrn; s assets ·but not to liquidate (based;' r>::~·~ 
haps, on their vie\'-,i of the value of the firm 's rernai ning assets) ; '; 
1)rchibitin.g precoGfirrnati!Jn s::de:s \vonld e1irn.inate tf.tis (Jptior1 bec?.t~_:.:: · ~:: 
firrns -...,vould be forced tc ch.oose bet\\ .. een corr1plete liquidatior1 tlD_d.c { 
. 7 l - • 1 1 l ' ~ ., 1 c11apter ana :torgomg an earq sa1e unuer cnapter 1 . 
A better solution would permit preconfirrn ation sales of substantial 
assets in chapter 11 but t ransfer authority to a more effective d.tc i-
sionmaker. One way to achieve this goal might be to amend the 
Bankruptcy Code to compel a vote by all claimants and shareholder:; 
prior to approval of any p reconfirmation sale of mos t or all of a firm 's 
assets . Though such universal suffrage seems to make sense fron1. a 
contractual safeguard perspective, because every constituency is vul· 
nerab1e in chapter 11 , 144 this framework would probably prove 
unworkable. In contrast to the vote on a reorganization plan, wh<:re 
the deemed acceptances rule tends to focus the voting and w here the 
cramdown provisions provide a means of confirming plans that on'; or 
.. . ~ . 1 '- . more classes rejects, precOTI I! Tmatw!l asset sa1es '.VO LUd reqmre 
approval of the appropriate majorities of every c1ass.145 The :necess ity 
r/ ,;, ["'(-,;<=>v·in o· " rmsensus 'l-'0'1lrl DHJOflifu tl1e ri"k of st.-at.a·:;rir heh~"·i,')··· 'L- L !,.... t.,..,J._ .!.>.,.. . ..l- b "V'- " .o .!. ._, ' .... . _.. ""-"-'""'b - ... j -~ .-. - - "-~ .!. 'v- ~- ~ ~o" -~ '-" ,__ ;,..(. "..:. .. 
~ < l • • ~ < 1. . . h . , 1 ., • f C' .-I • ' • anu wou1a signihcantiy 1mn t re partres a omty to e.~tect a ues1nwk 
··- ·~· ~>-·ni'~;I .. .,..., . ., t<or• "~. -.i. P. 146 .z-1.1 \_, , ,.... • ...,_ ~}..:.. l i..&. t:.l 1 .:.! J::....~ -
~ 42 This is discuss~d in gr,:ater detad infra Part III..t-: .. . 3. 
i43 .A-n exan1ple of this might be a la rge, diversified business that •Nished to sen its app1i ~u lt.::>~::; 
d ivision to help fi.n~tnce the scaling dO\Vn a nd reorga ni zativn of its core busirh~ss of p :cOC I:SSe (~ 
foodo; . 
1,1-1 See supra Pan I I. B.2. 
i45 1-here is no ohviGus v-ray to effect a compron1ise solution. \Vhereas lrn paired class-es th a t 
vote against a r:::organi.z;::tion plan are protected (a.Jbeit irnperf-:ctly) by the ~bso l ute prio~ ·~ty 
rule, see Bankruptcy Code § ll29(b)(2), and dissenters n1ust be given at .ieast the liq~tl c.i.:.ltion 
value of thei r c]airns: id. § ll29(a)(7), the decis ion \v heth cr to approve ;;_ sale of s ub~~tan~ial 
assets is an unquali fiable, binary choice. 
i46 Ano ther possibility \Vt)uid be for the parties to rart icipate in ;:~ sing ie, fir n: - 1.vicL~ vrJt ·,-: 
rather than a class-based vote. Such .::. vote ::::ou ld be ex tremely e:<pensive, ho\vever , and \V:J :Jld 
present nC!ariy insoluble prublems, such as the question of how to weight the votes of ch ,: 
various r:lairnants and int erest holders. 
:500 ['lloL 78:46 1 
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class of c reciitors ~vvho a:r·c icierrtifiecl as t};_..~ tru. ~:; resid ual o~ii/ners {Jf t h e 
·f-ir-ln ·i1 >·::·;· ·~"~ ou·t ~:; l' rk· C·f h ;:olTI;,..,..nntrv ·1'-';r-.!m·-c. !:ri·;;f' f1np '>,'(i'L'·p ·to a "'·i ·no-1e .~lo:>c: -;: !l .o. _ _ , j ,.,..~ U - ,....,.,._; .,.._., \..~""" A .....,. ,, ~ .... _,.,.._':.._..!. ~-_}-' '-'"'-'_; cl...L ' .... ..._,(.? "'I~' .o.l •"" "-' .. _. 1~ U.J.l. 'I. O'' '-".:1. " -l• .. :> V 
of cctrlriTCn~ s·ba re}to1ders to reflect t}1ei r st::(~1JS as resicitxal !JV/Ti~~rs of a 
.)!Jl"/err~ -~~fYi} . iLi:rniti:ng tb.-e fr~:ir.~ch.ise ir;~ rb·l:. Tasr~·{c.:n --~;vould ST!St1T·e b;t};. 
a man:-;;.gec.tJ.c vo·-te ar1c1 ·: hat dccisic~~i3 t:~:;: ;~i .~= .. de by tl1 -~ constitu·~rtcy 
-;;vitl1 the best c1ecisiort rrJ.a}~ i rtP_ .)· incerrtives. r""f J1e rr.~ c,s t obviou.s diffic111tv 
•• ool 
~~vitb. irrl}H.Jrt:iD.g '\: ~his strategy into tl-1e 1_;a n.l.cr·~.tptcy conie)ct is (tetermin_-
:t:n_g 'iVJ:i() th t residual o·~;;ners are. Ir1 t~~e UD. Llsual case w here a firrr1 is 
solvent when it files for bankruptcy, shareholders are the residual 
' . h . ,..1 1 1 ' . ; . owners; otnervnse, t e res1u ua owners are t 1ose cremtors ·w.ttose pn-
ority status leaves them immediately below the insolvency line. The 
residual ownership class could be identified if the Code were to pro-
vide for a valuation of the fi rm a.t or shortly after the filing of the 
chapter 11 petition. But such a valuation would be costly and would 
consume both physical and temporal resources at a time when both 
typically are at a prernit!m. Moreover, as the fortunes of a bankrupt 
finn rise or fall during the course of a chapter 11 case, the firm's 
residual ovmer could change. 14 7 It is thus far from clear when or how 
the clecisionmaking class should be chosen. 148 
FinaHy, the law could designate a particular class as the sole voting 
class. Adopting a blanket rule would eJ.irninate the need for a costly 
• ' fl. T ' - l C' • 'I • 1 l • ' 1 ...11 vaiuatwn. h'.wreover, oy ue:nnmg t11e vot:mg c ass re atlve.iy oroau y, 
by vesting the ·vote in unsecured creditors generally, for example, 
l·a.t:her than some subcai:egory of unsecured creditors, the danger of 
choosing the wrong class as ·voters, as well as the danger that the 
:C(:;Sidual class could change v;hile the case is perding, could be mini-
147 The recent chapter 1 1 case involving A.11egheny Internation.a1 is iilustrative. Shortly 
after the :iirm i'iled for bankruptcy, ;m auc tion developed that a t one point would have resulted 
in payment in full to both senior and un secured cred ito rs. Thereafter, the auction collapsed 
and che firm 's value began to do::terio rate. See, e.g., Cb;·e Ansberry , When Will Somebody-
/\ny;)ody--Rescue Bat tered Aliegheny?, Wall St. J., April 19, 1990, at A 1. By the time a plan 
:finally was confirmed nearly two ye;t\S later, the value of the fi rm had fallen precipitously. 
148 Loi-'ucki and 'Hhi tford cite concerns of this sort as evideT!ce that the residua l owne!·sh ip 
analysis is uitirnately untenable, at least with respect to the related question of to whom 
rna.l1agemen t' s fiduciary duties shou ld be owed . Lynn fl/1 . LoP ucki & William C. Whitford, 
Cmporate Governance in the Bankruptcy Reorganizat ion of Large, Pub licly Held 
Corporations 92-97 (1991) (unpublished manuscript , on f!le with the Virgin ia Law Revi ew 
Association). T he third approac~t discussed in the text can be seen as a response to th ese 
d ifficuit ies. 
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1_~:n sccun;d creditor to vote would mean that the true residual chss of 
unsecured creditors, as well as nomesidual classes o f unsecured credi-
t:·.n ~·~2. 't~ Or1S:o :hovvever, the ber1ell.ts of a clef:J.r ruie out \rieigh t:he co::.t.s c,f 
~y: r.::: r~.~~:ptir:.g to ,deter1T1ine precise ly rhe fir rn's r;esi c1 ual O\Vners. 'Jf':he 
s.naJysis dearly suggests that it is preferable that a msjor-ity of the 
's ~msecured creditors, rather than a court, approve any pr,':con-
r.; ;,·rna tion s:de of substantial assets. 130 
l +9 A related question is that of who in the fir st instance should be entitl ed to propose 2 sale 
of substan tia l assets-that is, who should have the right of initiat ion. One might argue that th.:: 
firm 's residual owners should also be given the right to initiate such a proposal, rather than 
merely the right to vote on proposals presented by management, but such a rule wou ld 
,_mci ermine the managers' abi lity to run the corporation in chapter 11 and also might invite 
str?. tegic behavior by the residual class. The current situation, in which managemen t initiat;;s 
any proposal to sell substantial assets, seems preferable. Notice that this rule mirrors the 
regime in pla.cr: under state law. See, e.g., DeL Code Ann. tit. 8, § 271 (! 983). 
ISO Conducting a vote would require disclosure and give rise to other, related administ rative 
costs. Remember in this regard that the current regime, with its requirement of notice and 
hea ring, see Bankruptcy Code § 363(b)(l), is not costless either. Although providing notice 
and a hearing is p robably less expensive than conducting a vote, the advantages of vest ing 
decisionmaking authority in the residua! class, rather than in a bankruptcy judge, would seem 
to outweigh any differentiaL Moreover, such votes would not be necessary in every case, only 
in the re lati vely infrequent chapter 11 case where management proposes a preconfirmation sale 
of :;ubstantial assets. 
Another potential objection stems from the observation that unsecured creditors' 
d-~c isi onrnaking incentives are skewed in chapter l I. Although unsecured creditors are likely 
to be the firm's residual owners , their residual status differs from that of shareholders outside 
of bankruptcy in that their upside potential is fi xed. Whereas shareholders are en ti tled to the 
r:nt ire res idual outside of bankruptcy , in ba nkru ptcy unsec ured c red itors are entiiled to the 
<:\m ount of their claims on ly, even if th e firm 's fortun es improve dramatically and the 
r.oo rgauized firm proves to be worth much more than the total of the claims. Based on similar 
reasoning, LoPucki and Whitford a rgue th at managers shou ld not manage on behalf of either 
shareholders or creditors alone in chapter ll because their st rategies will be too r isky if 
sho.r:':holder-orien ied ~~nd too risk adverse if creditor-oriented. LoPuck i & Whitford, supra 
note 148, a.t 18, 113- 14. 
For at least two reasons, th ese obse rntions do not alter the ana lys is in th e text. First, 
b'::c'"use firms' fortunes usually will not improve enough in chapter 11 to make full 
compensa ti on of unsecured cred itors a realistic possibility, unsecured creditors ' 
ch:cisi anmak ing incentives should not be skewed in any signifi cant way. Second, unsec ured 
creditors often receive a significant portion of the equ ity of the reo rganized company. See, e.g., 
Lo Pucki & Whit fo rd, supra note 84, at 165 . As a result , they often are the ftrm's fu ture 
shareholders, and will therefore share in nny postconfirmation ups ide. !n short, the skewing 
efi'ect s•::ems likely to be more theo reti cal than reaL 
-~. ,-
5()2 
have noted that th<:: managers 
,.. 
O I a firm outside of 
of a DlCJDosal bv 
)_ &. .) 
ctividends, sharel1olders rn.Llst ;:_:gree to the (pc~ss ibly v~/ealtl1 
decreasing) recapitalization. 152 The conseq uence of the shareholders ' 
1 "" • • • 1 . • ' • ,. . 
c~?Jernrna, he arguesj IS tha t even unc ... es1rab1e recap1tanzat10r1 propos-
a1s are likely to pass. ts 3 
Interestingly, the claimants and interest holders of a chapter 11 
debtor rnay face an analogous strategic choice if a proposal to sell the 
:(irm's assets to a thi rd party is cou pled ·,vith the vote on a reorganiza-
. ... r~ "1 1-, • ., .. 
twn plan. t' or example, suppose a Llm party proposes to purchase 
the fi rm for :£1 million in connection v;ith a reorganization plan that 
will pav subordinated bondholders 50% of the face value of their . "' 
c laims. Assume that all parties know the firm's assets actually are 
v;orth 51 .2 million. If the subordinated bondholders believed that 
rhey would receive only 25 % of the value of their claims under a 
. ' ' + . · ~ • 1 1 . t'- ' "h 'd h ,.. sttlct aosom,e pnon ~y ru!e p.an anc that . 11e oest L ley coUl uope tor 
_3 ' '"'Oct 'h . ' 1 I ,.. 1' t. ,_muer any plan y;;as J "!o, L e class woulu oe fOOllS.tl not to approve 
::h o: oronos.al. O ther classes might be confronted with 1he same tvoe 
.l- ~- ._, ..1 .L 
of d ilemma. As such, the parti~s ' desir e:; f~-:Jr the best possible distribu-
. ' d . ~JC<rl CO lJ l 1 callSe t.hern to appro·ve an ir1efficient sale. 1 5 "~ 
l5l See Gordon, s ~pra note 11, at 48; Jeffrey ~· ·L C5crdon, The f\.1andatory Structure of 
(.'CI~-pcratt.: L at,;v, S9 Colurn. L. P ... ev. 15~!-9, 1577-78 (1989). 
i5 2 Gordon~ s upr<~ note 11, at 47-60. 
153 Insider o wnershi p of significant percentc.ges of ti-l e Rrrns' stock a nd credible threats by 
;r:~inage~e:nt also appear to play a ro1e in shareho ld. r:rs ~ acceptance of these proposals. Id. 
15'· Strakgic cho ice issues appear to h<tve pl ayed a n impo rtant role in the collapse of the 
c ;~~! pt er ll auction of A..llegheny InternationaL See supra note 147. D u ring the auctio!1 , the 
d ttJtO!' twic~ accepted bids frorn Donaldson, LufKi n ~..: Jenrette Securiti es, but \vas pcr~uad ed 
0 :1 both occasions by the other principal bidcb-, Paul Lc:·;y, to reopen the bidding process. It 
\'/ :_lS 11'-.)l a t :tH clear that the Levy b ids offered gres re!" vaLJ.e . Instead, t.}H~ key· cha racteri :; tit: o f 
the Levy bids may have been that they promised be lle~ treatment fo r the shareholders of 
A.l!::;gheny . A.s ~~ rc~ult , shareholders (through their cornn1ittee) put sign ificant pressure on the 
d irecto rs of Pd legheny to consider Levy's offe rs . See .A.nsberry , supra note 147, at A1 
( d~:scribin g the events of the Allegheny case). 
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in. e-=:/ery c}~~apter ~- l cas.e. f~ve :n if the reorgartizatior1 pf{)pc~ ssJ d()(:S ·nc:·t 
ir!~i(J 1ve .2r~ ex1=' lici t s.:J..le:. in \Veigl1ing .. ~vl1ether to ap~prclve 8. :p } a~A e::-1cb_ 
-:12:=\s. rP_tiSt corrT }_)~~-re tl1e 2.trlCit1nt it rnig:ht recei ·ve tlnc1er rl stric1~ :-JUS(),-
But \Vh.at at~.~J ~ .. ~t (.~ ~1ses i :n~.:~:; 1 \'i ~g an ex·p1icit S3.le? R~equ i rir.:.~; th =:! t an ~y 
s::.le c~f t l1e fi r lTl~ S assets intac1 1-Je con(Juc ted separately frorn fhe r-eor-
ganization plan itself migh t dramatically reduce the ::;t ra tegic choice 
problem. In the example, the parties could be required first to sell the 
firm' s ass~ts to the third p.arty and only then to determine the distri-
• · • 1 ·w t · ( , ~ , 1 1 out JO n to each c1ass. l ... ecause Lle part1es we nave assurneu) r.:.n c -.:v tne 
ass\'::ts are worth $ 1.2 mill ion, they presumably would reject ine infer-
• }'+: • r · ~ q j 1" . 1 . · r .. · · 1 • 1c' r OI1er 11 1t. \Ver.~ unt}una1eL rrom tJJe questi0 11 or Ciistri outJ.on. 
T he drawback of sucb. c. rule is that it would chin m anagers' efforts 
to seek out and propose third--party sales. 15 6 A preconfirmation sale 
reduces the firrn's assets to a pool of cash, eliminates uncertain ty as to 
the firm' s f~Jrtunes and the value of its assets (the principal source of 
bo.rg:3.in ing l~ve rage for 1 o ~.ve r priority claimants and intetest holders) 
.. • , _.:; ~ 1 T\" \ .... ·=- n <- 1"; ...... L),s "' f ; ""'.:-- ~ ..... 1-h -=--- · .... r·c.o to the al-·" o' t•te p,-,·,.., r1·,+. , , ,-u -: ? Q. .an 1· o~ dLU Ul u,. ·~ .Lc v .d>~ ul J\" '' ..... u .• , >..- .t >;:; I . ..., -· J :::J 1 ' -. > •'-' t y . k -. U '-. l ~ 
cred itors Vfould be cashed out fi rst, and j unior creditors and sh::1re-
, •• _j ''· ' rl . ~ · .. ~ 1 ·h· b '+ nohJ·=rs orien \VOl l ! u recerve tlt- t e or no·t 1ng. .~. · ~s a result ~ rn ::~ .nagers 
-;.v it"b interests c..Jigned \Vith those of the jun ior creditozs cr sh?.reho1d-
"" r~: " I) ia:T' f o r F Q "' ~ v'"' fhe r· 'VlS·~ desira'o}e sale. 157 ,.,_, .... ._... ~ "'t; ...... t -- -,j (4.11 ..,. _ ~ • V'< - " · ._,. ~ 
155 See Douglas Bai rd & Thomas J<H:kson, Corporate R eorga nizat ions c; nd the: T rea t ment of 
L."!~vers e C·v/n t: rship I nte rests : 1\ Cc·rnrne:H on Adequate Prc tect icn of Secured C>··-:d itv r5 in 
Bunkruptc y, 51 TJ. Chi. L . ll~v . 9 7, 108 ( 1984) (a rguin.g tha t ban kru pt.:;y la \v " :.;hould a irn to 
~<e e r~ the as:;et-deploy1T1ent q uestion 3eparate from the dis tributional question :- anc! to bave th<.~ 
deploymen t q ues tiou ~J. ns>.ve red a·; 3. s~n g !e o, .. vner would ans\ver i t"). 'The st rategic c hoice iss ue 
i ~' co1Ttp1ica!:ed by plan propo nents ' u:.;c of difi-1cult-to-value debt an d .:q•,; it y s:::cu r ities. 
i56 S"=c ~up r3 notes 92-97 and acco n1panying tex t for a closely reiated a nal ysis of \v herher 
sb a re h:.; h:1 ~ rs shoul d 1ose their righ t to vote on a reorganization p la~1 even if th L~ )i nTi is ci ca rl_y 
!57 Se~ LoPucb & \Vhitfo rd , supra note 14·8 (co ncludi ng tha t m :E! L!g: <:: rs oC publicly held 
t1 rn:.s \'-.' ~~ re sornetirnes s hareho !d~: r - o r i en ted in chapter 11 , a nd sorneti rn cs cn.xi i to r-0 ci ;.o~n t :::d ) . 
For sin1ila r re2sons, n1anagep; n1ay also be hesitant to propose precontlnn2;:ion ~~ ~~se t s'lle:s 
under curn::nt 13. \V . TJ nless the fir1T1 is hopelessly insolvent (and the ]o\ve r c l a~::~c:; ;_hu.s urdi kt:ly 
to rec:: ive any d ist ribut io n under a ny p ian), the proposa l so n1eho\v al so gua rJ.n tees :·: reco ·.:e ry 
fo r junior credi tors ~1nd shareholders, or the 'iYlanagers' in terests are, fo r ~; OiJ""lt: (){her reasnn. no 
50tl. Virginia Low Revievv· [VoL 78: ,;}61 
3. Cl 'he Analogy to C"reditors ' Election. of the Chapter 7 r't·usto:e 
., ,. 1 ~ . l f' b . ' Wiy proposa to put precorlllrmatwn sa es 01 su stanLm <:>.ss,;:ts t:.J a 
vote by the unsecured creditors already has been adopted (a. :  ;'::;:::;t i11 
pc;r·;:) in c i1a·pter 7 Ii,qtlidati·on cases . Ir1 partict11ar) s:::ct~<~<·_;_ 
.-'i:-.<:·: .c;-~,;- cp:-: ,,, .• "' "·:~u ··c. d' ,.-.- ""al i> orc;; ""' ··· hp v o " inv- ~1" "" .... ;i t":;~ . ... · c :.. , [('; .... l ~ .. :n. 6 .\ ... . ~--..L·-·-' -,....~.~..J\......, A ......., t..,.. l\..... .. ~.- ... ~ ...._.:.> ~1 ...... " t.~ 10 L ... a.Ju, V .. ' -- - ~ .._.. 1.1 , ::;-~-\~- .p ,_ _, 
3e1ect th.e t rustee by a r-r1 ajority vote (in arnour1t) of t"he t~:-isec urefi 
cl'editors vvho vote, if the holders o f twenty percent in a:rnoun t of these 
claims have requested such an election. 158 Otherwise, the in::erirr: 
trustee continues to serve as trustee. 159 Of course, this mechanisrn is 
less direct th an my proposal to perm it unsecured credi tors to decide 
whether to approve a preconfirmation sale of substaniia1 assz..o: ts. But 
the unsecured creditors' more limited role in chapt-er 7 is easily 
explained. Chapter 7 usually consists of a piecemeal liquidation of the 
firm; 160 rather than selling the fi rm as a going concern, the trustee 
conducts a series of part ial sales. Educating the unsecured cred itors 
as to the m erits of each of these partial sales, and submitting each to a 
vote no matter how trivial the sale, would be as unwieldy as providing 
for shareholders of a publicly held corporation to oversee the ordinary 
operations of the firm. J ust as shareholders elect directors (who in 
tum appoint officers) to be their representatives with respect to the 
firm 's ordinary affairs and vote directly on fundamental issues only, so 
unsecured creditors, the fi rm's residual owners in bankrup tcy, leave 
the day-to-day business of a chapter 7 liquidation to their chosen rep-
resentative, the trustee. 
Bu t what if the trustee in a given case does not intend a piecemeal 
liquidation of the firm? W hat if she proposes a third-party sale? This 
possibility brings the discussion full circle. T he analysis of precon-
Jirmation sales of substantial assets in the chapter 11 context would be 
in such a situation equally applicable in chapter 7. T hus, the trustee's 
1 n~ 1 • 1 J • h 7 ' " proposal to erlect a tmra-party sa1e m c apter can oe seen as a i:un-
damental issue that should be put to a vote of the unsecured creditors, 
io nger aligned wi th those of th e shareholders or lower priority cred ito rs, managers u. r•.:: ~~ •1likely 
to propose preconfirmat ion sal es . 
I'S Bankru ptcy Code § 702(b). 
159 Id. § 702(d). 
160 Baird, supra note 2, at 131 , 146-47. Baird expla ins the rari ty of sales of fi r r,1~; intac t in 
chap ter 7 as res ult ing from the nature o f the chapter 7 trustee's powers, whic h a re des igned 
with piecemeal li quidat ion in m in d, and from the sac rifice of certain tax benefit s if a firm 
liqu idates in chapter 7. See Lo P uck i & Whitfo rd, supra note 84, at 17 1 n. 104. 
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as should a preccnfirmation sa le of substantial assets m chapter 11; 
lik.~wise , a propossd by the directors to sell most or all of a fi rm 's 
assets would ~ ci:"?ger shareholders' voting rights outside of 
]. ~luclicia l attc~ ./·J c(a:le??Lic 'l~reaf1nen t OJ(' ~shareholcle;;--s' i~feeting 
.Requests 
G . h J . . . 
1 1. . 1 . l 1' 1 · 1ven t1 e cra rna;:E: mcrease m cnapter 1 cases mvo vm g puo ICtY 
held fi rms, 16 1 the most important of the chapter 11 voting issues may 
be shareholders' right to compel a shareholders' meeting. In the last 
several years alone, the issue has arisen in three major bankruptcy 
cases. 
In Saxon I ndustries v. NKFvV Partners, 162 the Delaware Supreme 
Court, reasoning that shareholders are entitled to elect and replace 
directors absent extraordinary circumstances, held that Saxon's share-
holders should be able to compel a shareholders' meeting. 163 Share-
holders were equ.ally successful in vindicating their claimed right to 
compel a shareholders ' meeting in In re Lionel. 164 
In I n re Johns-1\lfan vil!e Corp., 165 on the other hand, both the bank-
ruptcy court and the district court rejected the Equity Committee's 
efforts to compel a shareholders' meeting, each court voicing concern 
that a shareholders' meeting would jeopardize a reorganization pro-
posal that had been three years in the making. The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed because it was not 
clear whether the district court had denied the meeting as a resul t of 
16 1 Sh aron Reier, Bankr uptcy Boondoggle, F in. W orld, Oct. 16, 1990, at 36 (noting that i 3 
of th e 25 la rges t bankruptcies have occurred in the last two yea rs). 
162 488 A.2d 1298 (De!. 1984). 
163 Id . at 1301-03 . 
164 L ionel Corp. v. Committee of Equity Sec. H olders of Lionel Corp. (In re Lionel Corp.), 
30 B.R. 327, 330 (Bank r. S.D .N. Y . 1983). 1n a llowing the Equi ty Committee to pursue its 
meeting request in the Delaware chancery court , the ba nkruptcy judge stated tha t " if the 
defendants 'are able to el ect a new board it may be that th e reorgani zation here will take an 
en<irely d ifferent turn .' " I d. (rema rkin g upon the court's observation at an earlie r heari ng of 
the case). The cha nce ry court o rdered Lionel's directo rs to call the requested meeting . 
Commit tee of Equi ty Sec . Holders of the Lionel Co rp. v. Lionel Corp. , N .Y.L.J. , June 28, 
198 3, a t 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 198 3) . 
165 52 B.R . 279 (Bankr. S.D.N .Y .), <}if 'd, 60 B.R . 842. 852 (S.D .N. Y .), rev'd, 801 F. 2d 60 
(2d C ir. 1986). 
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~pedo~n the leorgar~izati o:~1 . 166 TY1e tatter sittlaticn1 ~:va:rrarrt :]. ~j \~r11al of 
the reqlles t ~ the cot7:J\ t:.e!ci , Out t:b.e fcrrr:.er ... ~oes n·Jt, as =~l-~zLcet: ~)1de~rs 
1-.tave tl1e rig:ht to ;1 rr:--::~:\.t~ ·;· _l,g 3. b :; ~;.: _nt 2. s}·~ ~J-~/r;:cJg ti·;_.e rrt.e::t1 I~g "l/ .... c~ : -~ld. cc:c> .. 
stit"ute 3. sr.ch=:;ar 3GU.:;~ Ci.{Hj '/JO·Gl~J CLi_~SC :.,, ~_l'[C -p2 .. rable l lS.TT.it . . :., .__. trF; 
corporatior1. ! 6 7 ()n ce~r~CLlcL th. ~:; ba~nt<.r.urrtcy cottrt c.c rf:-t piled. art 
ex:h.austive record in SU1Jfi(Jrl of -j -r .s original deterrn.iriati(JfJ ctnct agr.u.r! 
e11jtJir1ed th.e ~Sq tJ.i ty (~o r.n rtri. t te-e fro~m see}\. in. g a rr~ i.-~e tir1. g. 1 {)(5 
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nize shareholders' state lav,; r ight to hold a meeting. 169 Nor.,.etheless. 
courts "v..ri11 interfere v~'itl1 s l1areh.olders~ efforts to re1)lace a11d elect 
di rectors if, as appears to have been the ca:::e in Johns-iiianvil!e, the 
shareholders clearly ha.v~ overstepped their bounds.' 7 0 Ni:ost com-
mentators have agreed that bankruptcy does not and should net affect 
shareho1ders' right to hold a shareholders' meeting to replace or elect 
directors.171 For exaxn.1Jle) fv1ichae1 Gert)er's t}lOtlghtf1l l cor11mentary 
166 Johns-!1,-fanville, 80 ! F .2d at 64-63 . 
167 Id . 
168 In re Johns-Manvilk Corp., 66 B.R. 517 (Bank r. S.D. N .Y. 1936). 
!69 Less than t'.vo years after the Johns-;~lcrn'iile decisions~ the Unit~d States I)ist rict Court 
fo r the V/estern District of P~nn~ylvania decided a fourth sharcho!decs' ~neeti ng request case 
in favor of a group of preferred shareholders \vho sought to make use of the voting rights they 
had acquired when A llegheny in te rn at io nal stopped paying dividends p r ior to bank ru ptcy. 
Follo\ving their victory, the preferred shareholde rs conducted a proxy contest and, at the 
subsequent meeting, p laced fiv .;: d ir<:c tors on the twelv:>person board. In re A llegheny Int'l 
[1 987-1989 Transfer Binder] Bankr. L R ep. (CC H ) 1j72,328 ("N .D . Fa. May 31, 1988) . 
P re-Code decisions perrn itti.ng or co1npelling sha reholders' rnec tin gs include i-Iarvey v. 
Plankinton Bldg. Co., i 38 F2d 22 i (7 th Cir. 1943); In re lP. Linahar;, I nc. , 111 F .2d 590 (2d 
Cir. 1940); Van Siclen v. Bush, 78 F2d 66 2 (2d Cir. l ? JS); Tay lor 'I . ?hiiC<del phi<l & Read ing 
R. F~ . , 7 F. 38 1 (E. D. Pa. 183 1 ). Bui see FGrtgang & r,.l~~. yer, supra note 99, :1t 65-68 (a rgu ing 
that shareho1dcrs' me.etings vve re p..:;rn1!tted in pre--Code cases on!y v;here holdi!""lg a l ~1eeti11g 
would have had no effect at ail o n t h~ revrgani z.a t ~cn). 
PO P re-Code ca:;es denyi rtg rnee ting reqnests include In re Potter Tnst rurnent c:a. ~ 593 F.2d 
4 70, 4 74 (2d C ir. 1979) (denying cnee ti ng sought by la rge shardwlder bent on "smash[ing]" 
the com pany); }laugh v. I ndustrie~~, In c. ~ 141 F .2d 425 (2d C1r. 194~-) (affirrn lng stay of 
rneeting pending resoluti on vf' a C:hapter )'~ case that \VRS likely "to te d isn~i s:;ed); Ci-raselii 
Che1n. Co. v. f\ etna Explosiv es C o ., 252 F . 456 (2d Cir. 1918) (d en~_,. ing pi·eferr(~J sh::treho1de;s' 
reques t for a meeting where ;:refe rred shareholders· voting rights uo;;e only after the 
appoint1nent of 8. recei ver and '.,;v'ere ii keiy to be ternporary); /drac (_:or f~L \' . Clernen t, l Bankr. 
c:t. Dec. ( C~ -RR.) 1504 (Ban~:r. D . Conn . 197 5) {denying ineeting \vhece rcq ucs~ came after 
confirmation of a reorganizat ion pbn that would give majo rity control co c urrent creditors) . 
I i i A n a r tic le co-au tho red by C~hain1 Fortgang and Thoma::: ]Vfaycr is a conspicuous 
exception . Fortgang t~':. i\.1ayer , supra no te 99 . Fortgar..g ;J nd iviayer read both the Bankruptcy 
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l~ -r~: ·n~·(• 'IT .. ,..._.--ji c •.r <')f ~~1C0rpryr~-d--ip (r , t9 i'P 1~~ -:-, -.v i--r1 --~_. 1')Sf:-; -_: ~c:e (_'.f .. "_;_ ._r.1.r!. ~ J·,r:a -.:.· ... ,\ •-·-_;_~ 1-'"' J ,f"''- -'~ .t...-.f -._ .• .1! .. .-v ~ ...l ..... .:..J. --6 ,_. ..._,__._ ..__.. .._~ ,_. '- ·· ' --~~ ' "" --' -- , ... 
·l~:i c .. r~s tc) -~ };_ e c;~' i1 -~~-ary, ar1cl •.;;;i·t.h the. c1 ~-c. f't~cs ~ (:'t t:; _.~- -~}-~: i: t;J ::: nc()lJ_\~~ge cc).G ·~ 
~ .. . 1 ' ...... , , 17 _; -_.,_.,/·1_, ,'.J'_-('_·J,_ r:~otg 2. r.t~ z..s. -~J (=>n p.t <:~. :~:.:J . .. -~ 
t hc~se C()r1ce r ns. ; -,~ __;_ }Ie argues th.at tl1e :feclcrD. i pre- xy r :..1Ii::s su.pport 
~}: z·.~ ~}:(/.de~·:~ ' ~~~~~ e;.·1tion. ir1 ,2h8:p~e :; 12 .Jr t ~~ : i .~4 ~ ~ ;;:~; • .:. \':-./ rigl1t to elect 
"''~-1 ·· ·p·~ ·: ,-.~~ rl i-r·~·c 1·')fS h.o.c;:,•Jse r'n,;- ·_Drir. r- 1· ., , ; ... ,..,-. ~ "'. ·""' .; ,, .;r•·p ~ "nr ·nrC1--...~ _._ .1( .. i .! •..-tJ- (..:1•, ,_.'("_. \._l . __ , ~ ....... '!,. -.. '- •J V {.....\ :...... t- ...... .... .._ -~ 1. J.. -'.1-...... . p· ...... ~. '·-· · , · -.1 \., ,...., :1,_ :1 1 !.~ .1 . f .f._.,j t\J.i t" ' ~ 
tectl ~Jn . 175 ;Qn the other l1a:nd ~ l1e r~cogr.tizes t}:,.at tJ1e draftf2rs .of tl1e 
FJankruptcy Code expressed a desire not only to prot·ec1: investors, but 
• ' . . 176 ~· ., 1 a .tso to pro:-note speeay reorgamzatwn. l o reco:c\cHe tnese con -
cerns, Budnitz proposes an elaborate b2Jancing test that presumes in 
mn>'t ' '"'"·''"' ·d·; ~> rPholdPf" "-h·'1n-J'rl !'"" pnt;tlc.rl tr' , Jr-c•t "' f! rl rpnl;:v·e rl ir"'r -..... ~ _ ,_.. .. >,.. ,_...c.:....__. ,.,.. ..;J .....,_,_.:,1._ ... ...... .... :~. , _..., ._, .__...!, _ \.,.; .... :....> u ....... ..... J -~. ... . 1 ...... ~c -.... ..... J ...,. ;, . .... ...., :~ ..... _ ..,..... "' ,_.c.. -\.J u ... .!. ~__,. 
" • 1 1 ;-tors as they )'!lsn .- ' 
I'·Teither the case law nor the commentary, ho wever, provides a per-
suasive respoEse to the question of whv shareholders should retain the . . 
right to hold a meeting if the corporation is insolvent, as most chapter 
11 debtors are. 178 Both courts and commentators suggest that share-
Code and pre-Code case law as precluding shareholders fro m calling J. sha reholders' meeting 
in the chapter ll context. 
172 M ichael A. Gerber, The Electio11 of Directors and C ha r te r 11-The Second C ircui t 
Tell s Stod:holders to Waik Softl y r,nd Carry a Big L~ ver , 53 B:ooklyn L. Rev . 295 (1 98 7). 
173 Ici . 
174 Ma rk :S. Bndnitz, C hapter II Busin c~ss Reorga~izations and Sl,areholder Meetings: \Vill 
the ?v1ee tin g P leas10 Come to Order, o r Shouid the Mee ting be C; nceiied Al together?, 58 Geo. 
Wash. L. Re'-' · 121 4 (1990) ; see also Anna Y . Chou, Corporate Govemance in Chapter 11: 
Electing a New Beard, 65 A m. Bankr. L J. 559 (1 991) (Congress intended ch.ap ter 11 to 
~al vage value for :; ha~eholders and did not in tend to deprive sharchoiclers of insolvent films of 
the right to eieci direcwrs). 
! 75 Budni tz , supra note 174, at 1225-27. 
m Id. at l23 3-3'L 
l'i i Id . c.t 1255 ·66. Budnitz suggests that courts should cornpa r~ the bt:netlts of holding a 
ITF.; e"Ling >.Vith YVhat he describeS aS "rnajor har;ns'' and ~' n1inor harmS.'' fV.iajor harms include 
~:oncerns such .?.s t h~ stage of the case, abus~ of the 2,l--:-\ ~reho l der -- direc ror rc1ations1;ip, and cost 
(\vhere th~ debtor is seriously low on funds). ?vlinor harrn ~-; include the th reat and 
consequences of deiay, and the availabi!ity of altern~!ives to a sha reho lders' tnecti ng. l n his 
vi~'f·i, n:.incr han"Y1S are insufficient, by thenlsdves, to warran t denial of a rneeting request. 
i7 3 U nlike Budr:i tz, Gerber does not suggest that the firrn'~; in so lvency shou ld never be c. 
Factor. F:_sthe;, he ackno'.;l/ ledges that ~~(tjh e re \v iii be case:.; in -\vbich ~1. cl:::btcr is so obviously 
... insol vent thc.t e::(p~rts can agree th3t :; tockholders ha ve no (:quity ... and no prospect of 
ever having an)':, c.nd that meetin g requests shou ld be denied in such a context. (Jcrber, sup!·a 
r~ote 172, at 3 5'~< cf. Budnitz, supra note 174-, at 1248- 49 (direc to1·s of an insoJvent flrn1 have a 
~.:on ti nu ing fiduc!a:-y duty to shareholders). 
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holders need this privilege as leverage in the negotiation process, 
regardless of whether the firm is insolvent; this i5 costly, bmvever, 
. 1' "d . h h 1 , , ' ' • • 1-especla.ly consr enng t at t1 e snarenowers mte~::::st ;s m ucn morf~ 
attenuated in an insolvent firm. 179 
i-p(' OD-r\J ...... -h~n ; s~ic:"' ] i v (~onslrl o,· t~ -==~ -;::..·1-... oct r..f roi-.·t--.c.:-'-. c 1r1 c::.r-0 1 ,..,_..-;1 ~~, 1<"' i---- •t.S.:> , 4 }'' -'"'-- - t. L A l ; . ~ _ "-"- ' ,,, , _ '-' ..._, , Ui ,:, ., ,,;~_._, -'--- •'-' " .)."-<- <C •. J • .!! 
, • ~ 1 1 1 rl h . , . ' oankruptcy. .becau.se cnapter 1 1 ueutors ust..;o.Lty ~:re mscJvent, an 
1·.,-,-,.,-,n c. ~~ ...... t"' l~n'll.d~""'~t~ f"\ .,... " "~1 0U1d ]oa~· 'P , h.-....,-a.hnlf1 c. ·.>l'ro .,.., . . ;'r; ..... , ~- ~-+1-.~ ....... r. i\1. ;rr·.-.~ _.tl~:.A. ,_,u ... a. \._., 1 y~ u.uU.11 """' 1 · .... ~c v .._. Jl.l (..l. .t LJ.i.VH...A\....!..:, •di~.b u. UlJ..l.u~5 . _•., LLJ lC"" 
over, shareholders may not expect to receive mucrt even if the fi rm is 
reorganized. 180 Thus, shareholders h ave little to lose when they 
invoke their right to call a meeting and are unlikely to be const rained 
by the possibility that their use of this tactic as a bargaining tool could 
jeopardize the entire reorganization. 
Several of the decided cases support these suspicions. The E quity 
Committee in .Johns-JI.lanville requested a meeting for the avowed 
purpose of imploding the current reorganization plan. 18 1 1 he Com-
mittee's willingness to unsettle the negotia tions, even at the risk of 
jeopardizing any prospect of eventual reorganization, appears to have 
stemmed directly from the probability that shareholders' interests 
would have been significantly diluted under that or any other plan. 
Similarly, in I n re Potter Instrument Co., 182 a 45% shareholder sought 
to compel a shareholders' meeting for the purpose of electing din~c­
tors who would contest a chapter 11 arrangement that had been 
approved by creditors, notwithstanding that such a meeting might 
sound the "death knell" to the debtor firm. 183 
T he "clear abuse" test relied on by the courts is an insufficient 
response to this problem because shareholders' incentives are system-
atically, not just occasionally, fi awed. Moreover , any d irectors 
179 In additio n to arguing from a positive perspecti ve t hat sha reholders' continued right to 
call a mee ting, despite insolvency, is consistent with chapter 11 's rela;~a tion of the absolute 
priority rule, Gerber suggests that permitting sha reholders to reta in this bargaining tool is 
unproblematic because it merely effects a redistribut ion fro m higher priority creditors to 
shareholders, without affecting the size of the overall pie. Gerber, supra note 172, at 343. 
Baird and Jackson, on the ot her hand, have argued t h ~. t red istribution in bankruptcy by its 
ve ry nature ultimately may reduce the size of the pie. See, e.g., Baird & Jackson, supra note 
155; Jackson, Creditors' Bargain, supra note 2, at 860-7 1. 
!80 See Jackson & Scott, supra note 89, at 158-59. 
18 1 Johns-M an ville, 60 B.R. at 852. 
182 593 F.2d 4 70 (2d C ir. 1979). 
18' Id. at 474-75. 
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elected by shareholders also will have suspect decisionmaking incen-
tiv-es. T hus, the effect of permitting a shareholders' meeting would be 
' 1 . . ' . t' . t . t ' ., d r • . ' 1... \ ' to put cec;s10nmaKmg au non .y m ne nan s 01 mrecwrs WHO c o nm 
rtpr-:::;;::nt the best interests of the corporation as a whole. 
·:.;~·--~-~_::: con c1us!OI1 that directors se1ectecl by share1-toiclers "'!.vi1 l s11 8J· -:~ 
, ,..., .- ·-.,- ",,.., ~- ~ ~~ -l 1·-· · it ..... -.; / 1Z' ·~oor ri~r ~~ l· onn-· ~L .... ~n cr ~ v .. ,,·.~n ~ l· .. .. r=:.:::' rrl -::4 ' ' ""' p ... -::.· --r . ·, l ·, ',, i -~·· ... :· 
i .• ., ;_} ]""-"'· -- '~L-- : , l t·· · • U·-~1 .'> 11.< •--' •'- l • 0 " ''--'-- • L -,~ • .> Ccj C> ·- ·-.; J :Jc, . . _'J •;:,<_ , 
-tci c>.s p ~~~t~ . ..::\rguably, eve11 directors elec~ted by th,= sh areholclers v;-i li 
r r\n°·i··rr• ~T":P...J }·....-, t ha t ," TI"'"' a £:i1 fffi ant<>f <O 'oan \r fU0T. (" '~T rl; r e;-. ·t r )r<; o~'llo ... . ,\ c.)~ " '~· '·' ' ·-U ;, .l et.: •. ·J- ,,._ ~ l • · '-- ·" ·- ::> u • . '}:' - ~), \.LL· .. ·~. , ~ , ~ ~'"-
j'i_ dUCl£"t f Y duties to creditors as well as to shareholders. 1n theory, 
t r1e:n, di rectors cannot simply side with shareholders if shareholders' 
interests conflict with those of creditors and of the fi rm as a whoie. 18 "1 
But this response is hardly satisfactory. First, it has not been empiri-
cally shown that d irectors who are chosen and elected by sharehold-
ers will truly embrace the interests of the estate as a whole once they 
have taken offi ce. 185 One suspects, to the contrary, that such directors 
will continue to represent shareholders' interests, although the fer-
vency of this favoritism may be limited at the margin by recognition 
of !:heir duties to creditors and the estate. 186 
Second, even if directors elected by shareholders were capable of 
putting their loyalty to one side, it seems ironic that shareholders, a 
constituency whose decisionmaking incentives almost always will 
conflict with the goal of maximizing the value of the fi rm, are given 
the right to choose the debtor's d irectors. In short, if one single con-
stituency should be entitled to call a meeting in chapter 11 to replace 
the tirrn's directors, shareholders seem an unlikely choice. 
Even the most persuasive of the arguments marshaled on behalf of 
granting shareholders' meeting requests proves problematic on closer 
inspection. As noted, both courts and commentators place heavy 
IK< See, e.g., Budn itz, supra no te ! 74, a t 1248-49. 
185 T i:e chspter 11 experience of A llegheny International rei nforces th e suspicion tha t ti1ey 
will not. T he five d irecto rs who were elected by the prefer red sha rehol ders in that case were 
p:;rceived by the parti es to be ad vocates, first a nd foremost, of the p referred shareholders who 
dectt:d th,;m , notwithstanding the d irectors' duties to credito rs a nd the c:;tate as a whole. The 
itknt ific a tio n was so strong that these directo rs were oft en refer red to as th e " Spea r Leeds 
-:li ;-cctors" (Spear, Leeds & Keilogg bei ng the preferred sha rehold er most responsible for tl1eir 
elect ion) . See A nsberry, supra no te 147, a t A 8. 
Jxt, Lo?ucki a nd W hit fo rd conclude that managemen t 's al legiances a re uncer tain in chapter 
11 See LoP uc!<i & W hitford, supra note 148, at 8 1- 84. Ho we ver, none of the cases in th eir 
st ud y a ppears to have involved the replacement o f directors du ring ban kruptcy wit h new 
d irecto rs elected by the debtor' s sha re holders. It seems likely tha t, as in A llegheny, s uch 
dir"ctors wou ld (at least nom ina lly) be beho lden to the constituency that elected them. 
510 Virginia Law Revie;y 
that shareholders' right to elect 
~r~-·p-ortny>·~- 1-..-:-;..fpn-l~n_,.. ,--l o·utsir10 of1-)"n1/y_1.,..p-.tc:::J ,.,--f'~):-Lr;vq •::l";;)] •"; \j t }-.;~ .,-..,r,orrn·.~ lLtl_ · ~ _(1;.1:.. ,) .... .1.1 ..... 6 ll.f.Al L..t "- l- ,-.,_,u. \ ,..., L d..!. ,_......_ U_}J,., ,./. .J.. •,:t. .i.'.._ 1 1t4b -w.Y~ ("4 ./ ,11.\v _t .. ..-..._ "-"'-t .j0) 
atrveJ 2~I~gt1 e, removes one of fe\v mec~bc;_rli.srns by \Vtt1c11 share-
h.o.idcrs are ~J.b i~-~ to rninirnize tl1e tb.reat of firr:n. :_ 87 
r1gl1t tfJ co:n·.~-
·- 1 ,~ ,-..·l-,.,. ,.. .~l.-.-,-1 ..-1 . -:;,...-·,-.." ·; e t~...,.-o -~ ,-,r;......., ,_;"). so:::-.r~ 1'--~, ~~ -~ " ·i· ~:- ~- -·L ""f' ,-·."-,-").-...:-.e\.. , .. .,..,'.- 'o:"--.:-r-·t-. 
pe~ d. :?Ji1GlC: l tL .. tu.:_l0 !.Ylt:t\,J.ll6 \..-c.t11 UL -1..-Cli; . .!.~. ,_,,J.s.1 ~.. ~::? ... t , a.::; L...-t.JL1.01JL•.:::tiL ;:\/1>.-ll 
tl1e perva.~si \It: restr11Ct1Jri11g of otl1er parties' conrract11al safeguar(ls 
thc.t t3.kes pls.ce ir1 cl1apter 11 . 
2. ~Vho Should the Voters Be and ~¥hen Should 
iE:lections .Be Jfleld? 
If shareholders should not be permitted to ccmpei a me:et}ng, '.Vh() 
should hold this right? Again there are t;;vo possible ansv;ers: either 
all constituents or the true residual owners of the firm. 
A.s in the discussion of asset sales, focusin g on contractual safe~ 
l • • • ' 1 h . f . ' (' t_• guarus :rmgnt po1nt towarc t 1e c mce o a umversa_~ lranctnse: 
because each constituency is exposed in bankruptcy, arguably each 
should have a voice in governance. 189 Universal sui-Irage in the asset 
sale context is ad ministratively infeasible because such a system 
would require the approval of every class for a sale of assets. Interest-
. 1 . , (' h" fi ' q . . mg1y, umversaJ JTarF:i 1se seems, at · irs t, to no1c more prom1se m con-
nection with the election of directors. In particular, the Bankruptcy 
Code could eiirnmate the necessity for unanimous approval, or for 
vveigl1ting eacl1 claimar1t or ir1terest l1olcler'.s 1~.roteJ by perrnitting eacJ.1 
cc)nstit!Jer1cy to elect a preascertained 11f.l!"flber (or 1Jerce11tage) c:f 
·::lirectc1rs. 190 
iS 7 Budnitz, ::.upra note 174, at 1248-50; Gerber, supra note 172, at 341-L!-8: i'·;fark A .. 
{.:=leavesJ Cosrncnt, Stockholders' Pjghts in a Corporate Der.nocracy -lJndcr [)el~l'.:\'are 
Corpc-ratiDn I.8'N Duri ng Bankruptcy: Saxon Ind~!stries, Inc. v. J.·'l/(FH/ .ParUI2rs] 11 :Ciel. J. 
Corp. L . f~2 l ( l 
188 See ~;upra nGtes 76-87. 
!SQ S-.:e supr:::~. notes 144-46 and acco11tpanying text. 
i 9° Cf. Del C-ede /\.nn. tit. 8, § 141(d) (1983) (authorizing flrrns to pro·;tdc tl;r a classified 
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diluted by the presence of di rectors beholden to other classes of dai.m ~ 
ants, but the directors ' efforts to serve their respective constituencie3 
would make decisionmaking consensus virtrtally impossible. t 9 1 
Th 
, . . 1 r. ·- . . . ., . , . . 
us, tnougl1 un ;versat su1rrage oners more mtngmng posswut ~ :: s; 
;,, •he "Ontnyt (]f' "• f'i :rec•c·rJ'·::. l P'·=·(' ' ; ,,r'. th e> n i r A;,-'! .,, ; ~l- rns~,,,-. ·;· ~,-, , .. , ' c···· 
J.A!. t _ ........ J., t,..\,... .~o. .Jl (J. Ul.l _,..._.t / :",-.. .._ ._;_-__._, ~~ .•. } d. '.. L.:.-':o. . 1 .oi ... \. . ...l • .t:...l ~t o/}. l,,;,.i .<. '-.. ~\....-Vo,.. :._'-) j(_.... ~ o .... _; 
C)f substantial assets, E111i ti11g tr~ ~; fran c1-iise to tf1e firm's true resict ~~t ;:d 
b., 't J ,. . • owners-presuma .y 1 s unsecureo c remwrs--emerges once aga1n as 
the better choice. As before, fhe chief virtue of such a rule is its eiTe:c t 
on decisionmaking incentives. T he rule also avoids the ki::1ds of 
administrative diffi culties that make universal suffrage w.rge1y 
umvorkable in the absence of a focusing device like the deemed 
acceptances rule. 192 
Selecting unsecured creditor~. as the appropriate voters still leav.ss 
the question of when elections should be held. Consider first the pos-
sibility that directors elected by shareholders might continue to favor 
shareholders' interests after the firm fi led for chapter 11 r~lief, 
notwithstanding that these interests would be then merely speculative. 
One could plausibly argue, based on this perception, that the firm' s 
directors should be replaced, or at the least an election held, at the 
commencement of every chapter 11 case in order to ensure that direc-
tors have proper decisionmaking incentives. 193 
But holding an election and replacing the firm's directors at the 
start of every bankruptcy would be both cumbersome and expensive. 
One reason the Bankruptcy Code permits current management to 
remain in place as the debtor irr. possession, with virtually the same 
rights as a trustee, 194 is to minimize disruption to the firm's ongoing 
business. Moreover, if current managers feared that new directors 
19 1 Martin Lipton and Steven Rosenblum make a somew hat similar point in arguing tha t, 
outside of bankruptcy. directors should represent all corporate constituencies rather than ju:;t 
shareholders, but that ··[i]t is not necessary, an d indeed it would be divisive, to elect separate 
classes or groups of directors to represent the various corporate constituencies, or to have any 
constituency have a separa te special right to nominate or advise on the nominati0>1 ()!" 
directors." See Martin Lipton & Ste ven A. Rosen blum. A New System of Corporate 
Governance: The Qu inquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Chi. L. Rev. 187, 24 7 (1991). 
192 See supra note 66 ~tnd accompanying texi. 
193 Such a rule would . be similar in mcmy respects to the contractual provisions th at give 
voting rights to lenders or preferred stockholders if the firm defaults on an obli gai. ior~ or 
considers a particularly risky undertaking. The notion in both cases is that defaul t or c: 
bankruptcy petition is likely to reflect a change in risks such that sha reholders no longc:r are 
the appropriate decisionmakers fo r th e firm. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at '1-0'~ 
194 Bankruptcy Code§ 11 07. 
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might immediately replace them, notwithstanding the business con-
tinuity contemplated by the drafters of the Bankruptcy Code, they 
would have a perverse incenti ve to delc.y en tering chapter 11. 195 As a 
r t s·ult, wholesale turnover at the 5tart of the bankruptcy co.se 1s a::; 
-. -: '"~""'')"'" · '" -:"'rc·.(,. ~ 'f ;o ·"'·r.t i J~ ! q 6 
u. ~ .\'-i~ L :. d . .-l.J. ·• ~- \....Jr-• ...... 1 .\! . 
The same concerns also suggest that the fi rm 's residua! o ;,ov ners 
should not have an automatic right to compel &. meeting. The Ban)<:-
ruptcy Code should provide some opportunity for the replacement of 
di rectors, however, because at times rn.is::nanagement or stalemate will 
make an election desirable. 
One possibility that could effectively balance these concerns wou1d 
be to adopt the "for cause" standard, used elsewhere in the Bank-
ruptcy Code to justify replacement of management \'lith a trustee. 197 
The "for cause" requ irement would establish a rebuttable presump-
tion that the current directors should remain in place for the duration 
of the bankruptcy case. 198 Because replacement of directors is a 1ess 
draconian measure than appointment of a trustee, courts should and 
presumably would require a lesser showing of "cause" in the former 
context than they currently do in the latter. 199 Such a rule would 
ensure continuity, while still providing an alternative to appointing a 
trustee on those occasions when the firm' s management is in fact 
195 Even if their jobs were secure, managers wou ld lose the advan tage of the prebankruptcy 
working relationship they are likely to have established with the current directors . 
196 The directors themselves o ften do no t wish to reta in th eir positions, however, due to the 
significant increase in board meetings and other responsibiliti es that typically accompanies a 
chapter 11 petition. One response to thi s problem would be, and should be, to increase 
directors' com pensation in bankruptcy. See, e.g., Lipton & Rosenblum, su pra note 191, at 227 
(making a similar suggestion in connect ion wi th th eir proposal that directors be elected on a 
quinquen nial basis). Another possibility would be to attempt to tie the directo rs' 
compensation to the success of the reorganization. In the event that directors do resign. th~ 
remaining directors themselves should fill th e vacancies, as the laws of many states permi t 
them to do outside of bank ruptcy. E.g., De l. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 223 (1983). 
197 Bankruptcy Code § 11 04(a)(1). Section 11 04(a)(2) al so authorizes appointment of a 
trustee " if such appoi ntment is in the interes ts of creditors, any equity security holders , and 
other in terests of the estate . ., 
198 Court discre tion is less problemat ic here than in the context of preconfirmation sales of 
substantial assets because the court is decid ing only whet her there will be a vote. The ac tl.!al 
choice of directors would be made by the firm 's unsecured credi tors, not the co urt . 
199 See In re Microwave Prods. of Am., 102 B.R. 66 1. 670 (Bank r. W.D. Tenn. 1989) 
("appointment of a trustee is the exception''); In re Tyler, 18 B.R. 574, 577 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
i 982) ("ap pointment of a tr ustee ... is an extraord imJ.ry remedy"). 
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otherwise serving ineffectively. 
for ;::1;~C t: f:~tance by a clas:; of c}z .. i:z~:- l s , ti1Clt CL rr~J.j!Jfity ~tTl 
t\vo-,. t l1irds in amount of tfAe clairn_;; vote i:n fo.vcr c· [ tl1e P-~··::·i~;c3E:-d t£'\)i·~ -
gcmization plan and that this stan.dard i:ends to operate 8. t\VO· .. 
+1-, ; ~_ ..J...., :S;. "~ln offfi"'J· O r1"tv "! !.r>. -:- ~--oo ,, ::..,..~1)~..-o.r,..-,a·:-.·f 20 0 
LdiL\,:, .oc,~J'~ - .l •:A "" ') >'~' LL\.·.0 .! ·~ · ··l''!l'., ... !H.]; . • 
A two-thirds voting requirement gives any claim;:;,nt who accp .. ures 
claims totaling just over one-third in amount veto povver over the vote 
~ 1 1 . . c 1 ' , ' ., . . or t 1e c"ass m questwn . - ourts a reaay nave oegun to struggh': with 
h . C' h 1' . • ( ' " \ • 1 l' . ' . ' t e quest10n m w at 11m1tatwns H any J shou.ec oe 1mposeG on part1es 
. f 1 • 20' ,.,..., 1 . . . .. 1' (' exercise o tms veto power. ' 1 ne aramat1c mcrease m Ulc tracmg m 
bankruptcy claims20 2 suggests that the issue vvill play a crucial role in 
fu ture bankruptcies. 
], Assertion of Veto Power in A llegheny International 
The scope of the veto power was a central issue in In re Allegheny 
International, Inc. 203 In January, 1990, nearly two years after ABe-
200 Se-:: supra note 99 and accom panyi ng tex t 
201 Se·~ infra notes 208-09. 
202 See, e.g., D iana B. H enriques, Speculat ing on Bankrup tcies, N .Y. Times, Oct. 2 1, 1990, 
§ 3, at 15; Stephen Taub, A ttention Vultu re Shoppers, F in . World , March 6, 1990, at 16. 
Despite the apparent virtues of cla ims trading, such as increased liquidity and the likelihood 
that the purchasers of claims will take an ac ti ve interest in the bankruptcy case, Fortgang & 
Mayer, supra note 99, at 4-6, courts h2.ve viewed the phenomenon with cons i derul~· l e suspicion . 
The courts' principal concern is that clai ms traders will t a k.~ advantage of claim2nts who may 
be poorly informed about their p rospects for recovery . To prev•ont th is r<:sult, several 
bankruptcy courts have devised their own safeguards. See, e. g., In re Alleghen)! :i nt'l, 100 B.R 
24 1, 243- 44 (Ban kr. W .D. Pa. 1988) (se llers m us t be given cu rrent est imates of the value of 
their claims and the right to rescind); In re Revere Copper and Brass, 58 '3 .R. l (BanlG. 
S . D .l'~.Y . 198 5) (requiring that sellers of cla ims be given 30 days to rescind !he sale where 
buyers fa iled adequately to info rm sellers of their opt ions). One co urt even deni-::d a transfer 
al together, where the buyer failed to disclose its in tention to propose a 100% plan, though 
Bankrup tcy Rule 300l(e), which governs transfers , trea ts the court's role as largely ministeriaL 
ln re Chateaugay (In re LTV E nergy Prods.), Ch. 11 Case Nos. 86B-1 12270/3 34, 402, L!-M 
(Ba nkr. S.D.N .Y. Mar. II , 1988) . The new ly revi sed vers ion of BankrupL y :'~ ule 300 l (e) 
elimi nates such ad hoc measu res by givi ng the transfero r 20 days to reconsider the transfer, 
afte r which t ime the court must substitute the transferee for the transferor in its records. 
N otice that neither the old nor the ncv; version of Bankruptcy Ru le 300 l (e) gov,:rns transfers 
of publicly traded bonds. 
203 118 B.R 282 (Bankr. W.D. Pa . 1990). 
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gJleny 1dea 1ts oanKruptcy petltlon ano a year a1ter an auct10n or tile 
cGmpany had collapsed, the bankruptcy court approved a disclosure 
statement submitted by A1leghenv. thus pavin2: the \Vay for a vote on 
t_l ... ' .._, ~ 
. ' l ·r , .• ~ , I ' . ' 
~··-~c)rg ~;. :n1zec ccrr1par1y. ..~..n an etiort to ensure deteai or t.ne uetJ"LOl s 
.
,--] fj :·; ;::; nri to be·· ·c· te• the procner: r<.: nf' i' on 'l·l ,..,,, ina it" O "'V'l P' "!;:;n J a r-npic·;;: l _) ,_.... ,...,, -.... '-.l- ._ A. L..i. - .1.. '-'t-' ..;lJ "--" .&. '-' AJ. I. .i .o. .LLL.._b J f' .l - . .i. '4 ' · t-'~ ~.,1~ :.J.. 
pL~rchased cla ims sufficient to give it a blocking position in t·,r.;o 
classes, the class of secured bank lenders and the senior class of 
' • · 205 ~1r·h l . d ' . unsecurec c.ta1ms. 'n en .~apomca cause tnese classes to vote 
against the debtor's plan, thus preciuding confirmation, Allegheny 
asked the bankruptcy court to disqualify Japonica's ·votes and to con-
firrn the plan. 
The bankruptcy court opinion in Allegheny points out that section 
1126(e) specifically authorizes a court to "'designate' (i.e., d isqualify) 
the ballot of 'any entity whose acceptance or rejection . .. was not in 
good faith, or was not solicited or procured in good faith.' " 206 Thus, 
a blocking creditor must wield her influence in good faith. The line 
bet-..veen good and bad faith is not always clear, however. A creditor's 
votes should not be disqualified merely because she purchased claims 
(as Japonica did in Allegheny) for the purpose of defeating a reorgani·· 
zation plan . But a determination that a creditor's intent is unrelated 
to her statu.s as a creditor of the class in question may warrant 
designation. 207 Accordingly, a creditor can reject a reorganization 
plan if she expects that a subsequent plan will provide greater 
value, 208 but not because she runs a competing business and wishes to 
see the debtor eliminated. 209 
20.: !d. at 286. 
205 Japonica purchased a total of 33.87% of the s~cu red bank claims. With respect to the 
~::nior unsecur~d claims, Japonica purchased slightly less than the 3:1% technically necessary 
to escabt ish veto power over the class, but because mi!ny of the claimants in this class 1-vert:: not 
expected to vote, and in fact did not, Japonica held an effec tive veto in this class as well. Id. at 
286-87 
20<. lei . at 287 (quoting Bankruptcy Code§ 1126(e)). 
207 Id. at 289 (citing In re P-R Holding Corp., 14-7 F.2d 895, 397 (2d Cir. 1945)). 
::os See, e.g .. Insinger Mach. Co. v. Federal Support Co., 859 F.2d 17 (4th Cir. 1988); 
i"1lo !-.: ava Corp. v. Dolan, 147 F.2d 340 (2d Cir. 1945 ); In re PiDe Hill Collieries Co., '1-6 F. 
Supp. 669 (E.D. Pa. 1942); In re Gilbert, 104 B.R. 206 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1939); In re Landau 
Boat Co., 8 B.R. 432 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981 ). 
2oo See In re MacLeod Co., 63 B.R. 654 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 19S6) (de~ig:1a ti ng votes of three 
crt:ciitors employed by debtor's competitor); see also In re P-R Holding Corp ., 147 F.2d 395 
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1 rte court 1n. /itLegizeny concltlc~ e tt1at JaplJDlCa<:; rr.:_ C>(iVt:: ~; 1ei1 rnto 
th'c latter category. Because Japonica appeared to have bought its 
t • .. .. •• • l ~ 1 1 ~ 1 c1mms tor the purpose or assertmg contro, over tne oeotor ana tne 
reorgai"l~zation. proces~~' rafher than to fttrther any in teres t sufficierrtly 
rel:.:t tc:cl tc' its s~ ta t r~s ~-)~ s ~l rnernber of tl-1e t'\At'O cl<J.sses t) f cL;._i rns . t}~c co·u. :· t 
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their voting rights. A1though courts appear to apply the stan dar d in a 
principled fashion, 211 the need for judicial oversigh ( 212 cou1d be signif· 
ican tly reduced by changing chapter 11 's voting ruh~s . 
2 The Need to Replace the Supermajority Voting R equirernent 
w·irh Simple Majority Voting 
Recall from Part H.D. the problem with the supermajority voting 
requirement set forth in section 1126. Supermajority voting is useful 
' ' ' 1 . h ' d h on1y ;vnere, as m a c ose corporat10n, t ere 1s a anger Lat corporate 
decisions will by their very nature affect majority and minority share-
holders differently. This is not the case in voting on a n~organization 
plan, where each member of the class will receive a proportionate dis-
tri bution.2; 3 Thus, replacing the two-thirds in amount standard '.Vith 
(2d C ir. ! 945) (bad faith es tabiished where purchase of claims resu lted in di sc rimination 
against creditors who did not seil their claims); In re Featherworks Corp., 36 B. R. 460 
(E.D.N.Y. i 984) (bad faith found where party changed vote after being paid outside of the 
reorga niza<ion plan). 
210 In re Allegheny, 118 B. R. a t 285. 
21 I .~cco rding to one COinmentator, the case law reveals two diffi-~rent approac hes to the 
issue o f good faith. Some co urts, based on the Supreme Court's decision in Young v. Higbee 
;::,:;., 32.:I U .S. 204 (1945) , ask whether the creditor in question is seeking better treatment than 
that received by the other m embers of her class; other courts, based on In rt' P-R Holding Co., 
j.J-7 F. 2.d at 897, find bad faith whenever a creditor is usin g her vote to ccdv,;nce "an interest 
other than ;:;n interes t as a creditor." See Andrew A frick, Comment. Trading C!aims in 
Chapter i 1: How Jviuch Influence Can be Purchased in Good Faith U nder Seci!on 1126?, 139 
U . P~:. L. Rev . 1393, HO.S-08, 14i6-22 (1991) (concl uding that good faith 'ho uld be pres•Jmtd 
bc{.:ause blocking c reditors play a dcs·irabie role in most chapter 11 cases). 
~ ~ ~ Agai n, judiciai di scretion is much less probl ematic here than in ihe co nte:\t of saies of 
substan ti al assets because cou rts ;:;re not calied upon to make business dec ision s. instead , they 
~crutinize for n1 isbehav·io r, a task n1 o re in line \Vith thei r competence. Cf supra note 139 and 
accompanying text (management, not cou rts, should make business dec!sion s) . 
213 See also Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 108, at 1357 (simrk n~ajority voi ing is 
sppro pria;e in arm 's-length merger decisions where all stockholders will be treated ~~like); 
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a rnc~j.o ~·i t~/ rr;:: -q tlirtii1e:rlt \fVOtd.d. sacrifice little in terms of cla.irn .r:u:~t pr~)-
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;lir11.tnisl1 in t110 relat ed. ·V~ravs tl-1e threat of hold-up by b iocl<.-lnx crcCti-
J -
~p.arty ti~i.a.t bD.ys r£1ore tha11 ·fift·y percent of the claims in a c~::~.ss s.eerr1s 
a.t leEtSt m.a~::gi:n .a11y less lik_-e]y to pLrt its investrr1ent at r isk. l)y \VieJ.d. irtg 
its vtto i:n s. f:1shion inconsisten t with the best in terests of the cls.ss. nc. 
In the d ose corporation context, fiduciary duty stand.ards stTike a 
b<:JJance bebveen minority protection and the risk of strategic behav-
ior. Kn Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc. , 215 for instance, the court 
held that a minority shareholder who continually vetoed the dividend 
proposals made by his fel low shareholders had violated his fiduciary 
duty to the firm and the other shareholders. 2 16 Section 11 26(e) per-
forms precis,~ly the same function--it serves as a fiduciary d uty limi-
tation on blocking creditors' use of their veto power. 
:f\,1y analysis suggests, however, that supermajority voting is both 
unnecessary and undesirable in chapter 11. This raises the question 
~whether replacing the supermajority standard with simple majority 
voting so red uces the threat of harmful behavior by blocking creditors 
.as to obviate the need for the fiduciary duty requirement no1N in sec-
ti~;:n i 126(e) . 
Because a change in the voting rules would reduce, but not elimi-
nate, the likelihood of strategic behavior, section 1126(e) dearly 
should be retained. The fiduciary standard that courts apply to par-
lv:Ii1ton Harris (!L i\.rthur P ... av iv, Corporate Governance: Voting Rights and f'Aajority P ... u.les, 20 
J. F in . i:':son . 203 (1988) (deriving forma l conditions under which simple majority voting is the 
3oclaEy optirnal corporate gover:nanct: rule) . 
214 The co;1cern that claimants act in the best interest of their class should not b·: confused 
'.vith a concern for the best interests of the firm as a whole. A claimant :1cting in the b.~st 
interes ts of her c:ass may well urge actions that , from the firm's perspective. a re suboptimal. 
See Bc.i rd & Jadc.son, supra note 155, at 106. T he problem with a claimant who us:~s her vot·~ 
strc<tr::gically is that C:{e·;cising the franchi se in that fashion is likely to be inconsist o::nt 'Nith the 
interests both of the class and of the firrn as a whole. 
215 421 i·J.E.2d 798 (Mass . App. Ct. 1981). 
1 16 :! d. at 800. T he shareholder apparently favored reinvestment of earning:>, raiher than 
di Yid:;nds, because of the tax consequences to him of dividends. The remaining shueholders 
suc:d when }le refused to withdraw his opposition even afte r the Int ernal Revenue Service 
threa tened to, and th en actually did, take action against the firm for unl awfu l accumula tion of 
es.rnings. 
1 OO ')l 
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(o:n t-sD. bsid iary rc!.ationshi ps outside of bankruptcy provides a useful 
~1nrJogue in this resp;:ct. In the parent-subsidiary comext, courts rec-
. • . • ' . . 1 h 'I ',-1 £' 1 b ogmze th.at, because a parent 1s tne pnnc1pa s ,arenoL,el· Ot tne su ·-
... . . . ' 1 ]" d . ,_ ' "" , ' . ,. 717 
s·idlar-y~ zts 1nterests 11sua1 y are a tgne 1 ~vv : t i ! t nose ol tr:~ Sti DS1d 1ary. -
i\.ccc,rdil·s. gly) ~o~rts apply the rel2.xed ·business j u ci ,grr-~ :~: 1-lt rule sta:ncl·· 
Erd ·t o YTHJSt decisio·ns rnade by the r)areT1t as corrt ro1Eng s}larehJ) ]cle r. 
Only vvh e:r. th e parent " causes the subsidiary to ac t in such a way that 
the pan:~n t receives something from the subsidiary to the exclusion of, 
' , . ' . . kl 1 ' ;.' 1 • . 1 . " ...J CJ.DG aetnment to, tne mmonty stoc . 10 oers 01 tne sucs:mary uo 
ccurts apply the more sea rching intrinsic fairness standarr1 .21 8 
Similarly, there is no need to disqualify a blocking credi tor's votes 
unless there is evidence that the creditor expects to receive something 
that the remaining members will not receive. A.lar.idin H otel Co. v. 
Bioom 2 19 is a classic example of such a situation. In Aladdin Hotel, 
shareholders bought a controlling position with respect to a class of 
debentures for the sole purpose of coercing an amendment to the 
debenture indenture favorable to their interests as shareholders but 
not to the remaining debenture holders. Thus, searching scrutiny of 
the shareholders' use of their debenture votes was needed, although 
not given by the court. 220 
A final issue to consider is the efficacy of the section 1126(e) rem-
edy. Because the remedy-disqualification of a claimant's vote-is 
injunctive in nature and does not contemplate payment of monet2.ry 
darnages by a controlling creditor who has breached her fiduciary 
duty , section 1126(e) may prove an insufficient deterrent. On the 
other hand, disqualification enables a court immediat.-=ly to undo the 
damage caused by the controlling creditor. Thus, a court can disqual-
ify votes in an appropriate case and go on to confirm the reorganiza-
tion p1an in question in the same hearing (if it othenvise would have 
passed). T he bankruptcy judge can aiso invoke her equitable powers 
to augment the remedy if necessary. 221 Because the equitable reme-
.. '1 h1 J, . bl b d' . ..,..,.., ~ . d1es ~va1 3.vle to L1e court--eqmta _e su or matwn , - ~- l:or mstance-
217 See Sin clair O il Corp. v. Levien , 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 197 1). 
m Id . at 720. 
219 200 F2d 627 (8th C ir. 1953). 
220 T he legisl at ive histo ry of § 1126(e) condemns the res ult in Aladdin and suggests th a t its 
fact s rct1ect the sort of manipulation that § 1126(e) was desi gned to prevent. House R eport , 
~; upra note 6 1, a t 4 11; Fortgang & Mayer, supra no te 99, a t 93 n.442. 
22 1 Bankruptcy Code § 105 . 
222 See id. § SIO(c). 
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' • 1 -;-1--.u r -r<> • (" , 1 1 .t1ave Drec1se1y ~li"~~ sa1n.e (:;n:ecr as an. aviard 01 !l1{)_netar:y aarr.tages, tne 
remedies available in connection with section 1126(e) should frdly 
:;(~rve their intende.d fltnction . 
. ... . 
su:crl!Tl2.rize, arnena1r1g sec!!C)11 1126 of the Bankruptcy C()tj~~ tzJ 
IYtcrv 1~1e for sirnp!e I11ajtJrity ra.ther than. su~)~:rrnajcJ rity voting :rrtight 
'~ ~ .. ~·ir·~--- .!-. t }-J ~ ·r·· n"!"" ~at of cro.~1to•"-7'' ~r-:__,nl· ·~r'o "' 1o ! r·rk~r-g DO" l' ti o~·. ·~,. ... -i .• a .L~ --•- ·• ·)1, · " '· .. 1'-- .• . \..,)a >J •--•·'-j•- • • •!;;. U. •J~• 1.1 , .> ~• L <4 ol U 
vv ie iding their in fluence improperly. The fiduciary duty standard 
codified in section 1 i26(e) should be retained, but need be applied 
- .,. 1 • • • 1 h 1 1 k' d' , f 
()il ly 11 tnere 1s evlGence tnat t1 e owe mg ere 1 tors votes are a • unc-
tion of an interest at odds v; ith that of the remaining members of the 
class. 223 
223 Two recent articles have continued the discourse with respect to this issue. Chaim J. 
For tgang & Thomas M. M<1yer, Developments in Trading Claims a nd Taking Control of 
Corpo:-a tions in Chapter 11, 13 Cardozo L. Rev. 1 (1991) ; Herbert P . Minke!, h. & Cynthia A. 
Baker, Claims and Control in Chapter 11 Cases: A Call for Neutrality, 13 Cardozo L R ev. 35 
( j 99 \). 
One final chapter II voting iss ue also should be mentioned: debtors' efforts to "lock-up" the 
votes on a reorganization pian . See, e.g., Trans World Airlines v. Texaco (In re Texaco) 81 
B.R. 8 13 (Bank r. S.D.N.Y. 1988). In Texaco, Texaco entered into a se ttlement with Penn zoi! 
whereby the parties agreed, among other things, that T exaco would a llow Pennzoil's claim in 
the amount of $3 billion and tha t Pennzoil would support any reorgan ization plan th ereaft er 
p roposed by Texaco. I d . at 8 15 . Rejecting Carl Icahn's argumen t that the agreement 
constituted an imperm[ss ibl e solici tation of acceptances by T exaco outside of the plan process, 
the bankruptcy court approved the settlement. I d. a t 8 15-1 6. 
Arguably what Texaco did was buy Pennzoil's vote. To apprecia te how the lock-up 
agreement can be reconceptualized as a fom1 of vote buying, consider the following reasoning. 
P resumably, Texaco would not have agreed to allow the full $3 billion had Pennzoil not also 
comm itted itself to support any reorganization plan proposed by T exaco, either at the time or 
in the fumre . If Texaco would have agreed, absent Pennzoil's commitment, to allow, say, only 
S2 .9 billion of Pcnn zoi i's claim, then Texaco effectively would have paid $.1 billion fo r 
Pen nzcii 's vote, less a disco unt re fl ect ing the likelihood th at Pen nzoi l' s claim would not be 
paid in full under the plan. 
Commentators have spli t into two cam ps on the vote-buyi ng issue o ut:>ide o f bank ruptcy. 
Co1;1pare Easterbmok & Fischel, supra note 6, at 410 (vote buying c rea tes agency costs and 
should therefore be proh ibited) with A ndre, supra note 21, at 597, 619-29 (vote buying he lps to 
;:ruxirmze shareholder wea ith and does not contribute to agency cos ts) a nd Clark, supra note 
21. at 793-94 (vote buying may promote desirable corporate contro l changes) and Manne, 
supra r<ote 21 (the market for votes promotes infcrma~ion-gat h ering and rewards those who 
:,now how to use the voting shares most profitably). On balance, vo te buying in bankruptcy 
s :~crns problematic und er either analysis, given the danger of stra tegic behavior by the buye r. 
This is '"specially true where, as in 'Texaco, the buyer is the debtor in possession rath e r th an an 
o ut side pa rty. The ine>·itnbie effect o f such vote buying is to solidify the control of the debto r' s 
current managers. F or example, Texaco's managers bought the vo te permanently-Pennzoil 
w<Js prohibited from proposing or supporting any other reo rgan ization plan. Texaco, 8 1 R.R. 
at 814-15 . Such practices cou ld thwart even desirabie changes in cont ro L 
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among otl1er things, tl1at cb.r.J.pte:r 11 needs both ITiore vc,t.es-----in tt.;_a t 
·- ' "' fi ....... .... ; , ">""'! ,-. f"'' 1...., .-. ,....~~ ...... , '-. ....,t an t~·-::1 1 <::\C r- ---- t,-. ("' ., O 1r' }- ,... •. ~t- t .; ~ vrtL.-0I1t r m _d!..lL. .u J-:..:..lC J \._;1 2-i...J.U.:-."t..- .1 ... \. L .. -~. .-:. ,;~.~ .J C t.,:, .jn U!\..l u·;: S lJ.D!TI.l!.. • . et~ tJ) :1 
vote, ratl1er tha·n left to t."f1e banl(r up tcy cotlrt's discretio:n-ailc1 , v; ith 
respect to directorial elections and class approvals, a diffe ren t vote. In 
each context, the analysis concluded chat the firm's unsecured credi-
tors should be the voters. 
In this Part, I address what appears at first to be a major practical 
problem with the conclusions of Part H I: although unsecured credi -
tors might, in the abstract, be the firm' s best decisiomnakers in chap-
ter I 1, the real unsecured creditors of real publicly held chapter 11 
debtors are numerous 2.nd highly dispersed. Unsecured creditors 
therefore are like1y to face the same obstacles to effective voting-
rational apathy and the incentive for individual creditors to free 
ride--that undermine shareholder voting outside of bankru ptcy .224 If 
this is tme, amending the Bankruptcy Code to give them the franchise 
l·n t 'h .n.s"" ·'on ~ o .. .rt (" , ,u rt.~ .,lrl ~o· p ·"ol·n ·rles·-H\~ ~ ~~ - ~'~i\. ,J n vU u ~.\:-' . u • .) . 
I argue in this P art that the game is in fact worth the cand le. A .. fter 
a brief theoretical overviev1 of the logic of collective action, I examine 
the problem s that eacb of the firrn 's major consti tuencies---senior 
creditors, un secured creditors, and shareholders- -would face were it 
not represented by a chapter 11 committee. I show subsequently how 
chapter 11 com m ittees help the par ties to surm.ount their collective 
action problerns, but T also note the lim ita tions of the cornmittee solu-
- - - ------ - ---
224 See supra Pa r t I. C. Col1ect i·.;e action problen~ s arise '.vhenever a grou p co rn prisin g n1o re 
tha.n one member .,_ . .,.ou1d b ~: nc: fit fro:-n provision of a collective good. I-i 2rdin distin gui shes 
c.:ollect ive goods frorn Pa ul San1ue1son's '"pu blic gocds,~' \vh ich ao: charact;: rj zed ont only by 
im possibili ty of e;\c!usion , but 3.l so by jointness of supply- that is, consumption of th<: good by 
one indi vidua! does not di n1inish th e c.mount of th e good availabl e to others . J-L1rdin, sup ra 
note 8, at 17 · 1 8; see Paul P. .. Samuelson, The P ure Theory of Pu blic Ex pend itu r,:, 36 Rev . 
Econ. & Stat. 387, 387 ( 1954) , reprin ted in I( enneih J. ArrO\V & T ibo r Scitovsk y, R.eadings in 
Welfare Ecc nc mics 179. 179 ( 1969). The reason for th e dis tinction is I he dearth of reed-world 
examples of true public goods . 
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tion. Finally, J conclude that unsecured creditors should, as 1 origi-
1-1 ~ 1 • • " • ?15 :na. y argued, oe g1ven votmg autnonty. --
,·1 
£1. T lr.c• T J., ,., ')."1' oJ ro 11Prtive A ,.l.;on· i _t It •- ,_ ' ,. t:;. t t )' '.) ~-" ll -........... .,. , \,.... l • • ::1 
}teca11 frcJ;-_r; ·;: he d·!sCLlSsion in Part I the irony c;f t tjs ~artt i .Ha:· 
di1emrn.a: if each of the members of a gro11p acts rationally~ rationa1 
apathy and b::;:;-fider problems are likely to prevent ;:t.:: group frcH-r 
supplying a collective good despite the fact that it is in the members' 
collective best interests to do so. 226 For a deeper understanding of 
collective action, it is useful to consider Mancur Olson's simplest gen-
eral statement of the dilemma. Olson defined the net benefit (i:'..J) to 
an individual i from i's contribution to the provision of a collective 
good in terms of the followi ng equation: Ai = Vi -C, where Vi is the 
gross benefit to i of the collective good, and C represents the cost. 2 27 
Olson argued that unless Ai > 0 for at least one member of the 
group, the group is unlikely to succeed absent coercion or other selec-
tive incentivesY8 Defining groups with respect to which no individ-
225 My concern throughout this Part is with intra-class collective action problems. I do not 
consider the interactions among the classes in chapter 11 , except to the extent t hat th ese 
in te ractions bea r on the iss ue of decisionmaking within classes. 
In brief, a necdotal evidence sugges ts that the constituencies of a chapter l ! debto r fo rm 
unstable and la rgely un en forceable coalit ions with one another during the course of a 
bankruptcy case. Se nior cred itors may ally initially with shareholders, for instance, and 
subsequently with unsec ured credito rs. Because these coalitions are unen forceable, they may 
give rise to prisoner's dilemma problems comparable to those encountered in the context of 
corporate decisionmaking in takeover negotiations outside of bankruptcy. Coffee, supra no te 
34, at 1533-44. Interestingly, the fact that many of the attorneys and some of the parties are 
likely to be repeat players sugges ts that the game arguably is, o r could be, an it erated one, 
which cou ld enhance the prospects for cooperation between members of any given coa li tion 
and thus strengthen the coa lit ion. See Robert Axelrod , The Evo lution of Cooperation 20-21, 
124-41 (1984) . 
226 Sec supra notes 40- 42 and accompanying text. 
m O lson, supra note 8, at 23; Hardin, supra note 8, at 20. A lthough O lson o.vas not th e first 
to point out that ra tional members of a group may have an in centive not to con tribute to the 
prov ision of a coilective good, he did gene ralize his analysis, whereas previous ob:;crvcrs had 
exp ressed the logic of collect ive ac tion only through specific exam ples. E.g. , Hardin, sup rs. 
note S, at 21-22. 
123 O lson, supra note 8, at 23-24. Edward Rock has recen tly pointed out one qualification 
to Olson's analysis: th e important question, in actuality, is whether Ai exceeds the gains 
avai lable to an indi vidual from a lternati ve cou rses of action, rather tha n whether Ai > 0. 
Thus, if the benefit to an individual from ex itin g, as when a sha reholder se lls her stock or a 
cred itor her claim, exceeds the gain sh e would receive were she to help prov ide the collective 
good , the ;~ the ind ivid ua l, assu min g she is rational, wili exe rc ise he r ex it option even if /\i > 0 . 
Si milarly, the ind ividua l has an in centi ve to contribute, even where Ai < 0, if he r net benefit 
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ual rneets this requireme~rt as "lcrtent," and groups with at least one i 
for w!:J Drn f:\.i > 0 as " privileged ," Olson concluded that the latter 
,-,- ·~cnn o· }, ,.]. no·!- +"hp for·,-;1P '"' '"l~P -~· ; 1-,..ly· ·c o S"CC~""'d 229 ..:)l J ....... :~--·;' u ;_.\ t ... t ~! ! · ...... .iL .... .:. .....,_::. ;. ~.l....... 1 -'l""'"-- 1• . 1 . ...4 """'~ • 
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are · -/~i. l ege ·dJ _l arge g:roups are aln1os·;: al ~ vayJ latent; accordir~g1y, h:~ 
-~-----:l-~ .... --.\. 0. -l :. 1.-. - -:- 1 ~ c.~,..... - ; ,... ~ 1-r c..ro-·'-l .. J re ~ ,....t --r~ f..-- , c- '~ o 230 1-ln. c1 ' _j~ ..... .-
~lA '--·~ iV~~~l( .. \...1. ~ • • :J.d.~.- l 2.. t ..... 1lL_,Y .rs u ... .1\...- .,_, L1 ,; ... 1 a-.. cu Lu ..:11L ~.. . .Jt..:~..a r 111 uisag1 ces. 
Hf': <u s;ues that the de::;ree of latency is rel ated not to the number of 
individtlH!s in a group, but instead to the size of its smallest efficacious 
subgroup, (k), which he ddines to be th ~ si ze of the smallest subgroup 
vvhos·e collective benefit exceeds the cost of providing a collective good 
-;-{1 ·r' h"" -""1'1 ·' 1. r~ D"I"OUp 23 i ·-- '- ' -- l l _t: 0 . 
Two factors are significant to the determination of (k) for a particu-
lar group. First, the greater the benefits of collective action as com~ 
pared ·.vith its costs, the smaller (k) will be. 232 Second, (k) is inversely 
proportional to the asymmetry of the group-that is, the smallest effi~ 
from contribution would exceed the benefit from any of her other alternatives. See Rock, 
supra note 49, at 455-56. See generally Albert 0 . Hirschman, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: 
Responses to Decline in F irms, Organ izations, and States ( 1970) (examining in a variety of 
contexts the circumstances in which the exit option will prevail over the voice option). 
229 O lson, supra note 8, at 49-50. Olson describes grou ps that fall just short of privileged 
status as "intermedia te" groups. Id. at 50. For pu rposes of clarity, subsequent discussi0i1 
refers only to "latent" and "pri vi leged" groups . R ather than speaking of intermediate gro ups, 
I characterize latent groups as "mildly latent" or "highly laten t" where such qualification is 
appropriate. 
230 I d . at 50-5 l. 
23 1 Hard in, supra note 8, at 46. Thus, for example, a I GO-member group may be more latent 
than a ICA.,"D-member group if the sma llest group that would benefit were they to organize and 
provide the good themselves were iOO fo r the 100-member group, but only 50 fo r the !GOO-
member group. A 100-member group might have a (k) of 100 if the collective good in quest ion 
were a step good-that is, none of the coliective good would be provided un ti l a threshold level 
of con tribution had been achieved--and provision of the good were also step, in the sense that 
each individual's only choice would be to contribute or not to contribute, as opposed to the 
choice of whether to contribute coupled with a decision as to how much. See, e.g., id . at 5 !. 
A n example borrowed from Hardin is illustrati ve . The collective good of Saturday morning 
quiet in the submbs would not be provided in a neighborhood with 100 residents if even one of 
those residents decided to mow her lawn. Id . 
For an example of a 1000-member grou p whose (k) is 50, assume that 50 stockholders of a 
corporation own a total of S l % of its stock- --49 ~rockho lders own 1% each, perhaps, and 1 
owns 2%- and the rema in ing 950 stockholders own th e remaini ng 49%, each owning less 
than 1% . If approving a proposed merger were a coliec tive good--the merger would increase 
the value of the firm's stock-and approval req uired a 5! % vote, then (k) would be 50. That 
is, 50 would be the smallest number of shareholde rs who, by casting affirmative votes, could 
ensure that the merger wou ld be approved. 
m ld . at 40- 4 1. 
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cacwu~~ suogroup 1s smaller u tile mernners m a group expc:c. cm::ttren:. 
benefits fror11 ·provis ion of a collecti·ve goocl t"han it is if gr:Jup mer:n-
}-,ei·c: h~v~ 1· r1P·n~~ 1,.,.~ 1 ,,·.,..,,1-ter.-=--s~L~ 233 'Thp.~ D f~rtors 1'11?~ V ar1 imp. orta:nt. rcde v ..:J ...,... ..., ~ ...... ., _ .....,w - ow o..J • - - '-'J V .1. - ·"' . ...... ;·- oJ . .. --
111 the analysi~) of tl1e foilo\vir1g Section. 
B. 
. i' ; 
lti C .~-:1 nee q.,t t:;clf1l?littees 
The parties' collective action in chapter ll --vihich I referred to 
. 1 ., . l' ' 11 . .J " . . ~ prevlOus,y as · provtcmg tne C011ectl ve goou ~-::ompnses a vanety or 
related activities. Effective oversight of the f1rm· s operarions durin g 
chapter 11 is part of the collective good, as is negotiating on behalf of 
one's class, fili ng motions and other pleadings if necessary, and voting 
in an informed fashion on a proposed reorganization plan. Together, 
these activities can be described as "monitoring-and-contesting" the 
chapter 11 case. 2 34 The purpose of this Section is to consider how 
likely the parties would be to monitor-and-contest actively in the 
chapter 11 context if they were not represented by committees. I con-
duct the inquiry by applying the theoretical insigh ts of the previous 
Section to each of the firm's major constituencies-senior creditors, 
unsecured creditors, and shareholders. 
The senior class of a chapter 11 firm typically consists of the 
debtor' s lenders-frequently one or a small number of banks. Senior 
creditors, 235 unlike the firm 's unsecured creditors and shareholders, 
are not widely dispersed. T hus, this group may have sufficient incen-
tive to monitor-and-contest even in the absence of committee repre-
m 1d. at 68. Hardin suggests th at <:~symmetry exis t. s where different members of a group 
pi ace different valu es on an equivalen t amount of the collective good. Id. at 67. T hus, an 
cnvironmentaiiy conscious citizen migh t value a clean stretch of beach much more than ot her 
c iti zens would. But in a corporate con text, where one shareholder mvned more of t he target 
firm 's stock tha n other shareholders and thus received mast of the benefi t of a takeo ver 
p remium, Hardin presumably would not find "asymmetry" bec,wse every member of the 
group would place the same value on each share of stocl,. I d . a: 70-7 i. l will use 
"asymmetry" to refe r to each of these situations, because both ha·;e the effect of lowering the 
size of the fim1 's smallest eft1caci ous subgroup, (k). 
2J.I Com menta to rs have used vHious term s to describe the co llective good tha t is supplied if 
shareholders take an ac tive role, th rough informed vot in g and other 2.ct i vi ties, in the 
governance of a fi rm outside of bankruptcy. Black, supra note 49, at 522 (ca lling it 
"shareholda voice"); Rock, supra note 49, at 453-54 (describing the collective good 2.s 
"[d ]iscipl ining"). I use the term "monitor-and .. contes t" to re11ecr the somewh at different role 
of ihe major "players" in a chapter ll case. In part icular, I \vish to convey a sense of 
bankruptcy as both a pa rtic ipatory and a n adversa ria! process. 
235 The firm 's senior creditors are often, but not a lways, secured. l assu me for the pu rposes 
of t he fo llowing analysis that they are in fact secured . 
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. '- )., . ~ . b ,.. 1 ' (' sen tatlCJ11, oecause t~1e proptJrtlori ot tne e:ne11ts tiJ eacn rr1emoer or 
monitoring-and-contesting is signifcant enough to justify incurring 
t.he re'lated costs. 236 
.~Ao.reover, even if the class is }::-~tent (tfiat is, :-\i < C: for eacl1 y-ner.n-
.c·) _l the costs (Jf cocJrdir~at ion ;).r~~ u.s u.al1y ve r2/ Jo·.;~/J ;:tn~j fr e::: riciir1g is 
~ .. :,:..)·,~y d ·,· ·.:::-1·(-~! .. \~ . . i~~.l.,_l ;j.j~j a CIA.~~ of t};Jj ';.,:. ~;·/ ....::. ;~'- , ... (" r·,r ri j ·;'' (f l~· '\i .... L • ·;n ~ (Y~hf- .~ V y-· .• ~,.~. t ,.._.,., _ _._... - ~·-v..__.. ~ ... ~ _....., ..... l.~~ · _l...v....,\... . .._ u _llb!J; \.J.~.l~....- :;,....i..l.b.A .. ~,. '-'"\.. .t-t•....,v ·~ 
th at ;,;;: Ill"'ITlbers will ove'"'~rn ,, ,}-. .c- ;.- cr>11e··· t i w~ >l{' ti'll't ,-,,-rJt-,1 , •. ,...., t-l,c;,_ 
._._.~ L .'1.-.. V .1......, .1- · , - J..L J.-'-JLLL. ....- \.-.&.._, J. '-'.:0 ._....__._ _. '-"- '-''--1.'\._ ):'-'-- ''- ._,l....-.l .!_ ... , --~·-.-
din notes, for examole, that '"so iidari tv , moral suasion, or strategic 
- J. J ~ 
interaction" favor the efforts of?.. small group r.md chat thl:':: members 
of such a group can engage in contingent choosing-that is, each 
member may implicitly agree to monitor-and-contest on behalf of the 
class only if the other members do the same. 237 The fact that secured 
creditors often have an incentive to play an active role does not ensure 
an optimal contribution so long as each member cannot receive t he: 
whole benefit of the collective good . 2 3 8 l'~onetheless, the secured class 
of creditors is the class least likely to be paralyzed by collective action 
problems in chapter 11. 
Unlike secured creditors, unsecured creditors such as bondholders 
and trade creditors are likely to be numerous and widely dispersed. 239 
One might therefore expect a high degree of latency with respect to 
unsecured creditors, comparable in many respects to the status of 
shareholders outside of bankruptcy. 240 If true, this observation sug-
2Jt Senior creditors are a classic example of what Olson described 2.s a small, and thus 
pote ntially privileged, group. Olson, supra note S, at 49-53. 
237 H ardin , supra note 8, at 40. We might therefore expect to see secured creditors taking 
turns attendi ng negot iating meetings with the debtor and other constituencies and sharing the 
costs of representing the class in court. Because of the number of bankruptcy "events," the 
coilective action game appears iterated for these c reditors . As noted above, see supra note 225, 
in an iterated prisoner's dilemma game, defec tion may not be the rational strategy for 
individual players; cooperation is significantly more likely. 
238 Olson, supra note 8, at 34-36. 
239 The drafters of the Bankruptcy Code wer::: aware of this problem . They observed that 
debtors may have a "natural tendency .. . to pacify large c reditors ... at the expense of small 
and scattered public: investors," but that pu blic investors, such as shareholders and 
bondholders, should "have legislative <~.ssur:mce that th eir interests will be protected." S. Rep . 
No. 989, 95th Cong. , 2d Sess. 10, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5787, 5796. 
240 Interestingly, the benefit (Vi) of monitoring-and-contesting to an individual unsecured 
creditor in cha pter 11 may be relatively greater than that to a secu.red creditor. Secured 
cred itors are compensated first and thus receive most of their c!:.l ims even if th e fim1 performs 
badly. T he fortunes of the firm and the succ t'SS of negotiations '.vith other constituencies, 
however, will di rectly affect the value ava ilabk for unsecured credi to rs , but this benefit is offset 
by expontntialiy greater costs to widely dispersed un sr:cured creditors who wish to provide a 
publi c good as cornpared to secured creditors. 
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gests that the smailest efficacious subgroup (k) far 3. gr-::mp of 
unsecured creditors usually will be extremely large. Yet the smallest 
efficacious subgroup of unsecured creditors m ay be significantly 
smalle r than the total number of ;nembers in the class because the 
:c.-i.::-~rnbers of a c lass of bondf1older s -~Yr trz1de creditcr(3 fr ,:: q~Jf~rltiy ·"vil"i 
·_;1 old clairns in substar1tially differ.:: :1~ ar:1o ~lnts ) i~~lk.i ng the:sf: classes 
-~~l.; c-t-~ ·1 · · ,-. .. ymmetrl· ....... ~ 1 l·n ·" atp-e --rl: h · t" ·:'! h r-rn '*"~, .... ~ ~no'ln ;:....,c- ~-n ri;:::..·.f.c, . .,~ " -a "'o""J d.:> l 1l .1.-u l • • . .d . '• ~ _, , <.-1. 11> ~L cUC>.l ·~ •• c"'.S "" -" d . '-' '~· '"''·" '' 
. -. -: · 1 D -. 1 cornractmg may owe some trac e :.::fecilors--sucn as an orncc supp(/ 
store- small amounts (say, $500), and other trade c redi tors- a sup-
plier of parts, for instance-much larger sums (say, $40,000). Both 
are unsecured creditors, but the supplier of parts obviously can exp,:;ct 
a much greater benefit if the class monitors-and-contests effectively. 
Concentra tion of debt in the hands of institut ional or other investors 
creates the same kind of asymmetry with respect to a class of bond-
holders .241 In short, unsecured creditors probably ·would not effec-· 
tive1y monitor-and-contest in most chapter 11 cases, but 
concentrat ion of large claims in the hands of relatively fevv investors 
could reduce the degree of latency in many classes. 242 
The benefit (Vi) to the shareholders of active monitoring-and-con-
testing is limited for an insolvent firm. Nevertheless, because the 
Bankruptcy Code gives shareholders significant leverage even in con-
texts where strict application of the absolute priority rule would elimi-
nate their interests entirely, the benefits to sharehold ers of collective 
action in chapter 11 should be roughly comparable to those antici-
pated by unsecured creditors. The cost (C) to shareholders of n1oni-
toring-and-contesting also is similar to that to unsecured creditors 
because shareholders are similarly dispersed. As with unsecured 
credi tors, the shareholders are likeiy to be a highly latent g::oup, 
al though the size of the smallest efficacious subgroup may be reduced 
241 In addition to asymmetry in the size of creditors' claims, my principal :::oncem ilere, 
there also may be asymmetry in Hardin's sense-nonfungibility of benefits as among the 
members of the relevant grou·p. Hardin, supra note 8, at 70. In particular, 'N hereas some 
unsecured creditors, such as employees, may have a vested interest in the long-ten:'1 viability of 
the firm, others may simply wish to ensure th at the firm will sur•; ive long enough to 
com pensate them. See Roe, supra note 18, at 542- 44. 
24 2 Postpetition trading of claims ca n crea te this concent ra tion a nd give postpet ition 
investors a much greater incentive to monitor .. and-contes t than the incen tives given th·~ 
individual claimants from whom the in vesto r bo ught her cla ims. See, e.g ., Fortgang & r/!ayer, 
supra note 99, at 6-7. In an extreme case, an investo r might acquire such a large stake in a 
class as to convert th e class from latent to privileged st:.Jtus. 
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by the concentration of share ownership in the hands of inst itutional. 
and other large investors. 243 
C. Th e Jrnpact of Chap ter 11 Corrzmitiet!s 
Co!lective Action Prob!erns 
·O: llf' } , aS lc')-,e S h" ·l·· ;o•}l r··,] rJ e r c and UD C.: ef'ur·arl f'fPd iln l~c: r·,f ,, n : ·+;: i :~ !v :_IP ·i,j 
'-' '-""-'.!-'- ,11 ~ .,!. _a ......... , .... _.~ ~ ~- _ ..., .l• •...., .....- .~._\,...._. ...... ......., ... ~..._.. .._, v ,. ·-·· 1 ..... ...... L ... .. v ... .l J ... ..... J. 
chapter 11 debtor, 2 J. c. will succeed in supplying a collective good only 
throush coercion or selective incentives. 245 G overnmen t intervention 
p resents a third option. 246 T he government may provide the collec-
t ive good itself or may compel the members of a gro up to contribute 
to the provision of the collective good. Chapter 11 committees are a 
classic example of the latter approach . 247 Chapter 11 committees 
enable the parties to overcome their collective action problems in two 
243 Rock, su pra note 49, at 459. Moreover, because several of th e shareh olders' options 
outside of bankruptcy are significantly less attracti ve in bankruptcy, the likelihood that 
shareholders will have an incentive to contribute to the collective good, even if the net benefit 
(Ai) for an individ ual shareh older is negative, is enhanced. See su pra note 228. In particular, 
the va lue of the fi rm 's stock is li ke ly to have plummeted, thus curtailing the shareholders ' exit 
option. Addit ionally, shareholders wi ll no longer be able to anticipate the possibili ty of 
takeover gains because an investor who wished to purchase control of a bankrupt firm would 
likely purchase the claims of a more senior class. See Fortgang & Mayer, supra note 99, at 75-
76. 
24-l History provides ev idence in support of the intuition that shareholders and unsecured 
creditors are likely to face severe collective ac tion problems. The widespread belief that senior 
creditors and the management of financially troubled firms routinely colluded against widely 
d ispersed public bondholders- that is, took advantage of bondholders' coll ective act ion 
problems-provided a majo r impetus for the bankruptcy reforms of 1938. See, e.g. , Roe, sup ra 
note 115, at 251-52. 
24 5 Hardin desc ribes two of the most prominent selecti ve incent ives as "by-product" theory 
and ''political ent repreneurship." By-product theory suggests that groups already organ ized 
for some other purpose will someti mes direct a portion of their resourc es toward provision of a 
collec ti ve good. Hardin , supra note 8, at 3 1-35. Poii tical entrepreneurship describes the 
situation in which the desire fo r private gain, such as prest ige or political advancement, 
motivates an individual to help provide a collective good for a latent group. !d. at 35-37 . 
Roc k has suggested that pol itical ent repreneurship may expla in recent high- profi le activism 
outside of bankruptcy by the heads of several public pension funds . Rock, supra note 49 , at 
4 79-8 !. 
~~6 Ha rdin, supra no te 8, at 52, 84. Govern ment intervention is a form of coerced 
cont ri bution simil ar in ma ny respects to participation in a labor union coe rced , fo r example. by 
un ion shop rules. See Olson, supra no te 8, at 68 . 
24 7 Ha rdin refers to governmen t intervention of this sort as a " Ba um oi so lution" to the 
collective action problem . Hard in, su pra note 8, at 52; see al so Baumoi. sup ra no te 8, at 180-
96 (disc uss i11 g circumstances under which government act ivi ty may ass ist indi viduals in 
a ttaini ng their desired ends) . 
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r·elated v;ays. First~ con1rnittees ce11tralize all of tl1.e fll.I1ctio:ns Ilcces-
.~- ' ' . __] t t' b t' ' 1 ,. sary to ertective momtonng--anu~con es mg y ne c1ass or C:i&Sses or 
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.,_.\,.. :~ tl1 tf1e debt(;r ir1 ·possessio;-t ~ib011t th.e admir1istratior1 {yf fhe cas:;, :c~ 
inv::-:stig.ate the operati fJJl S s.:nrl Ertances oJ' the cL~btcjr ? tc~ 1-~.::l p d.r:::t"~ 2. 
pl:::.r.~ a11d co0rdir1ate tl·teir coris ti tLterLcies' V(;tes, to rccp.1es~ ~i-~ :).t !.~. 
tru~. -l ee be a1Jpoir1ted , and to ~'per foy·;11 suclJ i) ther s~~rvice~ as a.t·e i .t-i t"h e 
i r1te.r~~~t of tJ1ose represerlte.;J. 7 ~:: /.\. ~ 
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., 'd d . ' ' J:: h ~ ' 'J •l Q to oe pm as an a rmn1strat1ve expense 1rom tJ. e oanKruptcy es tate;--·· 
these expenses thus have priority over distributions to shareholders 
and unsecured creditors. 250 This arrangement spreads the costs of 
com:nittees across all claimants. Unlike compensation for insurgents 
in successful proxy fights or attorneys' fees from derivati';e suit recov-
eries outside of chapter 11, compensation of chapter 11 committees 
1 t ' 1 1 . .- ''51 • ' ~ 1 t • ' a oes no oepenc, on a s uowmg or success.- As a resuH, cnap.er 1 r 
committees are likely to be more effective than their counterparts 
outside of bankruptcy at solving collective action problems, perhaps 
even causing overmonitoring because of the independence of payment 
and success. 252 
m Bankruptcy Code § 1103(c)(5). Congrcs:; made clear, both in the language of § 1 !03 
and in the 1-::gislative his tory, its intent that committees perform an import:mt m o nitoring role 
th ro ughout the case. See Creditors' Comm . v. Parks Jaggers Aerospace Co. (In re Parks 
J agge rs Aerospace Co.), 129 B.R. 265, 268 (Bankr. M .D. Fla. 1991) (holding that creditor, · 
committee does not acJtom ati cally dissolve after confirmation of a reorganization plan because 
reaso ;; s may exist fo r the committee to continue to monitor the debtor's actions). 
2-' '' Ban kruptcy Code§ 330(a) (authorizing payment of any "professional p::rson" employed 
by a committee pursua nt to Bankruptcy Code § 1103); id. § 503(b)(2) (ensuring that the 
paym ents wili be treated as an administrative expense). 
2o<J Id. § 507(a). 
25! Because proxy contest :ns t;rgcnts will be compensa ted only if they are successLi (<md 
not for efforts ex pended in losing efforts or in scrutin izing managemen t pr'.)posals th at they 
decide not to oppose), potential insurgen ts wi ll provide an inappropria te r.mou nt of 
monitoring. See Clark , supra note 21 , at 781-82 . Si mil ar shortcom ings plague the ru les for 
pay1Tu~m of attorneys' fees in the derivative suit context. See Clark, supra rwte 16, § 9.5, at 
396-97. The effectiveness of derivative suits is furth er li m ited by their post hoc nature, m :J. king 
them useful only in remedy ing actual violations, and by the likel ihood Iha.t plaintiffs' attorneys' 
ince ntives '.vill be at odds with those of their clients. John C. Coffee, Jr., The Unfaithfu! 
Charnpion: ~fhe Plaint jff as fvfo nitor in Sha:eholcler Litigation~ 48 La'A .. & Conten1p. P.\·obs . 5, 
32 (1985). 
252 1~he etfectiven:=ss of committees is enhanced by the eno rmous leveTaging ~ffect of 
ba nkruptcy on resources d irected to\va rd providir:g the collective good . Because 3n indiv idu:d 
g roup rn~mbcr need persuade on ly a bankruptcy judge of the virtue of he r positlcn , ra!her tha n 
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On the other hand, it may seem puzzling that the Bankruptcy Code 
requires that only unsecured creditors be given a committee in every 
case. 2 53 Appoin trnent of committees for other creditors and for share-
holde .,...r ~S ''0r.·1nlt-=-•t(..:!. ,icf ,-l ·iorret:o·r; ·'-1-rV 254 '\f p 1· CO]]c.r ·'"; .. ,, a. ':'<IC'1' "fl 'hP•"""'·~.; , 1~ 1 ~ "' t-·l ·-"·' J '··"~·~ ,1 "'·'' .'. ~ "' " ··-~L, n. '"' LU U.~ ,J ly 
explair1s ev~;n th;_:: :~e differences. 1\..-:;ca ll t l1at the firrr1's sectJrecl cre!j i-
[.ors mav claVP <:'LifFi r' l·.,--.. n l· )n 1"' i~ ':"!t1~ ; p"" i .---) r--1 lr1'Ill.t0i-a"'''1..-i .. r··o-r, -LP"'=i .. ,·n (' 1"1 ?. ';-"~ f·c.·r ... J 1 "' ..._, J . • .t .\ -- _ . . .. ... -A·-·""--" -·-·- -~ . ...... .._ " ....... ..... ..._ ..~. . ..... ~ ~. .......... .. . .......... ) .. ... .~. ,_ .... !. ~ r-- ..._;. 
11 even without the aid of a committee. Thus, the drafters under-
standably denied them the right to be represented by a committee in 
c;,:h ' ·. . . ' . f 0 0 't:; 1 , ' every case ...... ,ar;;;no;ders, a.!tnough .acmg s1gmucant oostac1es to col -
lective action, arguably have no financial interest in most chapter 11 
firms because most are by then insolvent. The desire nonetheless to 
give shareholders substantial leverage in chapter 11 and the recogni-
tion that some chapter 11 firms are not insolvent entitle shareholders 
to committee representation in appropriate cases. 255 
In contrast, the firm's unsecured creditors are a highly latent group; 
as the residual owners of the firm, they may need, and arguably 
should have, a committee in every case. N otice that this representa-
tion will be especially important if the Bankruptcy Code is amended, 
all or a majority of the members of her group, bankruptcy significantly reduces the costs of 
monitoring-and-contest ing a chap ter 11 case, as compared to the cost of engaging in similar 
ac tivities prior to ba nkruptcy. C f. H a rdin, supra note 8, at I 34-35 (noting that environmenta l 
act ivists, in lobbying the government to enact pollution controls, need spend only a fraction of 
the money that would be necessary to clean up poliution themselves or to pay individuals and 
firms to stop polluting); John Woestendiek, Southern Californians Cooking Their Last with 
Charcoal Fluid, Phila. Inquirer, July 4, 1991, at A I (a ntipollution measures will present 
manufacturers with major expenses but cause individuals only minor in conveniences). 
253 Despite th:: fac t th a t the language of Bankruptcy Code section 1102(9) appears to 
mandate appointment of ;m unsecured creditors' committee, LoPucki has shown that 
unsecured c redi tors' co mmittees are not always appointed, at least in smaller cases. Lynn M. 
LoPucki, The Deb tor in Full Control-Systems Failure Under Chapter II of the Bankruptcy 
Code? (Part II), 57 Am . Bankr. L.J. 247,249-53 ( 1983) . Couns do in fact appoint at least one 
committee of unsecured creditors in nearl y every case involving a la rge, publicly traded 
corporation. Lo Picki & Whitford, supra note 1~-S, at J]t,_ 
254 !d. 
255 Shareholders should nm be e!:titlcd to the increased ieverage affo rded by a committee in 
cases where the firm is deepiy insolvent. In such a case, creditors effectively would be 
subsidizing the representatio n of a class tha t has no colorable financi al interest in the firm , for 
payment of the equity committee' s expenses wi ll diminish the recovery avai lable to th e 
creditors. The decided C:!Ses gene rally support this view. E.g. , In re Emons Indus., SO B.R. 
692 , 694 (Bankr. S.D. N .Y. 19:35) ("generally no eq uity committee sh ould be appointed ';>hen it 
appears that a debtor i:; hopekssly insolvent"); see 5 Collier, supra r;otc 59,~ I 102.02, at 1102-
22 to -23; see al so Li)Pucki & Whitford, supra note 84, at 159-60 (suggesting tha t shareholders 
are more likely to pariicipate in reorganlzai;o n distributions if th ey are represented by an 
equity committee). 
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as this Articie recommends, to give unsecured creditors voting control 
over preconfirmation sales of substantial assets and d i.rectorial 
e1ections. 
The ar1alysis thl.!S far clepicts cl1apter 11 cornxnittees gs a 1i1Jel1-
crafted res-ponse to the pa r ~i -::~~ ~ co1l;:;ctivr; act iorl protJL:;n1s. -/: ·=::-)tr.:. r.n .~ t ... 
"tees prO\/i.cle an orgai1izz!_ tiG:1:.:"'.1 s tr11c ture) tog-ether ~;v i th :J.rl :.?. p _prc.~ ~:-rci ::rt :: 
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less, tl1e corr1mittee so1 u t io r1 su tfers frorr1 se·vera l sigr1ifican t 
shortcomings. 
The first stems from agency costs that a rise from the co:rnrnittee's 
acting in essence as an agent fo r the class. 25 6 The key question, then, 
is how significantly these agency costs impair the effec t iveness of com -
mittees. U nlike the agency relationship bet~.veen m .:magers and the 
firm, where managers O\Vn only a small proportion of the firm' s stock 
and thus have questionable decisionmaking incentives, the Bank-
ruptcy Code contemplates that the seven largest members of the rele-
vant group will serve on its committeeY7 Although the incentives of 
these seven members will not perfectly mirror those of the group, 
these representatives are likely to have a major financial stake in the 
results of the group's efforts; this should diminish agency costs. 
It is far from clear that these seven members will dictate the pos-
ture of any given committee, however. The attorneys and other pro-
fessionals engaged by committees inevitably play a crucial role in the 
process. If the attorneys conduct negotiations among themselves, 
rather than in their clients' presence, for instance, they may largely 
determine the direction of a given case. 258 A lthough this agency prob-
lem does not destine chapter 11 committees to failure, because attor-
neys and other professionals sti ll have a strong incentive to satisfy the 
needs of their committee, 259 the alignment of interests is likely to be 
256 See sources cited supra note 14. 
257 Bankruptcy Code § 1102(b)(l) (com mitt ees ·'shall ord inarily consist of the perso m , 
willing to serve, tha t hold the seven largest cl aims· · or seven largest amou nts of equity 
securities). 
258 LoP ucki & Whitford, supra note 84, at 154 ("reorganizati on plans a re not dire..: t ly 
negot iated by the parties in interest, but rather by intermedia ries functior; ing as the parties' 
representatives"). 
259 See, e.g., Ha rdin, supra note 8, at 107-08. Ha rdi n notes that a lthough one should vi;:w 
with skept icism the motives of a n organ ization's leaders, th eir self-i nterest may dovetai l fo r the 
most part with the goals of th e group , in that leade rs '<Vill retain their stat us oniy to the extent 
lhey can persuade their constituency o f the effec ti veness of th eir leadership . Id . at 108. 
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imperfect at best. LoPucki and Whitford point :yxt, :for instance, that 
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ents:.' intereStS, becaUSe they expect lO See 0~1f; B.:U {}~. :~-.L:r agai~n i::1 f~ . .rt~.1re 
z.genc1&. th2c -~ 
i:ntere.sts . 262 
in significant --?"'r-.,(",-0 ,c.r· <·~ ...._ '~~ '-' i-" : ... - -~· :.v grot~ ps' 
PL second probletn vvith chapter 11 cor:t}rnittef.:s sterns fr.on'1 the 
breadth of their coverage. Consider the unsecmed cr:editors of a p ub-
licly held firm. The unsecured creditors of large corporations com· 
prise d istinct and potentially conflict ing ciasses,2 63 yet the Bankruptcy 
Code contemplates that a single committee 'Nill r epresent them 2H. 
Bringing d iverse classes of unsecured creditors together under a single 
umbrella may not create difficult ies in some contexts, such c~S moni-
toring the operations of the firm. In others, however, coHective ac tion. 
problems will reemerge: a single committee cannot possibly e:ifective:ty 
represent each of three or four different classes vv ith frequently diver-
gent interests in the parties' negotiations on d ivision of the reorganiza-
i:ion pie. The Bankruptcy Code does speci:fically authorize the United 
States t rustee (or the bankruptcy court, after notice and a hearing)264 
to .appoint additional committees if she deems them necessary to effec-
tive representation. For exam ple, in In ,:-·e Johns-.i14anville Corp. , the 
court appointed several committees of unsecured cre:ditors-- inclu.ding 
committees for institutional and trade credito:cs, For asbestos :manu-
fs.cturers, and for asbestos health claimants--in :recognition of the 
260 LoP ucki & W hitford, supra note 84, at l56. 
261 Hardin, supra note 8, a t 35-37. 
262 }t a ck, supra note 49, at 48 1. Rock argue::; that ;N hereas the heads of publ ic: pension 
fun ds similariy may help provide the collective good of shJreho lder discipl ine outside of 
bankruptcy, '~their i!1Centives drive them to cham pion the !.jnds of activities th ~.lt garner 
political benefits but do not benefit the corporation ." l d . 
203 'TypicaHy there a re at least three disti nct clnssc·s of unsecu red c:ed itors of a public iy held 
firm: senior deben ture holders, subordina ted debenture holder,;, and t rade cred itors . Often 
there ·will be more . 
26.! Bankxuptcy Cede§ 1102(a)(l). 'The bankruptcy court ori g1n a!!y 9.ppeinted corn rnitt·::: -::s . 
~fhe d"t"afters of the Bankruptcy ·Code transferred this responsibi li ty !0 iJni ted States tn .. tst.-::es to 
'l.void the appeara nce of favoritism on the part of bankruptcy j udges . H ouse R eport , supra 
note 61, a t !01; 5 Collier, supra note 59, 1i 1102.01. a t 1102- .:,_ 
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sub:::.tantially different interests of the various groups. 265 ' [ et Johns-
~Manville is exceptional in this respect. Based, presumably, on an 
inmlicit conclusion that the advantages of add itional cornrnit'~ees are 
L V 
1 ik~ely tc; 
Tirt~ 
~more tl1an offset by a substantial ·dLrplicati crn 
(~ornrillttee for L\rtsecured creditors. 2 (1 6 
.l~~ final sf1ortcornin.g of chapter 11 cornmi tiees 1s tl-1eir ir1c.Oi.lity to 
s<::cure the participation of some or all of a group's sevc:n ia:·gt:si mem-
bers;' either because of tin1e constraints or) n1ore i·mr1ort2.nt ly) 1Jec~;_lise 
of the limitations committee membership may place on their <:>.bility to 
buy and sell claims on the chapter 11 debtor. 267 Investors who have 
acquired or augmented their stake in the firm through postpetition 
trading of claims as \vell as institutional investors268 are especially 
likely to chafe at the possibility that serving as a comrnittee member 
will preclude them from trading claims in the future. 
D. Free Agents in Chapter 11: Participation by Individual 
Claimants and Interest Holders 
From a collective action perspective, then, the chapter 11 commit-
tee structure enjoys only mixed success. Providing an organizational 
structure and a taxing mechanism facilitates monitoring-and-con-
testing by highly latent groups such as classes of unsecured creditors 
265 In re Johns-Manville Corp., 60 B.R. 842, 844-45 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 
801 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1986) (describing the bankruptcy court's appointment of committees). 
266 See LoFucki & Whitford, supra note 84, at 139. Another possible solution w the 
problem of diverse strategic interests is for the United States trustee to er,surc that each of the 
divergent classes secures representation on the committee. Thus, the United States trustee 
might appoint at least one senior unsecured creditor, one trade creditor, and one subordinated 
~nsecured cr-:ditor to the committee of unsecured creciitms, regardless of whether each 
qualified as one of the seven largest unsecured claimants. This solution addresses both the 
probiem of duplicati ve costs and the belief that diverse interests need representation. The 
committee 3S a whole still would fail to represent each of the diverse interests, however. 
Rather than champion the interests of each of its constituent classes, the committee would 
likely abstain from negotiations that pitted one unsecured class against another, and instead 
would limit its efforts to those aspects of the case as to which unsecured c:-eclitors' interests 
\Vere cortsistent. 
267 Cornmittee members are iikely to receive inside inforrnation a.bout the nrrn. i\lthough 
the Bankruptcy Code does not explicitly forbid committee members fn;m trs.ding 011 such 
ir1forn1ation, gs Fortgang and l\r1ayer note, Hprudent attorneys should advise ~1n:~_,. client vvho 
serves on a committee ... that the bankruptcy laws prohibit fiduciaries from trading in the 
claims or stock of the debtor'' Fortgang & Mayer, supr::; note 99, at 33. 
268 See Rock, supm note 49, c.t 494 n.196. 
Corporate Voting in Chapter 11 
1 -· • • . 1 • • , ........ • 1 .. 
oie nonp8.rt lC! pauon suggest tnat committees memCl<::ntJy promote th e 
j_nterests of t l-1 eir const it11encies. 
I nterestir:g.iy, c1c_ir-riants and shareh_olders \;.'itll a sign1 f1 c{rn t str:;.k e i:n 
a J)UlJl icl:;.-.. -h clc1 d.ebtor S(}m.-::t imes do act on tl1cir O\Vn 1 I1iti ~!_ ti·ve _, ra.t1;.er 
than s iirq~;iy rely· ing on a cc, rnrr1ittee to rel">r~:sent th_ e·~ ~- inr.e.::esLs. 
""L\ctivity of this sort provides empirical evidence (at least of the anec~ 
dotal variety) fo<· the contention that committees provide high ly 
.; rp·- -er·f'=e+ .. ,., .. -;r:c. ~ o ·,.t,.,t iu·y.-, "Ve~ ~ l1 i<: ac·t;Vl.Sill ::. ~ c-0. ·r·>iC F•C •• (11'0c·t i ;-,n • if 
.\ - • ..i.-~ ..... .:..i\...-'-"!.. .l'l.....l-' &.'\...- .') '-.ltlu .... ., 1.... I l l !~a..J ! .l .-1.J \.....• L U .J.JvJ :;: ,_ ~ ....... ._. ._.. ,.~._·1_.., -.~ 
the analysi:~ above correctly characterizes shareholders and uns-ecured 
creditors as highly latent groups, making collective action illogical in 
the absence of chapter 11 committees, why do we nevertheless see 
indi viduals monitoring-and-contesting? We would expect th;lt 
regardless .;) f how poorly their committee functioned, individual 
claimants and interest holders would have insufficient incentives to 
act alone on behaif of the group. 269 
On closer examination, the apparent incongruity of individual 
claimant activism is less surprising. Hardin has observed that groups 
sometimes overcome their initial latency by "piggybacking" --~that is, 
by borrowing the infrastructures of extant organizations. 270 He sug-
gests that the use by early environmental groups of exist ing nature 
appreciation groups and the use by the Southern civil rights move~ 
ment of churches are illustrations of this phenomenon .r71 This insight 
a lso ·helps explain the activism of individual claimants and sharehold -
ers in chapter 11. These individuals rely on their committee to per-
~ 1 . • f . . d . ...,.,, r torm tne vast maJonty o momtonng-an -contestmg. 1 ney orten go 
so fa r as to model the pleadings they file (and the positions they take) 
on motions tlied by the committee. One suspects that the level of indi-
vidua1 participation would crop dramatically in the absence of this 
- - - ----·--- - -·-- ---------- -
261:1 O ne possible explanation is that these individuals are rno ti va ted by c~·drarat i c na1 
inct:nr:v es, such as ange r, fear, or ethical concerns. See Hard in, su pra note S, at lO l -24. 
Exam pies of such behav ior are when the individua l in vestors in a faiicd real esta te •;enture, o r 
the e1n pic ycc~; of il l(>Cal business, attend the f1rst 1neeting of the debtor~s credi to rs, conven ed 
under .Bankruptcy Code § 34 1, for the purpos~ of venting thei r e n1 o-r ions conc~n1 ir: g th~ 
d::btor"s financ:iai collapse. ln th e discussion that foll o ws, I ignOI:-t ext rarat ion al cc,mide ra ri o ns 
beca use th ey do not see m to be the principal reason that large investors scrne(irnes participate 
in th~ c ha pter ll case of a publicly held firm. 
2:0 H ard in bo rrows the term " piggyback ing" from Berna rd G rofm:\n. See .H,~~di n, s upr<: 
note 8. at .:13 :;.!!. 
211 I d . at 43- 4 ... 1-, 
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ap:pea.rs to p.iay a crt~ ­
claiiilEn1ts or i:nteres,t :hcJl.clers ·to cor~. ~~ 
reirn~::t1rse 2tS sr1 a.d:(nir1istrative expense the s"acttta1 51 necessar~y 
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"f ' , ~.~.--·:-- -- :1,~,- " :o ·r." t n 11.6 ~~~~ 273 ,, 1'-' .. o-, ~"' .-l rrJ.a:::.::.eJ d '.; .... ~_:_U.<..i!UUt l .t l U ~ liC. L-d~i.:: . .r '"i...U.J.l ' UbLi d. 
ruptcy court's dete:nnin;::ctions as to whether and to what extent an 
individual activist should be comuensated for her efforts is sub]·ect to ' . 
-n'l P ~·t-,o -~~ - ·c. ;rY\ _ o ('o t~r-.....-. ~1 + lo.-. 1 . . a t1"e "'"0. -y "0 ·'=0t r_;, ~ ma.ij Ol (ii·~ oi:liTl,_, u •• p .... n.__C<ivA>S tfla c UTIGc1ffi n,_ 11 P• X. v' il[,-:;_.~ ~,n~< 
derivative suit outside of bankruptcy, 274 courts could, and 
should, look to this section as a means of compensating for the limita~ 
tions of the chapter 11 committee structure. Compensating activisrn 
~ ' -1 ' ' ·· 1 'I ' · "~~ ·< ·• • '.l • • by mc1v1ciua,, c1armants as surely rnucn Iess expensive tmm appomtrng 
additional ccn1.rnittees to ensure that the interests of every class enjoy 
atie(J.liate re~prese:r1tat:tor1~ 
E. ..-·4re u·nsec1Ared Creditors Still the .1.llight !,/oters? 
r-f'l1e st1ggesti-oi1 that c~hapter 11 committees resolve the collective 
action problerns of unsecur~d creditors and shareholders in only :::e;,n 
• C' 1 • . h h' h h' ., -tmpenect vvay c;:;turns us to tne quest1on w1t w 1c t 1s -~art began: 
should the Idankruptcy Code be amended to give unsecured creditors 
voting control. over preconfirmation sales of substantial assets a.nd 
directorial el{:cticins? 
272 Empi ricai evidence would be particularly useful here in helping to understand bt:tter the 
nature and extent of individual :;o,ctivism. The analysis in the text suggests that this activi.srn 
occ1.u·s in C()n(e~ts 'Nhere the intere5ts of the various classes represented by 2-1 cornrtt1.Uee are 
divergr:nt~ or \Vhere the ratio of the benefits to an individual of monitoring-and-~:ontes"Ling to 
their cost (Vi/ C) is particularly high. 
273 1n addition, Bankruptcy Code§ 503(b)(4) authorizes payn1ent of the "actual, nece;.sary 
expensesn of an c.ttorney or accountant of such creditors and shareholders. Courts in sor:u: 
c.:,ses nlret:dy cornpensato:' ind ividuc.l claimants, interest holders, and their attorneys, p'c_;rsuant 
to § 503. r\_lthough th~~l gcucrally deny co1npensation for activities that benefit only tht· 
individual crr:ditor, ciec:, e.g., In re Johnson , 126 B.R. 808 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1991), courts have 
2wardeci fees to creditors ·xho objected to a reorganization plan that failed to provide for 
interest paytnents on the cl0ims of unsecured creditors, In re Lehal Realty 1\ssocs., 112 B. H ... 
588 (Bankr. S.I>N.Y . 1990), or who mediated disputes between the debtor and th," creditors' 
commit;e,-:. In re Baldwin -- United Corp., 79 B.R. 321 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1987). 
27~- See suDra note 25 l. 
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-:~;~l i;J1 r::~·s p·;~ct tc, cl1(J<Jsi_n g cHrecttJr.s ·iT1 chaJYt(::r 1 L, tb.t::: cl1.an.gc clta.:rly 
V/O"tJ1~.J ·b .:: an. irn.Droverrterrt over tl1e curre:n.t regirrl·~. A1thtJttgh corr1-
, Q -
r• it Al'"a.;: "-· "'0' ·.- i ;lp ''nlv an ; ,T;--,erf~"'f '"Ol,tinr- i·o· '; TIS"'0Ured Cf""d. ;.tO"""' 0"u1 -~! JL - '\,..,"!..,...,) _:-'_! '1 .:..--:.-' ·U .!. - · J .:l .!~~ .r-· · A.,_. ._,.....; V U L . ...._. .i , _ :~ .\ · \..-t..- ~ · "-' · .'1 .!_u y -
tiv·es 5 it is rno:r~~; af)}Yf01Jriat·c t:bat they l_;,~ (he ·v~) t-~r~~ Jr1 t:be t>ie:rli of a.n 
::;lectioiJ. 
T . . " - 1 . 1' 1 1 •. .. rE: qu-::: si:10n m vvhetn-:r unsecured cref .. dtors or oanKruptcy judges 
.t;I ...... C\ ~ ~ J .... .-.1-r -~ [""'· ..,..,_,r. '\r .o b.::':lt ter rlp..-..: (' ~f"n C' ()-., ":-\' ... C.r• .._-n·P. ·-~·--., }·:or> sn 1 .n.~ 1r c;..-...mo 
O:::: ... .t ·""' . U.>:.~C.i..J L U ..:. .ii.l.(:i.h. \, .. ''-' \.'- ... ~ .. :h ..... ·v :.Jn.J u L il .t--'l ;:..~\ ... ..J! .... lll .... l..ia~... 1 .u. Q.~.'-'0 ..o.j ~y . ...;L_,_\ .. -
.. , , . ., rl' 1.. n k ,...., ' wh::tt cwser. Agam, nowever, amenumg L1e ban. ruptcy 'LOGe 
appears to be the preferable choice. Despite their imperfectly resolved 
collective action problems, unsecured creditors have much more at 
stake and can therefore be expected to wield their influence :more 
effectively. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article recommends several changes to the '.vay bankruptcy 
courts and the Bankruptcy Code currently treat corporate voting in 
the chapter 11 context. Each proposal is at bottom a suggestion that 
courts and the Bankruptcy Code should stick more closely to the nor·· 
rnative orincioles reflected in state law comorate voting provisions. . . , 
Amending the Code to effect these proposals could considerably 
improve an already well-crafted network of corporate voting ru les. 
The Article also ofters a preliminary inquiry into the nature of the 
parties' collective action problems in chapter 11. This area seems a 
particularly promising topic for further study. 
- -
